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ABSTRACT

In this monograph, student protests and disturbances are viewed within a broad and well-informed framework, which includes: (1) the growing importance of youth and college students in American society; (2) the changing social position of youth and the rise of a generalized youth subculture; and (3) perspectives on cooperative subcultures, deviant subcultures, and rebellious subcultures. The author examines comparative theories of student protest movements from other cultures, as well as discussing the varied theories which have attempted to explain the American student protest movement. Also included is a fairly comprehensive overview of the historical development of the student movement in our country. In a final section, the author discusses "what is to be done?" and points to the complexity of developing social and educational policy. Several approaches are presented as possibilities for working with student protest and their possible impact is explored. (TL)


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
Youth In Turmoil

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CRIME AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES:

A Monograph Series

Youth in Turmoil

America's Changing Youth Cultures
and Student Protest Movements

by
Jack D. Douglas, Ph. D.
Department of Sociology
University of California, San Diego

National Institute of Mental Health
Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency
5454 Wisconsin Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

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Foreword

The monograph, *Youth in Turmoil: America's Changing Youth Cultures and Student Protest Movements*, was prepared to cast student protests and disturbances within a broad and informed framework. Thus, perspectives on such areas as the growing importance of youth and college students in American society, the changing position of youth and the rise of a generalized youth subculture, cooperative subcultures, deviant subcultures, and rebellious subcultures all help to provide a background for the phenomena of student protest. Following a consideration of protest movements from such perspectives, the author further analyzes them from cross-cultural and cross-national points of view.

The document also considers the question, "What is to be done?" In so doing, Dr. Douglas discusses the complexity of developing social and educational policy, especially as it involves attempting to predict an exceptionally complex future. The consideration is serious, scholarly, and does not support any doctrinaire or ideological stance for understanding or responding to student protests. Several approaches are presented as possibilities for working with student protest. Rationales for these approaches are developed, the assumptions underlying them are considered, and the possible impact of the several approaches is discussed.

This presentation provides a clarity of view that is exceptional regarding such a heated topic. Moreover, Dr. Douglas provides the field an analytical schema—a general perspective, a system of concepts, and a way of approaching protest movement phenomena. Consequently, our techniques of conceptual analysis have been refined.

In order to provide the author complete freedom to develop the various issues of this topic, no detailed specification or outline was set in advance and no substantive changes have been made by the National Institute of Mental Health. The views expressed, therefore, are those of the author.

Saleem A. Shah, Ph.D.
Chief, Center for Studies
of Crime and Delinquency

By a revolutionary situation is here meant one in which confidence in the justice or reasonableness of existing authority is undermined; where old loyalties fade, obligations are felt as impositions, law seems arbitrary, and respect for superiors is felt as a form of humiliation; where existing sources of prestige seem undeserved, hitherto accepted forms of wealth and income seem ill-gained, and government is sensed as distant, apart from the governed and not really "representing" them. In such a situation the sense of community is lost, and the bond between social classes turns to jealousy and frustration. People of a kind formerly integrated begin to feel as outsiders, or those who have never been integrated begin to feel left out. As a group of Sheffield workingmen demanded in 1794: What is the constitution to us if we are nothing to it?

No community can flourish if such negative attitudes are widespread or long-lasting. The crisis is a crisis of community itself, political, economic, sociological, personal, psychological, and moral at the same time. Actual revolution need not follow, but it is in such situations that actual revolution does arise. Something must happen, if continuing deterioration is to be avoided; some new kind of basis of community must be formed.

R. R. Palmer,

The Age of the Democratic Revolution

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Acknowledgments

One inevitably incurs a great many personal debts in writing a book on a subject of such great concern to so many people. Many people whose names I cannot even recall have given me important ideas and bits of information in the endless discussions about youth that go on these days. This book, more than most, is very much a product of its times and its author's situation. Writing it has given me a better understanding and far greater appreciation of Thucydides, though I hope the outcome of our present wars will prove less dismal.

I am especially grateful to my Research Assistant, Carol Warren, who contributed so greatly to the work by her bright scholarship and her deep interest in understanding these mysteries. I am also deeply grateful to Joseph Gusfield, from whom I have learned so much through our endless discussions—and arguments—about youth, some in the heat of battle. I am very grateful to Howard Becker, Paul Campanis, Thomas Green, and David Riesman, who gave me such helpful ideas and criticisms concerning an earlier paper on youth. And, of the many others with whom I have discussed these questions in the past few years, I feel especially indebted to Bennet Berger, Fred Davis, Robert Habenstein, Kenneth Jennings, Stanford Lyman, Jerome Skolnick, and a vast number of other students, faculty, and administrators.

All who have wished this work well owe a great debt to Bonnie Barnett, our inspiring and efficient executive officer, and to her many lovely co-workers, especially Mrs. Colleen Carpenter, Vietta Gray, Mrs. Judy Shanabarger, and Dyan Williams.

Preface

America has always been a land of great conflict. Any society welded together so imperfectly out of many disparate parts, and peopled by such intensely competitive breeds of men, will inevitably be rent by deep and lasting conflicts. And the most intense of these conflicts will inevitably cast up angry men who will use violent means to achieve their ends, however great the costs to their society or to themselves.

Yet, even those of us who know these to be lasting truths about our society have been greatly troubled by the intense conflicts that have torn American society in recent years. We are troubled most because we know how precarious social order is in such a pluralistic nation; and because we know that in any society order will in the end be maintained at any cost, including the fearful loss of the individual freedoms which *have been so dearly won against the many forces of irresponsible power and dark unreason which afflict men.* But we are also troubled because we believe that these conflicts have very real and deep roots in our society, that they are not the result of the machinations of some small cadres of evil men, and that they are related in very important ways to the profound changes that are sweeping our society and the world. We are troubled because we have some reason to fear that they might be the beginnings of another great time of troubles and because we know of no certain solutions—or precedents.

These are surely times when things have partially fallen apart from the center. All forms of authority, even that of the once sacrosanct forms of scientific thought, are being challenged from many sides. The men of power are no longer so powerful, the weak no longer so meek. The myths of power and of hierarchy have been unmasked and rebellion and revolution have risen to challenge the unmasked powers. In some important ways this unmasking, this challenging of hierarchy and absolutism of all forms, is merely an extension of centuries old developments in the Western societies, and certainly so in American society where the forces of rugged individualism and outright anarchy have always been very strong. But in the past decade there has been a sudden burst of a more intense attack on all forms of authority in American society. The most serious uncertainty remaining is whether things will continue to fall apart from the center, and whether police power remains the last bulwark against the mad forces of anarchy.

Many Americans have obviously decided that our society is continuing to fall apart at the center—or, worse, is being intentionally torn apart at the center by evil conspirators—and that the multifaceted attacks on authority must be stopped if we are to preserve any semblance of social order. They have turned wholeheartedly to police power as the only answer. But the ways in which they have done so have only increased the power and number of those very forces they were seeking to repress and their clamor for “law and order” at any price has become a grave threat to our individual freedoms.

For many, the racial issue has been the overriding issue, coloring all others. There are certainly profound emotions, including the darkest fears, among Americans over race and racial violence; and the greatest dangers of bloody conflict still revolve around race, especially in our schools. But for many Americans in recent years the fears and anger over racial questions and racial violence have been superseded by the fears and anger over white radicalism, especially the radicalism and violence of college students. And there is good reason for this, even if the good reasons are not the real ones. The simple fact is that Black revolution, while potentially very destructive in many important ways, could never be successful; for no minority constituting a poor and repressed ten percent of our population could ever succeed in revolution. But, if there were a growing and massive revolutionary movement among the white majority, especially among the most intelligent and best educated group of that majority, and especially one which in many ways allied itself with the revolutionary groups among the anguished Blacks, then there would indeed be good reason to fear a massive revolution.

As the student protest movements and their accompanying violence have grown steadily in recent years, such questions have come to occupy an ever more serious place in American thinking and the demands of the public for effective action to stop them have grown sharply. At the same time, there has been a bewildering profusion of different and often conflicting explanations of the student movements. The demands for action have grown so shrill, while the knowledge about these events has remained so rudimentary, that there is now grave danger of an escalation in the already obvious tendency of many political leaders to act in ways that both curtail our individual freedoms and cause further growth of the violence, which in turn leads to further incursions on our freedoms. Regardless of our individual values and of the social policies or sides we support, few would doubt that there is great need for balanced appraisals of the forces that have produced the youth movements and of those movements themselves.

The difficulty, of course, comes in writing a balanced appraisal.

We are all involved. Indeed, such involvement is necessary for gaining an understanding of the social reasons for what is done. But involvement inevitably creates the problem of bias, of letting one's descriptions and analyses be determined unknowingly—or cunningly—by the nature of one's involvement. Certainly there are no guarantees of honesty or trustworthiness in this world. Each reader must be on guard and provide his own critical evaluations. But in the matter of understanding youth and student protesters today there is no danger that this ancient caveat will be overlooked. Rather, the danger is that readers, or potential readers who seek to categorize the author before they read, will react to what they think of the author, or his publisher, or his social position, rather than reason with the author about the state of the world, about what has happened and what will happen.

One of the primary purposes in writing this book has been to subvert such conspiracies of unreason. While the reader must judge in terms of what I have created, rather than in terms of what I might say I have done, I have tried at each point to understand the meanings of things to the different sides involved, though I have chosen to concentrate my efforts on the most, though by no means only, active element, the challenger—the students. There is a terrible lack of careful descriptive accounts of persons and events, but I have tried whenever possible to use such accounts, especially accounts by insiders, to illustrate how I have arrived at such understandings. But any reader must realize that lying behind any such illustrations and any understandings of very specific events is a more general understanding that has been partially gained from my own experience as a member of this society, as a young student (not so long ago) and as a teacher of sociology in a number of colleges and universities.

One of the overriding arguments and messages of the entire work is that a more general understanding is essential for understanding the specific movements and events. As will be especially apparent, I do not believe it is possible to adequately explain the recent American student protest movements without first putting them in the general context of the longer-run development of the generalized youth and student subcultures. These form the background, the general context, of the more recent and more specific student protest movements and, thereby, give them much of their meaning, both for the participants and for the other members of our society.

But even putting the movements in their context and analyzing them in depth will not provide us with any certain understandings. There is too little reliable information on what has happened; and human events ultimately remain far too problematic—and free—for any such certainty in our understandings of social events. Whatever our own values and evaluations of these recent events, we shall still

have to rely on whatever wisdom we can summon to choose the best path of action.

My own goal in this work has been to avoid any narrow value or political commitments as much as possible, so as to get at the most useful knowledge possible for all of us. My commitments to individual freedoms, human life and many other American values will be obvious to all Americans. But these are broad value commitments shared by most Americans on all sides of the current conflicts. While we would certainly find many disagreements over the specific meanings of such terms as "individual freedoms," we would also find that all sides agree on their general value and on many specifics, though the participants do sometimes attack each other as "commies" and "fascist pigs" in the heat of battle. I hope it will be clear by the end of this book that both major sides are a bit of both, but, more importantly, that neither side is much of either.

But, whatever goals we choose, there will be no easy, clear or final solutions to the problems we have defined for ourselves. These conflicts and conflicting groups will be with us and an important part of our social existence as Americans for a long time to come. Just as we will find no heroes or villains in such social tragedies, so will we find no final understandings or solutions. Let our virtue and our fulfillment be found in the search.

Jack D. Douglas
Department of Sociology
University of California, San Diego

Chapter 1. The Growing Importance of Youth and of College Students in American Society

One prime source of satisfaction in the radical's commitment . . . derives from the feeling of contemporaneity, of being in motion with others, and of involvement with a changing, growing tide of radicalism.

Kenneth Keniston,
The Young Radicals

The young have become evermore important in our society. This is true in terms of "objective fact," such as their number and their contributions to society. But it is far more true as a "subjective fact"—a "social reality." Regardless of their numbers or their contributions to society, the young are increasingly important to our society because the members of our society *believe* they are more important, *feel* they are more important, and act in accord with this belief and feeling.

This is more true of college youth than of any other group of the young. It is the college youth who have been paid evermore attention, who have been wooed for years by political parties and groups, who have been endlessly eulogized as the "leaders of tomorrow," and who have been minutely scrutinized by the mass media for portents of the future. Formerly, generations of adults were almost exclusively concerned with the "evils" of lower class youth and paid great attention to gang wars and motorcycle gangs, making such splinter groups as the Hell's Angels world famous. But today these erstwhile celebrities have become has-beens as the mass media have devoted their coverage almost exclusively to the "hell-raising" of campus splinter groups.

There are many important "subjective" reasons for the growing importance of the young, and especially of the young who attend college. But most of these do build to some extent on the "objective" factors, the facts about the growing importance of youth—especially the college educated youth—in our society. At the least, these socially recognized facts form the background against which these more "subjective" factors are judged by the influential members of our society. If there is no "objective" substance to the belief and feeling that the young are of growing importance, then we can be sure that the vast attention paid to them will be transitory, as the interest in the Hell's Angels seems to have been (they *do* still exist, though many people would probably be surprised to learn this). And, if we

expect public and official concern to be transitory, then there is far less reason for any of us to be concerned with social policy concerning college youth.

Our first concern, then, must be with the facts about the importance of youth in our society, especially of the college youth. The facts about youth are all too few (for many reasons discussed in detail in Appendix I), so it is all the more important that we be as aware as possible of the relevant facts that are available.

The Growing Number and Proportion of Youth in American Society

It is common knowledge today that the median age of the American population has been decreasing for a number of years, so that more than half of our population is still safely under the traumatic age of 30. In fact, today the majority of the American population is (approximately) twenty-five years or less. Heralded by the leisure industries as a tidal wave of consumers, and bemoaned by school administrators as an avalanche of pupils, in recent years the young have grown rapidly in absolute number and, far less strikingly, in their percentage of the total population. And census projections make it clear that the number and percentage of the young will continue to increase for at least the next decade.

As can be seen in Series A of Table I, census projections show an expected increase in the number of 18-to-24-year-olds of approximately three million from 1966 to 1970, of three million more by 1975, and of two million more by 1980. The percentage of the total population increases will be from 10.8 in 1966 to 11.8 in 1970, to 12.1 in 1975, and then a drop back to 11.8 by 1980. In the same time periods the age group from 25 to 34 years will show even more marked increases of three million by 1970, six million by 1975, and five million by 1980, representing percentage growths from 11.5 in 1966 to 12.1 in 1970, to 13.8 in 1975, and 14.8 in 1980.

While these will certainly be important changes, the truly striking increases in the number and percentage of the young are not shown in these figures because they had largely occurred just prior to 1966. The reason for this is simple and is probably the most important single fact about the distribution of the American population today: *in the period from approximately 1960 to 1968 the War Babies came of age.*

In the depression years of the 1930's the birth rate in the United States was exceptionally low, so low that the percent of the total population constituted by the 18-to-24-year-old group declined by 1.19, as this 1930's cohort reached the 18-to-24-year group from 1950 to 1960. But the period during and immediately after the war saw the dramatic increase in the birth rate that was commonly called the

Table I
Estimated and Projected Distribution of the Population by Age:
1966 to 1990 ¹

Numbers in thousands. Figures relate to July 1 and include Armed Forces abroad. Boldface figures depend, in whole or part, on projections of births; all percentages are affected by the projections of births.

Age	Series A					
	1966	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
All ages -----	¹ 196,842	208,615	227,929	250,489	274,748	300,131
Under 5 years -----	19,851	21,317	27,210	31,040	33,288	35,015
5 to 13 years -----	36,525	37,224	37,884	45,215	53,497	58,690
14 to 17 years -----	14,300	15,808	16,896	16,005	19,006	23,080
18 to 24 years -----	21,326	24,589	27,535	29,612	28,956	32,459
25 to 34 years -----	22,567	25,315	31,423	36,998	40,699	42,449
35 to 44 years -----	24,225	22,961	22,458	25,376	31,384	36,863
45 to 54 years -----	22,331	23,326	23,532	22,147	21,705	24,542
55 to 64 years -----	17,261	18,490	19,831	21,032	21,236	20,027
65 to 74 years -----	11,568	12,097	13,191	14,457	15,570	16,602
75 years and over -----	6,889	7,488	7,968	8,606	9,407	10,404
Percent -----	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years -----	10.1	10.2	11.9	12.4	12.1	11.7
5 to 13 years -----	18.6	17.8	16.6	18.1	19.5	19.6
14 to 17 years -----	7.3	7.6	7.4	6.4	6.9	7.7
18 to 24 years -----	10.8	11.8	12.1	11.8	10.5	10.8
25 to 34 years -----	11.5	12.1	13.8	14.8	14.8	14.1
35 to 44 years -----	12.3	11.0	9.9	10.1	11.4	12.3
45 to 54 years -----	11.3	11.2	10.3	8.8	7.9	8.2
55 to 64 years -----	8.8	8.9	8.7	8.4	7.7	6.7
65 to 74 years -----	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.7	5.5
75 years and over -----	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.5

Baby Boom. The results of this succession from the Depression Babies (The Baby Bust) to the War Babies (The Baby Boom) can be clearly seen in the census figures of Table II.

From 1960 to 1968 the 18-to-24-year age group increased by 43 percent. Since it is this group from approximately 18 years to 24 years that constitutes the core of what is increasingly coming to be known as "youth" or "the young" (which we shall discuss in more detail in Chapter 2), *The coming of age of the War Babies*, in less than a decade, especially when coupled with the greatly decreased number and percentage of adults in the most productive age group from approximately 35 to 45 years, has been a profound demographic change which has in turn had profound social effects.

From the end of the Second World War through the 1950's there was a great deal of discussion in the mass media of the importance of the Baby Boom during and immediately after the Second World War

¹ Bureau of the Census, *Population Estimates*, Series P-25, No. 381, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Commerce; United States Government Printing Office, December 18, 1967, p. 6.

Table II
Age of the Population in 1968, 1960, and 1950 With Average Annual
Rate of Change ²
 Numbers in thousands. Total population including Armed Forces
 overseas.

Age	Population			Percent distribution		
	July 1, 1968	April 1, 1960	April 1, 1950	July 1, 1968	April 1, 1960	April 1, 1950
All ages -----	201,166	180,007	151,718	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 5 years -----	18,521	20,321	16,243	9.2	11.3	10.7
5 to 13 years -----	37,239	32,726	22,255	18.5	18.2	14.7
14 to 17 years -----	15,053	11,162	8,473	7.5	6.2	5.6
18 to 24 years -----	22,842	15,975	16,150	11.4	8.9	10.6
25 to 34 years -----	23,966	23,007	23,999	11.9	12.8	15.8
35 to 44 years -----	23,649	24,181	21,572	11.8	13.4	14.2
45 to 54 years -----	22,889	20,503	17,403	11.4	11.4	11.5
55 to 64 years -----	17,880	15,573	13,328	8.9	8.7	8.8
65 years and over -----	19,129	16,560	12,295	9.5	9.2	8.1

Age	Change				Average Annual Percent Change	
	1960 to 1968		1950 to 1960		1960- 1968	1950- 1960
	Number	Per- cent	Number	Per- cent		
All ages -----	+21,158	+11.8	+28,200	+18.6	+1.3	+1.7
Under 5 years -----	-1,800	-8.9	+4,073	+25.1	-1.1	+2.2
5 to 13 years -----	+4,513	+13.8	+10,471	+47.1	+1.6	+3.9
14 to 17 years -----	+3,891	+34.9	+2,689	+31.7	+3.6	+2.8
18 to 24 years -----	+6,867	+43.0	-176	-1.1	+4.3	-0.1
25 to 34 years -----	+959	+4.2	-992	-4.1	+0.5	-0.4
35 to 44 years -----	-533	-2.2	+2,609	+12.1	-0.3	+1.1
45 to 54 years -----	+2,386	+11.6	+3,099	+17.8	+1.3	+1.6
55 to 64 years -----	+2,306	+14.8	+2,246	+16.8	+1.7	+1.6
65 years and over -----	+2,569	+15.5	+4,265	+34.7	+1.7	+3.0

to American society. Journalists, government officials and, apparently, everyone else believed that this Baby Boom phenomenon would have profound effects on American society. There were strong demands for social planning to meet the important changes that would result from the Baby Boom. There were many predictions of the great effects this crop of War Babies would have on education, consumption, investment, real estate, and almost every other aspect of American society. There was a great deal of discussion of the great overcrowding in schools that would occur when this unprecedentedly large group of students hit the schools (and the emphasis was generally placed on such striking terms as "hit"). There was widespread speculation about what would happen when this group inundated the col-

² Bureau of the Census, *Population Estimates*, Series P-25, No. 46, Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Commerce; United States Government Printing Office, February 17, 1969, p. 5.

leges and the labor market. There were some expressions of impending doom, though these were generally balanced by the optimistic economic forecasts of businessmen looking at the consumer potential of this wave of young people.

For some unexplained reason, in the 1960's almost all of the speculation, discussion, portentous prediction, and optimistic planning died away almost completely. Just as the pupil invasion was hitting the schools the hardest, especially the State colleges and universities, and just as the demand for public investment in schools and social services was reaching its peak, thereby placing an ever growing demand on the tax base of society, the Baby Boom phenomenon almost disappeared from the public arena. Though some of the grimmest predictions, such as chaos in the schools and widespread unemployment, were effectively prevented by a rapid increase in investment in schools and by the continuing economic prosperity of the Nation, some of the grim predictions had indeed come true. Double and triple sessions in elementary and secondary schools were common, State colleges and universities were, in fact, inundated with new pupils, the demands for all public services for this massive group of (relatively) economically unproductive citizens was very intense, so that taxes on the productive segment of society had to increase very rapidly, and in turn led to a "taxpayers' revolt"; but the public had apparently forgotten that many of these grim details had been effectively forecast by those who knew the demographic details of the Baby Boom.

In terms of their numbers and their proportion of the total population, there could be little doubt that young people, especially those in the 18-24 age group, from 1960 up to the present have grown at an extremely rapid rate, and have, in this sense, become evermore important in our society. These young people have been of growing importance in our society also in that they have placed ever greater demands on public services and, thereby, public tax investment. All this may appear to be of negative importance, rather than of importance because of the contributions of the young to society. It is, nevertheless, a matter of fundamental importance. (It should also be kept in mind that this negative aspect, their cost, is a shortrun phenomenon that will be reversed in the next decade as this group becomes the most productive group of society.)

The Growing Importance of College Students in American Society

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the many strains placed on social services by the young in the past decade have been simply the result of the War Babies coming of age. There have been other, perhaps even more important factors, especially in the causation of the strain on schools and colleges.

There has been an almost steady increase in the percentage of young people enrolled in American schools over the last half century and more. In the early part of this century there was an accelerating rate of attendance of elementary schools and secondary schools. Today the great majority of the young under 18 years of age are enrolled in schools and only the sudden increases in the number of students due to the Baby Boom and some upgrading of standards caused any strains on the elementary and secondary schools.

At the same time there was a steady but slow increase in the percentage of people attending college in the early part of the century. In the post-war period, however, this percentage grew rapidly and at a slowly accelerating, if erratic, rate. As can be seen in Table III, there was a 2 percent increase from 1946 to 1951, a 9.5 percent increase from 1951 to 1956 (probably due partly to the men returning from Korea), a 4 percent increase from 1956 to 1961, and an 8 percent increase from 1961 to 1966. But it must also be noted that this percentage increase from 22 percent to 46 percent did not simply lead to a doubling in the absolute number of college students. Because the War Babies came of age in the late 1950's and early 1960's, there

Table III
Enrollment in Institutions of Higher Education Compared With
Population Aged 18-21: United States, Fall 1946 to Fall 1967³

Year	Popula- tion 18- 21 years of age ¹	Enroll- ment	Number enrolled per 100 persons 18-21 yrs. of age	Year	Popula- tion 18- 21 years of age ²	Enroll- ment	Number enrolled per 100 persons 18-21 yrs. of age
1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1946	9,403,000	2,078,095	22.1	1957	8,844,000	3,036,938	34.3
1947	9,276,000	2,338,226	25.2	1958	8,959,000	3,226,038	36.0
1948	9,144,000	2,403,396	26.3	1959	9,182,000	3,364,861	36.6
1949	8,990,000	2,444,900	27.2	1960	9,550,000	3,582,726	37.5
1950	8,945,000	2,281,298	25.5	1961	10,252,000	3,860,643	37.7
1951	8,742,000	2,101,962	24.0	1962	10,761,000	4,174,936	38.8
1952	8,542,000	2,134,242	25.0	1963	11,154,000	4,494,626	40.3
1953	8,441,000	2,231,054	26.4	1964	11,319,000	4,950,173	43.7
1954	8,437,000	2,446,693	29.0	1965	12,127,000	5,526,325	45.6
1955	8,508,000	2,653,034	31.2	1966	12,888,000	^b 5,885,000	45.7
1956	8,701,000	2,918,212	33.5	1967	13,632,000	^b 6,348,000	46.6

^a These Bureau of the Census estimates are as of July 1 preceding the opening of the academic year. They include Armed Forces overseas.

^b Estimated.

³ Simon, Kenneth A., and Vance Grant, *Digest of Educational Statistics*, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 68.

Note: Beginning in 1960, data are for 50 States and the District of Columbia; data for earlier years are for 48 States and the District of Columbia. Beginning in 1953, enrollment figures include resident and extension degree-credit students; data for earlier years exclude extension students.

were more than four million more 18-21 year olds by 1967. *The absolute number of college students had tripled in twenty years.*

The rapidly growing percentage of the population in the 18-21-year-age group enrolled in college and universities has been the result of a number of basic changes taking place in American society which have increasingly made formal education and research the foundation of much of the rest of our society. Since these changes are continuing and, very possibly, accelerating, we can expect education and research to continue to grow in importance and to involve an ever greater number of young people.

The number of the young going to college has grown rapidly, primarily because a college education has become evermore important in our society. A college education has most obviously become more important from the economic vantage point of a young person considering whether he should go to college and then to work or opt for immediate employment after leaving high school. From the commonsense standpoint of most members of our society, a college education has been closely associated with financial success: commonsensically, going to college means far more money. There have, in fact, been a great number of statistical studies done to show how much greater the lifetime incomes of college graduates are, and these kinds of figures have become the spearheads of many advertising campaigns. The results of a typical study of this sort are presented in Table IV.

Table IV
Estimated Total Income of Males From the Year of Specified
Number of Years of School Completed Through
Age 64 by Region and Race, 1959 ^a

Years of School Completed	Non-South White Males	Non-South Non-White Males	South White Males	South Non-White Males
8	\$224,000 ^a	\$172,000 ^a	\$197,000 ^a	\$115,000 ^a
12	300,000 ^b	195,000 ^b	274,000 ^b	138,000 ^b
16	371,000 ^c	215,000 ^c	346,000 ^c	157,000 ^c

^a Assumes that eight years of school are completed in the year that the person is 14 years of age.

^b Assumes that 12 years of school are completed in the year that the person is 18 years of age.

^c Assumes that 16 years of school are completed in the year that the person is 22 years of age.

The conclusions of these studies are always rosy—for the college graduate or the prospective graduate. The figures always show him winning by \$50,000 to \$100,000 over the high school graduate and far outdistancing the hapless dropout. The college degree would appear to be a guaranteed meal ticket and, indeed, a certificate of

^a Lassiter, Roy L. *The Association of Income and Educational Achievement*, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1966, p. 7.

citizenship in the affluent society. But there are some basic problems with these rosy prospects.

The Economic Values of a College Education: Objective and Subjective

The most basic problem with the rosy picture of the economic value of a college education derived from such correlational studies is a reasonably simple methodological one. Almost all of these studies do nothing more than correlate college attendance or college graduation with the incomes of the individuals. Almost none of them attempt to hold constant various other factors which most of us would recognize commonsensically to be potential causes of the correlations between college graduation and economic status. For example, it is perfectly clear that individuals who graduate from college are far more likely to come from affluent families and will have the kinds of accumulated capital, personal contacts, and previously learned business acumen that will lead to higher incomes, so that on this basis alone one would certainly expect that individuals who graduate from college will have higher incomes than those who don't. Yet the entire relationship could be due to the correlation between these other factors and graduation from college, rather than any relationship between graduation and, eventually, income. This point has, in fact, been made very well by Vaizey in his book *The Economics of Education*:

This leads to a point of major importance; there is a multiple correlation between parental wealth, parental income, access to educational opportunity, motivation in education, access to the best jobs, and 'success' in later life. Above all, there is sheer native wit and ability which will 'out' despite all additional handicaps. It is dreadfully easy to involve oneself in a chicken-and-egg controversy: 'which comes first, the income or the education?' especially in old and class-ridden societies.

It follows then, that all the statistics may go to show is that incomes are unequal, and that education is unequally distributed; there may be no necessary causal relationship between education and income.⁵

At least one important study, however, has attempted to hold constant the other factors in order to determine just what relationships do exist between college graduation and income. In this study, Wolfle and Smith showed that there do exist significant relationships at the high school and college levels between such factors as standing in

⁵ Vaizey, J., quoted in *Economic Aspect of Higher Education*, edited by Seymour E. Harris, Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, March 1964, p. 50.

the class, intelligence scores, and family background. But they also found that more education was directly related to higher income over the long run.

In general, the results confirmed common sense. Male high school graduates who stood high in their classes tended to earn more than those who stood low in their high school classes. Those who made high scores on intelligence tests later earned higher salaries than did those who made low scores on intelligence tests. The ones who came from more favorable family backgrounds had higher incomes than those who came from less favored portions of the socio-economic scale. (Not enough of the women were employed to justify statistical analysis.)

Superimposed on these three trends, and in a sense overriding all three, was clear evidence of substantial salary differences associated with differences in the amount of education beyond high school. For the men within any given level of high school class rank (for example those in the top ten per cent) or for the men within any given range of intelligence test scores (for example from the sixtieth to the eightieth percentile), the median salary rose steadily with larger amounts of post-high school education.

High school grades, intelligence-test scores, and father's occupation were correlated with the salaries being earned fifteen to twenty years after graduation from high school, but the amount of education beyond high school was more clearly, more distinctly related to the salaries being earned.⁶

There are, however, still some important problems, even with this kind of careful analysis of the relations between factors. First of all, it is entirely possible, and would appear to have commonsense justification, that the individuals who go to college are individuals with higher motivation. Since it may well be that individuals who succeed economically are individuals with higher motivation, it may be that the individuals who wind up economically successful would have done so whether they went to college or not. There is no clear evidence concerning this point. Secondly, most studies of relationships between education and income, including the few really good studies, such as the one by Wolfle and Smith, are unable to take into consideration the large amount of income foregone and invested during the years of education. And, thirdly, they are generally unable to take into consideration what Seymour Harris and others have called the "discount problem."⁷ That is, income at the time an indi-

⁶ Wolfle, Dael, and Joseph G. Smith quoted in Seymour E. Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁷ Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

vidual is going to college may be of far greater value to him than it will be a few decades later, depending on how much one chooses to discount a college education, which is certainly a factor largely dependent on individual preferences (or utility).

The actual relations between income and education are clearly very complex. There may well be no general positive relationship between actual income and degree of formal education. If there is, the difference is not terribly great for most individuals, but the general relationship may not be nearly so important as specific relationships. What does seem to be very clear is that there is a direct positive relationship between technical education and income and that this relationship has been growing rapidly in recent years. It is, in fact, only in rather technical fields that there is any direct relationship between what an individual learns in formal education and the nature of the job that he performs through his career. Wolfle, for example, found that in the natural sciences, 42 percent of the graduates entered corresponding occupations, whereas, in psychology the percentage was only 20 percent, in the social sciences only 13 percent, in the humanities and arts only 24 percent, and so on.⁸ Over the years even these relations may greatly decrease as many of the more successful individuals in technical fields enter managerial occupations where their technical skill is not so directly related to the job. Individuals who graduate in the general education courses, such as English, philosophy, and so on, probably do not receive any great economic advantage from their formal education unless they go on to business school, law school, medical school, or some other form of professional training of a technical nature.

However, after having considered how uncertain the objective facts about relationships between economics and formal education are, it is of crucial importance to note that this may not be nearly so important in determining what has happened to education as the "social reality" of the relationship between college and success. Whether it is or is not true, most members of our society have believed for at least a century that graduation from college will lead to far more money, far more financial success. Perhaps this belief was largely the result of the fact that in the 18th and 19th centuries college was largely attended only by the already affluent. In fact, certainly most people who graduated from college were financially very well off, or were destined to become so by assuming lucrative jobs in their fathers' businesses. However it came about, this belief in the great financial value of a college education became a firmly entrenched "social reality" by the 20th century and has served to create a strong motivation for individuals to attend college. It became a basic force behind the immigrant's dream of sending his children to college.

Even more importantly, it seems highly likely that college in more

recent days has come to be seen by young people as a gateway to something of at least equal importance to financial success. College has come increasingly to be seen as the gateway to social respectability, prestige, and interesting kinds of work. Certainly any young man who reads the newspapers, or listens to his reasonably knowledgeable parents discuss such matters, would recognize that the average carpenter, plumber or electrician earns two or three times more money than does a typical elementary or high school teacher. Indeed, there are probably some cities in which the trash collectors with very low educational levels earn significantly more money than do the teachers. While any high school graduate advised of these facts might be saddened by them, and might certainly prefer that they were not so (unless he is already dedicated to one of the higher paying jobs), there is little reason to believe that most individuals are profoundly affected by such facts. It seems apparent that most of the young people would prefer a far less well-paying job if they find the work of interest and, especially, if they find it prestigious and important in itself.

The college degree has increasingly become a gateway—a “license”—not merely to generalized prestige, but to very specific kinds of jobs, such as teaching, which are not greatly demanding, but which individuals expect to be far more interesting than occupations that would be open to them without the college degree. It might very well be that this social belief is also false, as indeed, many of those who have taught, especially in the elementary and secondary levels, would urge is true; but this, too, is not very important. Today it is a growing “social reality” to the young that the kinds of jobs that college leads to are more interesting and prestigious than other jobs. For this reason, then, a college education has become far more important in our society, especially to the highly motivated, hard-working young people, even if there is not a positive economic relationship of significant degree.

But colleges and universities have become vastly more important in our society than such practical and “subjective” considerations might lead one to expect. As we shall see at greater length below, our society has increasingly become a technological society, a society in which the basic source of wealth and the basic mental and emotional preoccupation is increasingly the result and goal of technological knowledge and production. As this has happened, the so-called knowledge industry has increasingly become the focal point of our society, the social fulcrum point about which the rest of society turns. As the primary centers of technical research and education, the colleges and universities have been at the center of the center: they have been at the center of the knowledge industry. Because of this, the colleges and universities have vastly increased their social

influence in the last few decades. In his work on *Notes on the Post Industrial State*, Daniel Bell has excellently summed up this increasingly central position of the universities in our society:

The university, which is the place where theoretical knowledge is sought, tested and codified in a disinterested way, becomes the primary institution of the new society. Perhaps it is not too much to say that if the business firm was the key institution of the past one hundred years because of its role in organizing production for the mass creation of products, the university will become the central institution of the next hundred years because of its role as the new source of innovation and knowledge.

In addition, everyone is aware of how much the Federal Government, and, increasingly, local governments are dependent upon the universities for advice for the basic policies by which the government is run. Everyone is aware that industry has turned increasingly to the colleges and universities for such advice. In fact, the colleges and universities have probably become seen as far more the center of the knowledge industry and of the society than they actually are; yet, again, the power of the universities is important as a "social reality"—beyond the objective facts of such power. Indeed, so great has been this belief in the influence of the colleges and universities, that there has been a very specific form of anti-intellectualism, that of *anti-academism*, growing throughout the society in recent decades as individuals come increasingly to resent the power of the universities, their faculties, and students. (This resentment is now breaking forth in great force in the current social debate over the problems of the colleges and the universities.)

As the colleges and universities have been seen increasingly as of vital importance in society, as perhaps the cornerstone of the society's economic development, artistic glory, intellectual achievement, and national defense, they have come to be seen increasingly as the source of social influence. The colleges and universities, therefore, have come increasingly to be seen as the wellsprings of national leadership. As the advertisements and the graduation oratory put it, the colleges and universities have become the "trainers" of "tomorrow's leaders." Since most people in our society are very much interested in social influence and power for its own sake, and since prestige, economic success, and all kinds of other things can plausibly be believed to go along with such influence and power, it is no wonder that there has grown a "panic to get one's children into college." The panic has grown as well among the young who do not wish to be left out in the society's development or left out of inter-

* Wolfle, quoted in Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

esting and valued paths of life—and this panic has led to much resentment on the part of those subjected to it, the students. High school has come increasingly to be seen by those with much motivation as a stepping-stone to college, and, as the enrollment and graduation numbers have spiraled in the colleges, the panic to get into the graduate schools has grown. College students, at least once they face getting a job as seniors or graduates, have come increasingly to feel that the B.A. or B.S. is not very significant, that in order to get that added economic edge, that added edge of influence, that added edge of prestige, one must have an M.A. and, of course, the panic among those with M.A.'s has grown, so the desire for Ph.D.'s has grown rapidly. The result has been a rapid spiraling upward in degree aspirations and in the number of degrees granted. As we have seen, the number of college graduates has grown very rapidly in the last 20 years, and the number of advanced degrees has grown even more rapidly. There are already approximately 5 percent of the population between the ages of 25-34 years enrolled in some form of formal education and this percentage is still growing rapidly. It is now relatively common for individuals to remain "students" until the age of 30, and vast numbers over the age of 30 are still tied to universities through thesis committees.

Numbers, Power, and Action

The numbers of the young, especially of college youth, and the growing power of the universities have been of fundamental importance in several ways in the development of the political activist groups, the student protest movements. They have, of course, been important in producing the focusing of the mass media on college youth: now that they are more important and have more present and future power from both their numbers and their central position in our society, the adult world is vitally concerned with what they do, and certainly with their apparent attacks on the adult world. In the growth of their sheer numbers, their proportion of our society, their subjective importance to the adults, and their financial power as consumers, the young have come to have an ever greater effect on the nature of everyday life in our society: they are everywhere and everywhere they go they carry their own subcultural styles of dress, speech, behavior, and values. In terms of numbers alone, those under thirty have come to be the basic element of the public context of our everyday lives: movies, television, books, stores, cars, and almost anything else meant for the mass audience or mass consumption must take youth as *the* basic element in the mass market—youth sets the tune, quite literally in the case of popular music. Popular music is youthful music.

But there are some far less obvious ways in which the numbers and proportions of youth give them power and thus help to produce

youthful activists. Very importantly, the rapid growth in their absolute numbers, especially, once again, in higher education, produces some qualitative differences in political power and action. In the first place, it is probably quite true that there has been no great change in the number of committed radical youth in colleges, though it is also true that there have been recent changes in this area. We shall examine some more of the details of this question later, such as the recent changes and the changing proportion of college youth who are highly liberal, but Seymour Martin Lipset has adequately summarized the general findings on this point of the small proportion of outright radicals:

It remains true, as Herbert Marcuse pointed out recently, that the majority of the students in all countries are politically quiescent and moderate in their views. According to national surveys of student opinion taken by the Harris Poll in 1965 and the Gallup Poll in 1968, approximately one-fifth of the students have participated in civil rights or political activities (17 percent in 1964-1965, the year of the Berkeley revolt, and 20 percent in 1967-1968, the year of the McCarthy and Kennedy campaigns). The radical activist groups generally have tiny memberships. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) claims a total membership of about 30,000 out of a national student body of 7 million of which about 6,000 pay national dues. A Harris Poll of American students taken in the spring of 1968 estimates that there are about 100,000 radical activists or somewhere between 1 and 2 percent of the college population. A Gallup survey also conducted in the spring of 1968 reports that 7 percent of male students indicate that they will refuse to go, if drafted. Given that the activists are such a small minority, the question must be raised as to who are they (sic), and what are the factors that contribute to activist strength.⁹

But even if there had been no increase at all in the percentages of radical youth, which is certainly not the case, the vast increase in the absolute numbers would be sufficient to produce a vastly larger absolute number that would have more absolute power and be more socially noticeable, since attention is determined more by such absolute magnitudes than proportionate magnitudes. Martin Meyerson, making use of roughly the same figures as Lipset, has made this point very well by making a few simple calculations and arguing from them:

⁹ Lipset, Seymour Martin, "The Activists: a Profile," p. 46-57 in *Confrontation*, Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, eds., New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968, p. 51.

With five and a half million students, a third of whom are women, American colleges and universities have a larger population than Denmark, Ireland, or any one of a majority of the independent nations in the United Nations. At such a scale, higher education increasingly contains the divergences and convergences of the larger American culture. With these vast numbers, paradoxically, even a small minority may be large. If 98 percent of the students are "silent," and the other 2 percent dissenting, the latter category would have over 100,000 students, a large figure for any kind of protest. (No single national group devoted to student protest is that large; for example, the Students for a Democratic Society claimed a national membership of over 3,000 in mid-1965.) However, even a relatively small number can, if concentrated at a few influential institutions, have a potent national impact.¹⁰

But I believe there is far more to it than such objective considerations of power. The absolute numbers and the proportions do give the young more power, a power which we shall see is being mobilized by the development of a generalized youth subculture and a student subculture, but they also produce a far greater subjective *sense of power* than the objective facts taken together would justify. The profound egocentrism of youth, that Thomas Wolfe feeling that they are immortal, that they are the finest, the most beautiful, the strongest who have ever lived, and that what they do is the most important thing ever done—all of this gives youth a sense of power, a feeling of the great things they will surely do as soon as they can. And their proverbial impatience makes them want to rush in and get it done right now: "Never mind the cautions! Forget all the miserable failures of history! *We* know how! *We* can do it!" This straining against all constraints to take over, to do it one's own way, is all an ancient part of youth. But in a time of such rapid absolute and proportional growth in the number and apparent power of youth, of those who will surely agree with one because they are like him, the sense of power found among youth is very heady indeed. It is a time when the young over-reach their power, but in so doing they produce profound social change, though rarely what they seek. Herbert Moller may be wrong in arguing that all the basic changes in Western society have come during periods of rapid demographic growth (increases in the percentages of youth), but he is surely getting at an important point.¹¹

¹⁰ Meyerson, Martin, "The Ethos of the American College Student: Beyond the Protests," pp. 266-291, in *The Contemporary University: U.S.A.*, Robert S. Morison, ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966, p. 267.

¹¹ Moller, Herbert, "Youth as a Force in the Modern World," pp. 237-260, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Geneva, Switzerland: the Hague, 1968.

As emperors and corporals glory at the sight of their mighty hosts striding the land, so do the youth today exult in the power of the *swarming tribes* that come together to celebrate the unborn world they feel they must create. But, as emperors before have been tempted to over-reach themselves by the sense of power that comes from the marching hordes, so have the youth been tempted to over-reach themselves by their exultation in their new-found power. The fact of power can be used to create, but the sense of power feeds on itself and destroys where it would create.

Chapter 2. The Changing Position of Youth and the Rise of a Generalized Youth Subculture

The first typical adolescent of modern times was Wagner's Siegfried: the music of Siegfried expressed for the first time that combination of (provisional) purity, physical strength, naturism, spontaneity and joie de vivre which was to make the adolescent the hero of our twentieth century, the century of adolescence. What made its appearance in Wagnerian Germany was to enter France at a later date, in the years around 1900. The "youth" which at this time was adolescence soon became a literary theme and a subject of concern for moralists and politicians. People began wondering seriously what youth was thinking, and inquiries were made by such writers as Massis and Henriot. Youth gave the impression of secretly possessing new values capable of reviving an aged and sclerosed society. A like interest had been evidenced in the Romantic period, but not with such specific reference to a single age group, and moreover it had been limited to literature and the readers of that literature. Awareness of youth became a general phenomenon, however, after the end of the First World War, in which the troops at the front were solidly opposed to the older generations in the rear. The awareness of youth began by being a feeling common to ex-servicemen, and this feeling was to be found in all the belligerent countries, even in the America of Dos Passos. From that point, adolescence expanded: it encroached upon childhood in one direction, maturity in the other. Henceforth marriage, which had ceased to be a "settling down," would not put an end to it: the married adolescent was to become one of the most prominent types of our time, dictating its values, its appetites and its customs. Thus our society has passed from a period which was ignorant of adolescence to a period in which adolescence is the favourite age. We now want to come to it early and linger in it as long as possible.

Philippe Aries,
Centuries of Childhood

Social scientists have long disagreed over most basic questions concerning the nature of the youth in American society. As we have noted several times previously, the basic reason for such continuing uncertainties and conflicts over questions concerning youth in our society is that there is so little reliable evidence on youth. (Also, see Appendix I.) Yet the disagreements over the nature of youth in

our society seem to be far greater than warranted by the problems of the information. This would appear to be largely the result of an insistence upon taking extreme positions on the nature of youth. For whatever reason, there seems to be a proliferation of extreme theoretical positions on questions concerning youth in our society.

On no question concerning youth has there been greater conflict than that concerning the existence or nonexistence of a youth subculture in American society. For many years, a large percentage of sociologists seem to have followed the tradition of psychological thought on what is called "adolescence."¹ This tradition of thought has argued in some detail that adolescence is a socially defined state (some would call it a "role") directly related to the necessary biological transition from childhood to adulthood. For many years they believed that, since all individuals had to go through this biological change, and since there seemed to be certain necessary psychological conditions associated with these necessary biological changes, then society would necessarily take note of this period in life by surrounding it with certain beliefs and rules. Indeed, many psychologists and sociologists came to see "adolescence" as one of the great problems of life; and the "problem of adolescence" was used to explain everything from the sports of the young to juvenile delinquency. Much of this form of thought can be seen in the vast number of books which include in their title the now forbidden word "Adolescence." This tradition of thought, however, was largely relegated to various forms of social work and other activities in which the practitioners had to deal with the public conceptions of such matters after the cultural anthropologists began their extensive cross-cultural comparisons of the "ages of life." Margaret Mead's famous study, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, and several of her other less well-known works were specifically directed at answering the question of whether adolescence is a biologically or culturally defined phenomenon. Her answer, of course, was that adolescence was very much a culturally defined phenomenon and in societies such as Samoa was in no way associated with a time of troubles, an age of *Angst*. On the contrary, she went so far as to argue that in Samoa this traditional period of turmoil was a period of relative happiness. (Indeed, many of us have long felt that she overdid the matter by depicting adolescence in Samoa as a period of bucolic joy, one intended to be envied by American youth who felt hemmed in by Puritanical rules.)

The biological theory of adolescence and adolescent roles in society was succeeded by the cultural theory of adolescence. This theoretical perspective is probably best represented by the now famous

¹ See, for example, Hans Sebald, ed., *Adolescence: A Sociological Analysis*, New York: Appleton Century-Crafts, 1968.

study by James Coleman of *The Adolescent Society*.² Through his questionnaire studies of high school students (which we have criticized in some detail in Appendix I), Coleman argued that there was very clear evidence that American high school students identified themselves as a distinct group (of "adolescents," of "youth," or of what?) and that they shared many values with each other which they enforced upon each other and which were quite distinct from the values of their parents. In addition, he argued that the high school students were primarily concerned with what their peers thought of them and their actions: this adolescent society was very much a peer-oriented society.

. . . our society has within its midst a set of small teen-age societies, which focus teen-age interests and attitudes on things far removed from adult responsibilities, and which may develop standards that lead away from those goals established by the larger society.³

The theory of adolescent subcultures developed by Coleman and various other social scientists was quickly and effectively criticized by many other social scientists. Both Epperson and Grinder argued that Coleman had incorrectly interpreted the meanings of answers to his questions in such a way as to falsely support his hypothesis that there exists a highly autonomous "youth culture" that operates to partially subvert the values and goals of adults in American society:

Coleman asked his subjects, for example, whether "disapproval from parents" or "breaking with a friend" would be more perturbing, and appears to have regarded the two events as emotionally equivalent. Not surprisingly, he found 43 percent of his subjects would prefer to incur the disfavor of their parents. Epperson rephrased the question to read "parents' disapproval" and "friends' disapproval," and found that only 20 percent would rebuke their parents.⁴

But the most important and general critique of the theory of the highly autonomous and oppositional youth subculture is that by Bennet Berger. In essence, Berger argued that Coleman and the other theorists of the adolescent subculture had overlooked what he considered to be a crucial fact, that is, that the values and activities expressed by adolescents, or, at least, high school adolescents, were not actually in conflict with the values and behavior patterns of their parents. He argued, for example, that the emphasis on sports, getting along with other people, being friendly or nice, and so on, were really very much encouraged by parents and were very relevant

² Coleman, J., *The Adolescent Society*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1961.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Grinder, Robert F., "Distinctiveness and Thrust in the American Youth Culture," pp. 7-19, in *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1969, p. 11.

to the future lives of the adolescents:

Athletics, extracurricular activities, dating, popularity, cliques, cars, dances, the mass media—the whole paraphernalia of adolescent life—is surely not nearly as irrelevant to adult futures as Coleman appears to think. For most students (the half that will never get to college, and the more than half who won't finish) qualities like popularity, charm, sociability, attractiveness will be very valuable to them in later life In this light, the adolescent subculture may easily be regarded as a milieu marked by the dominance of plenty of mechanisms of anticipatory socialization for adulthood.⁵

Much of the controversy over the existence, or nonexistence, of a generalized youth culture in our society is due to two crucial problems:

1. There is a certain lack of clarity in the use of fundamental terms and an implicit disagreement over the use of such terms by those involved in the controversy.
2. Many of the participants in the controversy have failed to note the importance of the pluralistic nature of American society, so that they have failed to see that one can have a generalized youth culture in which millions are involved in different ways, but which is rejected and even opposed by millions of other young people.

Each of these problems warrants some specific consideration before we attempt to resolve the question of the existence of a youth culture and the question of its significance in American society.

What Is a Youth Culture?

There is not much disagreement among the students of youth concerning the most basic meaning of "youth culture." Almost all social scientists agree that the only such culture worth discussing is a *subculture*. All forms of evidence would seem clearly to indicate that, if there is a *general* youth culture throughout American society, then it must be a subculture. That is, it must be merely a variation of the culture of adult American society even if it is partially in opposition to that adult culture. In a general survey of social scientists concerning this question, Gottlieb and Ramsey found that there is, in fact, general agreement that there can only be a youth subculture. Until the last few years, there has been no significant doubt that the vast majority of American youth accept and identify with general American culture. Many of the social critics, in fact,

⁵ Berger, Bennet, "Adolescence and Beyond," pp. 394-408, in *Social Problems*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Spring 1963, p. 400.

have argued that youth is generally marked by its great subservience or conformity to the general goals, if not always the specific manifestations, of adult American society. There have been a few social thinkers who have argued that this apparent conformity of youth with adult values and goals is only apparent, not real. They have seen it as a mask used by the youth to manipulate adult society. Colin MacInnes, for example, who has presented what is probably the most sophisticated and worthwhile use of this idea, has argued that "The young have two ways of defeating the old, and replacing them in power. One is to adopt, at an early age, the protective colouring of elderly social *mores*, and outwit the old by pretending to be like them. The other is to confront their elders, and rebel."⁶ While this view of social life as a mask, a "costume party," as some have called it, is a very powerful theoretical point of view for understanding our complex and pluralistic society, it does not deny that the youth (sub)culture is conformist. On the contrary, even this point of view assumes that they are being very conformist in their behavior, in part precisely because they are so secretly alienated from it. (It is also entirely possible that what begins as play-acting may become real commitment. The play-acting attitude may, in fact, be a very useful device for teaching the novitiate how best to become a full-fledged actor.) Therefore, when we use the term "youth culture" it must be understood that we mean "youth *sub*-culture."

The disagreement over the definition of "youth subculture" comes over the questions concerning what should be considered to be part of that subculture, and this argument over the specific definition has a great deal to do with determining whether one believes there is a *general* youth subculture throughout our society. Some social scientists would insist that a "genuine" subculture exists only when there is: (1) a distinctive, shared conception of common membership in a group or social category, (2) further distinctive differences in shared meanings between this group and the larger, supraculture, and (3) some significant distinctive language that helps to set off the subculture from the supraculture. The real difficulty comes in specifying how different the elements must be, how generally shared they must be by the members of the (presumptive) subculture, and whether the sharedness must be of highly specific items (i.e., the *same* linguistic categories or styles of clothing rather than simply more similar to each other than to those of the adults).

Such arguments over definitions seem fruitless. The fundamentally important point seems to be whether the members of society themselves, the adults and youth, conceive of themselves as different groups and, if so, whether such conceptions seem to have significant

⁶ MacInnes, Colin, "Old Youth and Young," *Encounter*, November 1967, pp. 29-35.

effects on their lives. Since it is the meanings of things to them that determine what they will do in everyday life, the abstract, formal definitions of the social scientists will be of value in explaining their actions only insofar as they do in some way parallel the everyday definitions of the members.

When we consider the question from this standpoint it becomes clear that there is a general youth subculture in American society but that this is not a subculture with clear boundaries sharply distinguishing it from other groups in American society. Americans of all ages share certain roughly defined categories of age, and those designating the young (e.g., young people, adolescents, minors, etc.) are very important and definitely distinguish those persons ascribed to this category from others ascribed to the various categories of adulthood (e.g., grown-ups, of age, over 21, old, aged, etc.).

For certain basic reasons which we shall investigate below, the members of our society have developed many very distinct linguistic categories for communicating with each other about different age groups in our society. Once these linguistic categories have been created, they themselves become an independent factor in determining and maintaining social distinctions between the young and the adult world. The linguistic categories communicating these distinctions become important ideas for the members of society, ideas about which many subsidiary ideas are developed. The linguistic categories, then, become a very important aspect, or part of, such social groupings as youth cultures. They become an important reason for the further development and perpetuation of such groups.

However, it is of great importance to note that the age-category distinctions made and shared by members of our society are very complex, situational, and vague in their boundaries and by no means are all of them universally shared. What is most apparent about these age categories is that the linguistic terms used to refer to them are very complex, and this linguistic complexity is directly related to the complexity of the social meanings communicated. The young can be referred to as "boys and girls," "youth," "adolescents," "children," "kids," "teenagers," "minors," "immature," "young men and women," "young people," "under 21," "juveniles," and so on. The same profusion of terms is found in the terms used to refer to the many other age distinctions. As should be clear to anyone accustomed to using these terms, each of them has different meanings and these differences are often so important to us that we have to struggle mightily to find just the right term for the situation and intention we have in mind.

The obvious implication of the complex and problematic use of these many social categories to communicate about the nature of youth in our society is that the members of our society do themselves

distinguish some general kind of youth culture from the other groupings they would distinguish in our society. They do not merely distinguish age differences, but, rather, believe that these age differences are associated with certain other important differences. But the nature of these differences is quite vague and problematic for the members of our society. This in itself should lead us to expect to find only vague and problematic differences between a "youth culture" and "adult society" in our society. In general, this is what we do find, but we also find that the changing position of youth in our society is leading to an increasingly clear distinction with increasingly clear uses of linguistic categories to communicate this distinction.

The reason we have so many terms and have to struggle to use the "right" term (and yet so often fail to use the "right" term) is that the social meanings of age are extremely *problematic* for us. Except for a very few, the terms themselves, such as "under 21," do not refer to sharply distinguished categories. When, where, how, and why someone becomes "adult" or a member of any of the other many categories is quite unclear, or problematic, for us. The members of our society have some rather complicated ideas and theories about "maturity," "immaturity," "responsible," "grown-up," and so on, which they use, in conjunction with their intentions in any given situation (such as to flatter, cajole, put in one's place, belittle) to determine which category seems "right" for that situation. These ideas and theories, like the age categories themselves, do not refer to specific, external phenomena which the members can "put their fingers on." Instead, they are more of the nature of ambiguous, background (or deep) meanings which give one a "feeling of appropriateness" about the use of the age categories. This is a major reason why there is so much confusion and so much argument between the members of our society over who is and who is not "mature," "a kid," "an adult."

The Nature of the General Youth Culture in American Society

So far all we can conclude is that there exists a general youth culture in American society in the sense that individuals of a roughly defined age are generally, though problematically, imputed to the category of youth. This is the minimal definition of youth culture in our society, but if that were all there is to the youth culture it would not be of much significance to anyone. But there is more to it than this.

There are certain important general dimensions to the youth culture in our society, which do set youth off from other categories. First of all, there are several obvious characteristics of youth in our society which we should certainly consider to be characteristics of

the youth culture even though most people have failed to see them as such. The vast majority of youth in our society have certain things in common in their social position which produce certain common characteristics. The vast majority of the young up to the age of 18 are enrolled in primary or secondary schools. From the age of 18 to 21 or 22 almost half today are involved in college education. It is clear then, that the vast majority of the young, at least up to the age of 22, are pupils. They have common concerns as pupils, common knowledge to some degree, and even common feelings about school, though the degree of sharedness of these feelings would be much less. The vast majority of the young also live with their parents, so the vast majority will take their relations with their parents to be very important to them, especially because they also depend on their parents. While social scientists and the journalists of the mass media have chosen to concentrate on the common problems that the young have with their parents, all we can be sure of is that they will have joys and problems in dealing with their parents, just as anyone living with and depending on anyone else will have certain joys and problems concerned with that person. The young also have a common concern with learning how to deal with other people sexually. Since this is not something they are born with or something they learn as children, they are very much concerned about learning about it during the period of youth, especially into the early 20's. In this respect, the great majority of youth are involved in the many concerns, problems, joys, tactics, and so on, of dating relations in our society. While none of these sexual concerns or dating concerns are completely eliminated with increasing age, they are far more characteristic of the young than of children or of the older groups in our society. While all of these differences characterizing the young in our society are quite important, they are not the characteristics of youth normally associated with youth culture by social scientists or journalists. Somehow, they are too obvious to take as the distinguishing characteristics or the causes of a youth culture.

When most social scientists or other members of our society speak of the American youth culture, they normally have in mind certain leisure activities and certain styles of life which they believe are characteristic of American youth and which they believe are in some way very important characteristics of American youth. This leisure or style aspect of "youth culture" is especially clear when people refer to "teenagers."

Unfortunately, most of those who have believed this have failed to see the obvious complexity of "leisure" activities among the American young and the less obvious complexity of relations of the young to them. As with most other things in such a pluralistic so-

ciety, there are many different kinds of "leisure" activities for the young and many different ways of relating these activities to involvement in or alienation from adult society. Grinder, for example, has argued very convincingly from his study of high school participation in peer group activities that much of this activity is adult sponsored, "wholesome" activity of the "school-club" or "extra-curricular" type. Many of these activities are intended to feed into adult culture, especially such clubs as those devoted to "young achievement." But even such overtly adult-oriented, "conformist" activities can be taken part in for very different reasons, even the cynical one of wanting to appear to be conforming so that one can really do whatever he wants to do—in private. As Grinder concludes:

However viable the distinctiveness of the youth culture, solidarity of thrust seems not one of its salient features. Some adolescents depend upon the youth culture for a reward system alternative to that of the adult society, some use the youth culture to support their transition to adulthood, and others denied youth culture pleasures, withdraw from both peer and adult value systems.⁷

Yet the situation is even more complex than this would indicate. For not only do the youth use such adult-oriented leisure activities for different purposes, even oppositional ones, but many adults make use of similarly complex and devious strategies. It is not at all uncommon today, for example, to find adults, even church groups, sponsoring youth activities that have names such as "Read-In," in which they are trying to utilize the vocabulary of youth revolts for very conventional purposes, such as "getting to know your local library." We may have reached a situation in which even those activities intended to produce traditional patterns of activities are presented in terms of styles of opposition. But this complication is also indicative of what I believe to be the underlying trend in the development of a generalized youth culture in our society. The very fact of using the rhetoric of revolt to appeal to youth for conformist activities indicates that the adults involved with such youth do feel that such rhetoric has an appeal. The question is what the nature of that appeal is.

This *rhetoric of revolt* used by the young and by their would-be co-conspirators among the adult groups is most apparent among that one form of leisure activity that is most characteristic of the youth in our society—music. For the past several decades music has been recognized by members of our society as the characteristic public form of expression of the young. Other art forms, such as painting, are of very little significance among the American young, probably

⁷ Grinder, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

in part because they do not lend themselves to the kind of passive-participation so characteristic of these public youth activities. Even the dance forms of earlier generations have been quickly disappearing as characteristic forms of youth activity. And the domination of popular (or mass) music by the music forms of the young has become so great that "popular music" has come to mean specifically those forms of music consumed by the young.

Not only have the young come increasingly to use music as their characteristic form of public expression, and not only have they come increasingly to dominate that art form in its popular variants in our society, but that art form has come increasingly to share certain general characteristics of style and to express certain general beliefs and values. There is certainly variety in the popular music of the young, as one inevitably finds in any important and large area of activity in our pluralistic society, but there is a growing consensus in style and in messages. No one has analyzed these developments more clearly and insightfully than H. F. Mooney:

This brings us back to a basic generalization. Despite eddies and cross currents always present in the streams of taste, the outstanding trend in American popular music in the 1950's and the earlier 1960's was a rejection of prettiness, over-refinement, academic orchestration and lyrics, smoothness, even subtlety. . . . Classicism, polish, formal discipline, carefully contrived arrangements, adherence to accepted rules in music, as in literature and art—these were likely to be anathematized even by many intellectuals for coldness, lack of spontaneity or "hypocrisy." In short, there was an attack on middle-class standards, on that residue of Puritanism which distrusted the "natural." . . . It was one of those times when the perennial reaction of youth against the norms of older people is accelerated, heightened, intensified. Youth boldly threw in the faces of its elders its own musical description of love: "Gimme Gravy for My Mashed Potatoes." The very appearance of Cass of the Mamas and the Papas—lazy-fat, slovenly, serenely sensual, affronted the middle class ideal of refined womanhood as a trimly neat, highly disciplined, meticulous housewife, teacher or stenographer . . .⁸

It is very important to emphasize the continued existence of pluralistic traditions, even in musical styles. There are still millions of young people in American society for whom "Rock of Ages" is a far better expression of their tastes in musical style and a far better expression of their values in aesthetic activities than the rock forms

⁸ Mooney, H. F., "Popular Music Since The 1920's," in Jonathan Elsen, ed., *The Age of Rock*, New York: Random House, 1969, pp. 9-30.

of popular music. While these are probably a decreasing percentage of American youth and are certainly paid less attention to by the general adult population, they are still important in assessing the degree to which any cultural trait is shared by American youth.

Even recognizing the existence of an increasingly homogeneous art style and an increasing homogeneity in the messages of those art styles among American youth has relatively little direct bearing on the general issue of the importance of a general youth culture for the rest of American society. It is becoming increasingly clear to sociologists that social activities are highly situational. What an individual does in one realm of his life need have relatively little bearing on what he will do in the other realms of his life, and certainly what one group, even a very large group, in a pluralistic society does is by no means indicative of the general trends of the society. In fact, what one group does may be very important in producing a general trend in just the opposite direction in that society, for the activities very often generate strong and more than equal opposition from the other groups. As Irwin Deutscher has argued so well, it is very clear that there is no evidence showing that the abstract expression of public attitudes, even attitudes about such emotional subjects as racial issues, have any direct bearing on what people will actually do in their everyday lives.⁹ The same individuals who express very negative, even bigoted views, of some racial group may treat them in a perfectly egalitarian fashion in their everyday activities, and, in the same way, an individual may express highly egalitarian attitudes but act in a very bigoted fashion in his everyday life.

Art forms such as music are, in fact, notoriously situational in Western societies. It is very clear that the relations between artistic expression and other aspects of Western societies are extremely complex. An excellent example of this relative lack of relationship between artistic expression and the rest of society, or perhaps we should better say the complexity and indirection of such relations, can be seen in the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century. Few trends in artistic expression have been more profound and more important in the long run than the Romantic movement. In the end, the Romantic movement destroyed formalism in all of the art forms in the Western societies. It was a totally victorious movement in that sense and it was one which, in time, had a fundamental effect on the tastes of the vast majority of the members of Western societies. Yet, anyone who concluded from this that Romanticism was a direct expression of the general social values, ideals, goals, and everyday activities of the members of the Western societies would not only be

⁹ Deutscher, Irwin, "Attitudes and Actions," *Social Problems*, Vol. 13, 1966, pp. 235-254.

wrong, but would be wrong in the most total fashion possible. For at precisely the same time that the Romantic movement was gaining strength and was destroying the ancient forms of art in the Western world, science, technology, positivistic philosophy, mass production, and a corporate society were becoming the realities of everyday life and were winning the hearts of the masses of men. The glorification of natural feeling, the attack on "reason," at least in its most formal aspects, was taking place at precisely the same time that formal reason was becoming the everyday life reality of Western societies. While we would only be justified in concluding that the relations between artistic expression and everyday life are very complex, we can certainly see from this instance that it would be truer to argue that artistic expression in Western societies is an oppositional kind of activity, rather than an expression of the nature of everyday life; that is, artistic expression may serve as a release from everyday life, an escape or even an inversion of everyday life, rather than an exemplification of everyday life.

There are certainly many hundreds of thousands, perhaps even a few million, American youth for whom the hip art forms do represent an expression of their feelings, values, and activities in their everyday lives, but certainly this is not true for the great majority of American youth who find hip art forms so extremely pleasurable. On the other hand, it is probably not true that the hip art forms simply express their fantasies of an alternative, opposite way of life, of a desire for a release, or any such thing. There does seem to be a certain shared yearning in these involvements of American youth in the hip art forms. Certainly there is the very old yearning of youth for freedom from older forms, freedom from authority—even "Freedom" for its own sake. Perhaps this is no more than the ancient yearning of youth to consummate that growing reality of freedom, at least freedom from parental authority, which adulthood has always meant in Western societies, but beyond this expression of youth's ancient desire for freedom, desire to show both themselves and the world that they are now free, that they have thrown off the bonds of authority of their parents and of the adult world in general, there seems as well to be a certain glorification of youth itself in the messages and styles of these hip art forms. Youth in American society today is not a time of humble striving and hard work. It is a time of great pride. The adult world itself has glorified youth, has taught them to think of themselves as important, as the wave of the future, as the hope of mankind. They have been taught this at home, in the schools, in certain mass media. At the same time, their disproportionate growth in numbers and in their importance in the all-important technological fields of work has given them a profound sense of their own importance, of their power in society.

There may be uncertainties, counteractions, overdriven strivings, in the overweening pride of the young today, especially since the adults give more rhetoric than substance to the importance of youth, but it is also a very real thing for the young. Many of the adults seem to be suffering the pangs of uncertainty so very apparent in the mass media discussions of youth. The youth themselves are intensely self-assured about their own importance and about the glory of being young.

In many ways, then, the central leisure activity of American youth, the hip art forms that are so dominant today, seem to be a glorification of youth. Certainly this is a very important aspect of what we have called a youth subculture. We have, in fact, not merely a growing sharedness of the conception of themselves as "youth," but a growing, intensely focused glorification of that common membership, that common youthfulness. This certainly does not mean that the shared art forms show that they share a generalized way of life or show that the youth are creating such a distinct shared way of life. It does show that there is a group with a growing self-conception of itself as distinct, and this may very well form the basis for more concerted action in the future, perhaps even for the development of a distinct, common way of life, but there is little evidence of this today for youth as a whole. (As we shall see, there is somewhat more of this sharing of a distinct "way of life" for college students.)

Many who have not seen the leisure culture as a possible symbol of the new and powerful youth culture have seen such a new and powerful youth culture in the new *personal style* of dress, hair, hygiene (or lack of hygiene), and demeanor of the young. In fact, since most older members of our society are able to keep themselves out of range of the popular music forms of the young, and almost all of them do so quite effectively, they become aware of the "hip culture" of the young primarily through changes in these personal styles, for they cannot avoid coming into contact with some young people unless they live in retirement villages. There is no doubt that many older members of our society, even very liberal and educated older members who have been used to diversity in most realms of their lives, find the new personal styles of the young very upsetting, perhaps shocking, and sometimes disgusting. These older people take personal styles as symbols of personal beliefs, values, commitments, and actions. Seeing these styles as so completely different from their own, and seeing them as repugnant, they come to believe that all the young who share these personal styles are just as different and just as repugnant in their values, beliefs, commitments, and actions. And many, seeing these personal styles spread to an ever greater percentage of the young, have come to feel that they are symbolic of

the "youth culture" and of a general "youth rebellion."

Certainly there has been, at least in the beginning, a reasonably close relation between the hip art forms and the hip personal styles of the young. The hip artists themselves have made this relationship very clear by adopting these personal styles, some, presumably, because they believe in it and some for the cynical reason that they will help them sell records and tickets. This in itself, however, might mean only that the young are simply indulging in more of a leisure fantasy life and are expressing their opposition in their leisure situations to the general "real" structure of their lives. But there does seem to be more to it than this, as is easily seen in many of the public statements of the hip artists and of the hip fans.¹⁰ The young have used these personal styles and forms as symbols of opposition to the adult world in many cases, and yet, as with so many other previous changes in personal styles of groups, which seem to take place mainly among the young in our society, this close association between personal styles and general beliefs, values, commitments, and everyday activities seems to exist only in the beginning of the movement. After these initial stages, the styles become increasingly autonomous, independent of such internal commitments and general ways of life. Anyone who deals with the American young today knows that various elements of personal style, such as the length of one's hair, are no longer very closely associated with those internal commitments and general way of life. There are many extremely conservative young people today who make use of those personal styles and seem very comfortable with them. There certainly is a general trend toward longer hair, sideburns, beards, moustaches, and so on, among young men in our society just as there is a general trend toward fewer and more flimsy clothes, more casual clothes, longer, less constricted hair styles, and so on, among young women, but today none of this can be taken to be symbolic of a growing youth rebellion or any such thing. For the older members of our society, these personal styles are still very much a subject of great concern, a symbol of revolt, and, because of this, because they have some effects on what the older members of our society think about the young and what they do, these personal styles are of significance. But they are not significant as symbols of a general youth culture.

In general, there are still far too many differences among young people in our society, especially class differences, and so on, and these are still far too important to the young people themselves in many different specific ways, for a general youth culture in the sense of a distinct set of values, beliefs, commitments, and everyday patterns of activities to have developed. There may be an incipient development of such a distinct way of life, or, at least, there may

¹⁰ Klapp, Orrin, "Style Rebellions and Identity Critics," 1969, unpublished.

be a cognitive and emotional basis for such a distinct way of life, as seen in the artistic self-glorifications of youth and the artistic celebrations of the state of youth, but as yet nothing much has been made of this in producing a distinct way of life. Even the distinctive personal styles, such as long hair for men and fewer or no clothes for women, have certainly not become the predominant personal styles of the young.

As many social scientists have argued before, this generalized youth culture is primarily the result of the changing position of youth in our society. As our society has become increasingly an industrial-technological society based on years of formalized training, the young have increasingly been partially segregated from their families and from the rest of society in schools where they interact primarily with each other and with those they distrust, the common enemy—the teachers and administrators. This enforced separation and interaction has formed the basis for this growing generalized youth subculture and for more specific subcultures of the young as well. At the same time, it has made possible and, to some extent, has enforced a kind of partial independence that forces an earlier partial-maturing, which in turn supports the efforts of the young to create such subcultures and to use them as the bases of organized action of many kinds.

These changes in the social position of youth have made possible the changing meanings of "youth" and the growing general subculture of youth; and these in turn have formed the base for the changes that have taken place in the more specific forms of youthful subcultures in our society. Some of these specific subcultures have acted to counter the development and spread of student protest movements, while others have overlapped those movements and have helped to create and support them.

Chapter 3. Cooperative Subcultures, Deviant Subcultures, and Rebellious Subcultures

What is striking about any social situation that is examined in detail is how complex all the circumstances are, and while one risks losing an over-all configuration in the patent effort to sort out the details, the effort to find meaning—in sociology as in language—has to begin with the simplest description of what happened. This is especially true in the case of Columbia, for if one looks at the background—the years, say, from 1966 to 1968—the events which exploded in April and May are, at first glance, largely inexplicable. It is easy, of course, since history is always written after the fact, to give some apparently plausible account of “the causes” and “the determining factors,” and these tend to give an air of inevitability to the sequences. But as I have studied this history, and reflected on my own participation in it, I find the “outbreak,” “uprising,” “revolution”—none of these words is adequate—extremely puzzling.

Daniel Bell,
Columbia and New Left

As one should really expect of an open group with ambiguous or problematic categories and criteria of membership, a group which everyone eventually leaves, and which is largely dominated by and intertwined with the supragroup of the adult world, the social world of American youth is very pluralistic and fragmented. Aside from the generally shared youth subculture, which, as we have seen, consists primarily of the self-identification with “youth,” a vague dis-identification (or separation) from adults, and, to a much lesser extent, certain esthetic and personal styles, American youth have been fragmented and pluralistic. There have been a great number of different subcultures with different orientations toward adult society. In a very general way these many different subcultures can be profitably described and analyzed for our purposes in terms of their general orientations toward what *they* see as adult society. From this standpoint these subcultures are, roughly, either *Cooperative-Cultures*, *Independent-Cultures*, or *Contra-Cultures*. That is, either they cooperate with what they see as the distinct adult society, or they act without regard to adult society, or they act against adult society. Obviously, any particular youth subculture tends to be a combination of such orientations, especially because youth subcultures

in general tend to be somewhat ambivalent toward the adult world. But many of the larger ones that have considerable influence have a reasonably consistent emphasis on one orientation.

Cooperative-Cultures: Straight Youth

Most youth subcultures are either directly or indirectly cooperative with adult society. While these groups are specifically socially defined as being for the young, they are generally sponsored and even administered by adults. These Boy Scout and Girl Scout groups, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. groups, moral rearmament groups, athletic associations, chess clubs, business opportunity groups, church youth groups, and so on, receive very little headline publicity, but they continue, though to a decreasing degree, to be massive youth groups. Taking together all groups with a dominant cooperative attitude toward the adult world, they make up by far the majority of American youth. They receive little attention because today as always they are simply continuing to do the day-to-day work of teaching youth the values and motives of the adult work world. These groups have this as a specific goal—learning the values of manhood, etc. They make use of the various motives assumed to be possessed by youth (play, sports, interest in new places, etc.), but which have actually been taught at an earlier age and can now be turned to other ends, to motivate them to learn adult tasks. While it is possible that the youth in this situation might feel some form of what Max Scheler called “ressentiment,” a form of highly repressed resentment that leads to a strong support of the repressing force, there is simply no evidence for this sort of thing. Probably only very prolonged, intimate participant observation could reveal such phenomena and, as we have seen, there are no such studies as yet. At the present time, all arguments that such adolescents or any other segment of youth necessarily experience frustration from the demands for “conformity” of adult society must simply remain in opposition to what appears to be obvious: these youth, who are probably a majority of American youth and certainly constitute a vast majority of youth organized into groups, appear to very willingly cooperate with their adult teachers in progressively making themselves into adults. They see themselves, and adults see them as well, as adults-in-the-becoming, as future adults very much like past adults, very much like their own parents. Though he and others who share his views have almost always failed to see how rapidly the generalized youth culture has developed and how very rapidly many more youth, especially college students, have become “alienated” in recent years, Samuel Lubell is certainly right in the conclusion from his research that most youth, even students, remain “straight” today:

One of the more disquieting aspects of the much advertised

"generation gap" is our apparent inability to analyze, diagnose, and understand it.

Few phenomena have received more publicity and even study during the last four years than the new "youth generation." Still, all this attention has brought little public understanding.

The dominant impression left by the term "generation gap" is that of a unified younger generation that is breaking drastically from both its elders and society in almost every conceivable way. Actually, though, my interviewing over the last four years on how young people differ in their thinking from their parents suggests that (1) much more continuity than gap exists between the two generations; (2) parents have not been rendered obsolete but continue to exert an almost ineradicable influence on their children . . .¹

For every "teeny-bopper," "hippie," or "student rebel" who captures the attention of the mass media, there are many others who constitute what Matza calls the "scrupulous youth"—the Boy Scouts, church youth groups, and so on; for every surfer or member of any other leisure subculture, there are many others who work at junior achievement businesses, study to become apprentices, work for grades, and so on. Certainly even these "straight" youth are more "tuned in" to such groups than adults because of their shared identity as youth and they often have a "secret envy," or gain vicarious gratification from identifying with them, especially since so many adults have chosen to identify the offbeat as the spokesmen of youth. But any such identification with the offbeat youth is far too slight to warrant considering the great majority of youth to be part of that particular subculture.

Contra-Cultures: Deviants, Dropouts, and Rebels

There are probably some youth groups that simply have little or no specific orientation toward the adult world. Perhaps some leisure groups are *Independent Cultures* of this sort, simply dedicated to fishing, rowing, or whatnot, without much consideration of how this might be related to the adult world. There seem, however, to be relatively few of these. In our society youth seems to be largely defined only in relation to adulthood, to what he will become in the future, whereas the adult stands whole without any necessary reference to what he once was. In addition, youth—the future—is generally considered to be too important to be left alone by adults. While youth are by no means *forced* to conform, as many social

¹ Lubell, Samuel, "That 'Generation Gap'," Chapter 4 in *Confrontation*, Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, eds., New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968, p. 58.

scientists believe, or forced to rebel, as others believe, they are largely forced to take either a predominantly cooperative or predominantly antagonistic orientation toward the adult world.

Those that take a predominantly antagonistic orientation are *Contra-Cultures*. The youth subcultures that have attracted the widest attention, especially in recent years, are those that in some way are oriented against—or, at least, *away* from—the adult world as they see it. There seem to be three distinct and important orientations of this type, which differ in qualitative factors as well as in degrees. These are the *deviant subcultures*, the *leisure subcultures* and the *rebellious subcultures*. While each general category covers a wide variety of rapidly changing groups, there seem to be three roughly distinct modes of intertwined elements that warrant distinctive categories and analyses.

Deviant Subcultures. The deviant subcultures have been far more widely studied and analyzed by social scientists than either of the other two. Construing the term “deviant” in the narrow sense normally used by sociologists in discussing youth, I refer by this term to those groups who share in a general “troublemaking,” “tough” orientation. While they sometimes engage in criminal activities, the greatest amount of their time, effort, and creativity goes into noncriminal activity, much of which has the purpose of aggrandizing their self-esteem and group prestige.²

As Thrasher long ago argued in his study of 1313 gangs in Chicago, ganging has been a normal aspect of lower class, urban youth in American society.³ These gangs begin early, certainly by the age of four or five, become increasingly distinct and differentiated as the members grow into their teens, normally engage to some degree in various forms of “tough” and “troublemaking” behavior that frequently brings them into conflict with the police, and begin to disintegrate as the members move into their twenties, get jobs and marry. While sociologists in the last few decades have been almost exclusively concerned with delinquent gangs, most of these gangs are only peripherally or intermittently involved in delinquent behavior. Most of them are much more like the Nortons described in Whyte’s classic work on *Street Corner Society*,⁴ except that the Nortons remained unemployed and unmarried well into their later twenties because of the depression and were involved in the earlier ethnic machine politics of America’s great cities.

There are a great number of different studies of these gangs and many very different theoretical explanations of them by sociologists,

² Matza, D., *Delinquency and Drift*, New York: Wiley, 1964.

³ Thrasher, F. M., *The Gang*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928.

⁴ Whyte, W. F., *Street Corner Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937.

ranging from the ecological theories of the Chicago school⁵ up to the present-day, modified subculture⁶ and situational theories. In spite of their many differences, almost all of these studies and analyses have agreed that these lower class, urban gangs are deeply concerned with "toughness," which they see as indicative of "manliness," and engage at times in activity that gets them into "trouble" with the police.⁷ It has also been generally agreed that these are the basic factors that distinguish these youth groups from middle-class youth groups. The disagreements have come more in the interpretation of the facts.

As David Bordua has argued, since Thrasher's study of Chicago gangs emphasized the ("positive") excitement and fun of gang activity, including the delinquency, sociologists have come increasingly to view the toughness and troublemaking of lower-class gangs as ("negative") reactions against their status positions. This is especially true of such recent subculture theories of delinquency as that of Albert Cohen,⁸ who argues that this delinquency is totally negativistic and is the result of their ambivalent rejection of (or rebellion against) the middle-class standards enforced on them in school. These theorists who see delinquency as a form of rebellion against middle-class society are in general agreement with those officials and members of the public who argue commonsensically that delinquency is a form of rebellion that constitutes an attack on the "moral foundations" of our society and threatens "anarchy and the dissolution of society." These analysts have generally believed that there is a direct relationship, either of similarity in origins or causality, between the "rising tide of criminality among the young" and the growing "youth rebellion." In fact, many see the students as "hooligans" who are just like "hoods." (Ten years ago there was as much public and official concern over delinquency as there is today over student rebels. There is still concern and fear over delinquency, but, in spite of the rapidly rising official rates of delinquency, the students have banished the "hoods" from the mass media. Perhaps each has served the same function of focusing adult fears and resentments of youth and of justifying—to adults—the continued exercise of power over youth—as youth.)

These various theories of commonsense and social science that see lower class, urban gangs and delinquency as a form of rebellion against the adult, conventional society have failed to consider a

⁵ On the ecological theories, see especially Shaw, Clifford R., and McKay, Henry D., *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

⁶ Cohen, A. K., *Delinquent Boys*, Illinois: Free Press, 1955.

⁷ W. Miller's ideas about false concerns agree with this description, but he invokes homosexual fears to explain such phenomena. He has simply overlooked the obvious importance of physical strength in the work of these people. See W. Miller, "Lower Class Culture as a Generalizing Milieu of Gang Delinquents," *Journal of Social Issues*, 1958, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 5-19.

⁸ Cohen, *op. cit.*

number of crucial points that invalidate the whole theory:

1. They have generally failed to consider the importance of the urban situation of these adolescents. As Yablonsky and the few others with direct contact with these boys have reported,⁹ the boys themselves consider their toughness and violence to be "defensive," a direct response to the threat of other groups, and they often compare their actions with those of nations. (In many cases they have used names that show such identifications.) To most sociologists this has seemed irrelevant or rhetorical justification: after all, even if this were true for a few, wouldn't this defensive explanation itself demand that for each defensive group there be at least one offensive group, so that at last half these gangs would be "sociopathic" aggressors? I think the answer to this can be an unqualified no. These gangs have normally existed in urban situations where there was very great ethnic heterogeneity which involves differences in values, motives, beliefs, language, and behavior. The external control agencies such as the police have, for many reasons, been quite incapable of preventing much of the violence in such areas, so the boys have no such higher forces to whom they can appeal. Now *it is precisely these complex, heterogeneous situations in which one finds resort to violence by nations and individuals: at least in part, violence is a last resort, a continuance of conflict by other means, when differences cause conflicts which cannot be resolved by argument and negotiation.* (Where youth boards and the police have helped to bring about negotiations between warring gangs, the boys have generally responded very favorably.) Moreover, and very importantly, in such a situation it is not at all true that there must be an aggressor group for each defensive group: in this amorphous, conflict-filled situation a very few aggressive groups can victimize all the others, very much in the way a Nazi Germany could effectively assault all the other nations of Europe. In addition, in a complex situation like this, and one in which there are not formal channels of negotiation, it is always likely that one group will interpret some of the actions of some of its neighbors as attacks. Once this pattern is established, as it was in America's cities over a hundred years ago, it tends to be perpetuated both because the gangs tend to perpetuate themselves by training new members (i.e., gangs become their own reason for being, comparable to a nation's "raison d'être") and because distrust and suspicion tends to perpetuate itself—and each of these tends to feed the other. Finally, it seems reasonably apparent that gangs have become less organized, less frequent, and less violent in American cities as the ethnic groups have slowly become more alike ("assimilated") and more accommodated to each other. There is almost no comparison in terms of violence between what we have today and what Thrasher

⁹ Yablonsky, Lewis, *The Violent Gang*, New York: Macmillan, 1962.

found earlier in this century and late in the nineteenth century.

2. Sociologists and other analysts, especially those who feel threatened by gang violence in the lower class, have generally failed to see that delinquents and gang boys are generally emphasizing certain values and feelings in their violent behavior held and accepted by the other class groups as well. All groups in our society highly prize manliness, strength, and courage, though it is certainly possible that these boys, coming more often from southern European peasant groups, would emphasize these and male dominance more than do the older, northern European groups in this country. All of the evidence clearly indicates that these boys see their actions as a way of proving courage and manliness. To the middle classes and sociologists this has always seemed overemphasized ("counteraction") and absurd, since they seem to violate the rules on appropriate means of expressing or proving such things. What they fail to see is that, living in a very different situation, these boys *must* find different means of expressing even the same values, feelings, and beliefs.¹⁰ Middle-class boys can find their tests of strength and courage in the Boy Scouts and organized sports, and some of the lower class boys do so as well; but for most of them these simply do not seem realistic paths. Besides, the apparent aggression of other gangs must be met either by counterviolence or by submission. In general, there seems to be a great deal of agreement on *abstract* values of the different groups in American society, but there are a great number of these abstract values in our pluralistic society (courage, strength, sacrifice, wealth, beauty, truth, sexiness, virtue, purity, work, leisure, simplicity, savoir-faire, standing up for one's rights, keeping one's cool, etc.). Even more importantly, different groups find themselves in different situations in which different values are more relevant and in which some values can be more plausibly realized than others. The members of these groups in different situations find that they can more plausibly *construct certain specific, concrete value-positions* with their implied status and prestige meanings than they can other value-positions. Consequently, even given the same abstract values and the same striving for self-esteem and social status or prestige, the different situations will lead individuals (even the same individuals over time) to emphasize different values in constructing their concrete, situated meanings from the same general realm of abstract meanings. middle classes degrade lower classes as poor and dangerous; upper classes degrade middle classes as petty and self-righteous; lower classes degrade upper classes as lazy, selfish, and effeminate. What is of crucial importance, and what positivistic sociologists who have assumed the social world to be homogeneous and unidimensional have failed to see,

¹⁰ Douglas, J., *The Social Meanings of Suicide*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.

is that each of these value-positions or constructions of situated meanings is potentially equally plausible, depending on the situation from which one views it.

3. One of the strongest forms of evidence supporting this situational interpretation is the fact that almost all of the members of these youth gangs leave the gangs soon after meeting the most basic criteria of adulthood for males in our society, that is, a steady job and marriage. It is only when the members do not get jobs and, largely as a consequence of that, do not get married that the gangs and the tough, troublemaking behavior continues. This was true of the quasi-adult gangs found among ethnic groups in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, true during the depression (as is seen in the Nortons gang), and seems true of Negroes today, among whom streetcorner gangs sometimes extend well beyond the twenties.¹¹

4. It is also very clear that the vast majority of instances of serious troublemaking by the members of such youth cultures do not involve any attack on the adult world in general. They rarely cause trouble, especially in the form of violent attack, for the adults in their neighborhoods. If the grocer chases them away from his store, they hate him, not the generalized, abstract adult world. Certainly most of their serious trouble, and a very great deal of their petty trouble as well, comes from their relations with the police. From early childhood they struggle with the police over the right to "hang out" on the streets and sidewalks in their neighborhoods.¹² (Thrasher was probably right in seeing this as a basic force leading to the integration of play gangs into troublemaking gangs.) As teenagers, they are seen by the police as more dangerous than middle-class youth doing the same thing, so they deal far more punitively with these lower class groups, arresting them in situations in which they "talk to" the middle class youth.¹³ Even stealing is directed very largely at specific, outsider "marks,"¹⁴ so that there is not some generalized attack against the adult world or the world of law and order. Even convicts from this group believe in the justice of the "system" and often "idealize" it, while attacking the law enforcement individuals as corruptors of the "system."¹⁵ There is, then, a great deal of evidence that the trouble with the law that the members of these youth groups have is not due to any "rebelliousness" against the adult world, such as a great number of sociologists have as-

¹¹ Liebow, E., *Talley's Corner*, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967.

¹² Werthmann, C., "Police Action and Gang Delinquency," in D. Bordua, ed., *The Police*, New York: Wiley, 1966.

¹³ Cicourel, A., *The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice*, New York: Wiley, 1968.

¹⁴ Schwendinger, H., and Schwendinger, J., "Delinquent Stereotypes of Probable Victims," in M. W. Klein, ed., *Juvenile Gangs in Context*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 91-105.

¹⁵ Prisoners in isolation in maximum security prisons have been found especially prone to such idealization.

sumed.¹⁶ As I have argued in much greater detail elsewhere,¹⁷ their relative troubles are caused in good part by the policies the law enforcement agencies have toward them because they are lower class, urban, and ethnic, not simply because they are more deviant.

In general, then, these deviant youth subcultures are very *situational*. They are closely associated with the situation of the urban lower class groups, especially the ethnic groups, and there is no reason to believe that their behavior is a form of "rebellion" against the adult world. There is, in addition, every reason to believe that the often proclaimed dangers to the "foundations of our society" from the supposed increases in this form of behavior are simply the result of a misunderstanding of official statistics on delinquency and crime. It now seems reasonably clear that there are anywhere from three to ten times as many serious crimes in this society as are actually reported in the official statistics.¹⁸ This does not at all mean that there has been any change. My impression from historical sources, and certainly from works such as Thrasher's, is that the actual rate of crimes, especially violent crimes, is probably far less today and decreasing most of the time, though there may be perturbations. But with the vast majority of serious crimes always going unreported, it is extremely easy for better reporting of crime in the official statistics to produce increases in crime rates of 300 percent to 1000 percent. (In Philadelphia and New York City, revisions of crime reporting have doubled the official rates in one year or less.)

There is some definite indication that these deviant youth cultures are not only not rebellious but are also on the decline. New waves of immigration could reverse this, but even that would probably not give such subcultures a rebellious orientation.

While it seems highly doubtful that the public schools have been important in causing delinquent subcultures, as Cohen and others have argued, it does seem likely that these subcultures have helped to isolate the boys from the demands of education. If the marked decline in gang violence should prove indicative of a decline in the strength of the gangs, just at the time when lower class groups have become so greatly aware of the financial value and the availability of higher education, the effect could be an increasing effectiveness of education with this segment of American youth.

On the other hand, an increasing percentage of such deviant youth are Negroes, simply because the older ethnic groups have left the core areas. The politicizing and radicalizing of the urban Negroes has

¹⁶ Matza has, on the contrary, followed the usual assumption that delinquency is a form of rebellion ("Position and Behavior Patterns of Youth," *op. cit.*, p. 207).

¹⁷ Douglas, J., "Deviance and Order in a Pluralistic Society," in *Sociological Theory*, E. Tiryakin and J. McKinney, eds., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, forthcoming.

¹⁸ See *The President's Crime Commission Report*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.

clearly affected significant minorities among the high school and junior high students. This could give an increasingly rebellious orientation to their gang activities, which could further alienate them from education and the job market, and, thereby, help to feed them into continuing rebellious subcultures even at the adult level. All previous gangs have shown a strong tendency to simply leave education, work, and politics alone and then to disintegrate as the boys entered the job market, which meant that the gangs had little lasting effect on them. However, a radicalizing of Negro gangs could be taking place that would make the gangs more oriented toward rebellion against the adult world, at least insofar as the adult world is seen as the world of middle-class values, work, and the power of officials such as the police. There is, in fact, some clear evidence that this is taking place.

In Chicago the Blackstone Rangers, which is a combination of young and adult members, was definitely caught up in the politicization process resulting partly from the community action work of certain government agencies. They seem to have gone from being a reasonably typical youth gang concerned with various forms of protective work, aggressive attacks, and similiar activities that brought them into great conflict with the police to being a rebellious youth group with far more organization than is typical of youth gangs. Though they do seem to most people to have become politicized as a result of their direct involvements in OEO programs, Senate investigations, and systematic police harassment, the Blackstone Rangers seem to represent an in-between youth culture that could move in the direction of far more political action. As James Alan McPherson has concluded in the best study yet made of this gang:

The Rangers do not appear to be militant either, at least not in the contemporary sense of the word. They have refused to make a coalition with the Black Panthers. They do not seem to have any political philosophy. If anything, they believe only in themselves and in their motto: "Stone Run It!" But they are waiting too. Whether it is for more federal funds or for their presence and power to be recognized by the black community through their influence over ghetto youth, they are waiting. And their energy is at work.¹⁹

The Black Panthers are a far more obvious example of a politically oriented, rebellious Black youth culture. While using many of the tactics of youth gangs and apparently sharing many of the common hatreds of such gangs, and, possibly doing some of their recruiting from such gangs, they have developed a political program that con-

¹⁹ McPherson, James Alan, "The Blackstone Rangers," *The Atlantic*, Vol. 223, No. 5, May 1966.

stitutes a direct challenge to the official power of the police. The Black Panthers more than any other group have also forged certain alliances, however shifting, with some of the student protest groups, especially the Black ones; and they are apparently seeking to build a coalition of radical groups to increase the power of all such groups.

These groups, largely as a result of activities of members of the adult world, and even to some extent, though quite inadvertently, by government policies, have increasingly become the link between the traditionally patterned delinquent subculture of lower class youth and certain groups involved in some of the student protest movements. The Black Panthers have had many close contacts with various student groups and in some cases have become informal spokesmen of student protest. This has been especially clear in California, where some of the leaders of the Panthers have been treated as visiting celebrities by large student groups and where the Panthers have had many direct and indirect influences on the Black student protest groups.

The center of political interest for a great many Californians these past weeks was not so much the national elections as the tumult provoked when some University of California students invited Black Panther "Minister of Information" Eldridge Cleaver to lecture at Berkeley. The uproar over that has been followed by fresh confrontations between students and police at San Francisco State College after the ouster of Black Panther "Minister of Education" George M. Murray, an English instructor. Murray had advised students to "get guns" if their demands were not speedily met. The trustees of the college system, ignoring normal procedures, fired him without formal investigation or hearings. This set off a wave of demonstrations; electric typewriters were tossed out of windows. Police were summoned; the campus was shut down on November 14 and only last week reopened by the trustees.

Once thought of as not much more than a handful of petty desperadoes in black spectacles, berets and leather jackets, more poseurs than effective militants, the Black Panthers have been thrust by such incidents into a position of influence among black power nationalists. They are especially prominent in the San Francisco Bay communities, from which they sprung a bare two years ago. The founders were college dropouts, some of them having been schooled also in state prisons or county jails . . .

All this hubbub has enormously enhanced the attractiveness of Black Panthers as public speakers. Murray and

Bobby Seale are all over the state, arguing their impatience for an equal share in the benefits of American society. Asked by one student why they persisted with dirty words, Seale said, "Because the filthiest word I know is 'kill' and this is what other men have done to the Negro for years." Cleaver is kept hopping from state colleges to the luncheon circuit, from Stanford to Harvard to Jesuit schools. Indeed, the Cleaver exhortation to revolution, pocked with explicit barnyard terms, has become something of a fad. Cleaver has made it into several of the major magazines. Forty thousand copies of his book have been sold. When Cleaver drew a ticket for speeding, the reaction of the arresting highway patrolman was immediately noted ("He was a gentleman"). When Cleaver missed a date in court (because he was lecturing at Harvard), the judge gently admonished him to keep an engagement calendar now that he is such a busy man. Even candidate Spiro T. Agnew used Cleaver (his appearance on campus "makes my blood boil") as an issue.²⁰

While such groups are not yet large, they add a new dimension to the protest movements, for they have the physical courage, the knowledge of weapons, and the desire to use them which student protest groups have not had. There can be little doubt that some of the more extreme members of the student protest movements would like to use them as a source of power for achieving their own ends, including armed rebellion, especially in the form of urban guerrillas. On the other hand, it is clear that thus far these Black *political youth gangs* have successfully resisted becoming the "Storm Troopers" for the white radicals. But the whole situation is very fluid and it is quite uncertain as to the direction these political youth gangs will take in the years ahead. We can only be reasonably certain that they will continue to exist and to be important, especially since they are actively recruiting and training ever younger members, so that they are to some degree succeeding in politicizing the traditional delinquent gangs even at the junior high school level. This politicization of the junior high and high school gangs is also taking place in part because other adult groups, including parent and teacher groups seeking support for the school decentralization plans, have actively recruited their political help. If these combined moves continue with the success they have had thus far, there is little reason to doubt that the traditional pattern of apolitical delinquent gangs will be replaced by a pattern of politically oriented, rebellious gangs involved in both traditional patterns of crime and newer patterns of political pressure and violence, which will likely be centered in the urban

²⁰ Leary, Mary Ellen, "The Uproar Over Cleaver," *The New Republic*, November 30, 1968, pp. 21-24.

schools. Indeed, there is some reason to suspect that the political rhetoric and goals of the radical adult groups are already coming to serve many gang youths as rhetorical justifications for their traditional patterns of crime as well as their newer forms of political action.

Rebellious Subcultures. Rebellious subcultures of youth are distinguished from the more political and radical protest movements of youth by their basically unradical, nonactivist (nonviolent) focus. The rebellious subcultures reject much of American life, as they define it (the "square world"), and do attempt to create their own alternative way of life; but they do both without becoming very political about it, without doing much to convince others, to organize support, to defeat their "enemies." Most of this rebellion is, in fact, low key, quiet, sometimes even secret. Much of it is indistinguishable from what we have early dealt with as the growing generalized youth subculture. Very importantly, much of this rebellion is the result of the patterned encounter of "idealistic youth" with the "cynical, hypocritical adult world." There are some very important reasons why each generation of American youth finds itself "idealistically" in conflict with the "lack of values" or the "hypocrisy" of adult American groups.

As I have previously argued, "American society is a morally pluralistic society made up of a great number of different ethnic groups, economic groups, educational groups, religious groups, and so on. In spite of this great moral pluralism, the members of American society have been able to work together very effectively in many spheres of activity, except for one revolution, one extremely bloody Civil War, and many rebellions and riots of lesser dimensions over the first two hundred years of the Nation's existence. This moral pluralism of American society poses the constant threat of open conflict. The way in which American society seems to have coped reasonably well with the problem is through a strong insistence on adherence to the procedural rules of public activity (i.e., majority rule, etc.), the development of certain overarching but largely amoral goal commitments (i.e., health, wealth, security, and personal freedom), and the all-important division between public morality and private morality. It is this separation of one's private moral feelings from one's public moral statements and actions that seems especially important in helping to produce the rebellious youth who become the core of the rebellious youth cultures.

Public morality in a pluralistic society does two things which are well understood common-sensically. It prevents our being continually involved in moral argument, prevents fights and so on. The importance of this is most easily seen

in the case of moral entrepreneurs who try to enforce their morality (or public morality) on others, especially on their private actions. Such people are seen as surly, cranky, moralistic, prudish, mean, nasty, and brutish.

These are people who don't understand or cannot adopt the pluralistic nature of our (situated) moral meanings. These are people who do not share those commitments and understandings that make successful *accommodation* possible in a pluralistic society. *If members of a pluralistic society are going to "work" successfully together, they must be able to accommodate themselves to conflicting commitments* and they probably must be able to withdraw to their own enclaves to express themselves freely to the like-minded. This latter condition (or "expressive function") of knowing and expressing the "true self" (one's self-image) is achieved in our society through a strong emphasis on *privacy*—private clubs, sanctity of the home and the anonymity of the massive cities. Of far greater importance, *accommodation* is achieved largely through the development of specific commitments to moral meanings and understandings. It is very striking that some of our only highly-shared moral commitments should be specifically in that area—public behavior—of our lives in which we come into contact with many thousands of strangers from every conceivable "walk of life"; that these commitments should be strongest and most widely shared among the executive middle class groups who are specifically the people who must *manage the moralities* of strangers to achieve work goals; and that these groups specifically socialize their children to live by these morals for the expressed purpose of "getting along with people." As Melville Dalton has so clearly seen, in a pluralistic society acting in accord with such *accommodative morals* as courtesy, tolerance, minding one's own business, keeping your nose clean, decency, playing it cool, keeping your cool, not being too assertive, etc., are of utmost importance in achieving social status in our society. One of the common culture shocks in our society comes when adolescents raised in the private, homogeneous morality of the home first encounter the accommodative morality of the pluralistic world of work and political action. They see it as cynical (which it is), hypocritical (which it has to be), and damnable (which it is only to those who aren't committed to accommodative morals).²¹

²¹ Douglas, "Deviance and Order in a Pluralistic Society," *op. cit.*

In most cases these morally committed youth remain quite rebellious toward the "cynical" and "hypocritical" adult society throughout their formal education. American higher education has nurtured and fostered such views, since large percentages of the faculty have been "alienated intellectuals" in open conflict with the accommodative morality of the business world. It is no surprise, then, that we should get more "idealistically" inspired youth rebellion as we get more youth more involved in higher education.

But there are many different forms of more specific subcultures that are in more open rebellion against the "square world," the "over-30 world," the "adult world," the world of "Dadism and Momism." Many of the larger rebellious subcultures involve the least amount of rebellion and the coolest forms of rebellion. Probably the most important of these are what we can rightly call *leisure subcultures*. These subcultures are built primarily around a simultaneous rejection of work and the whole work ethic and work-a-day world built around work and the glorification of some leisure activity as the being and end of life—often called *The Life*, as we find among the surfers.

If it were not for the negative connotations of the term, the leisure subcultures of American youth could best be described as *leisure cults*. While most American adults and youth are members of some form of leisure subculture (e.g., golfing), many of the leisure subcultures of youth are distinguished by the great intensity of members' commitments, the degree of public expressiveness with which they communicate this involvement, and the tendency of their members to build a way of life around the leisure activity that is in opposition to ordinary adult ways of life, especially the work-a-day, organized, nonspontaneous life.

There seem to be two general orientations toward leisure in these youth subcultures. The earlier orientation, which until recent years was almost the only orientation, consists in simply being devoted to certain forms of "fun" or "play" activity, especially to certain entertainment styles, and acting out this devotion. This acting-out has often been the basis for creating *entertainment subcultures*. The second orientation, which has been growing rapidly in recent years, consists in viewing leisure as antithetical to work (i.e., "free time") and, sometimes, as conducive to more fulfillment of one's (creative) self than the hated "square world." It is this latter development, in which the leisure subcultures merge with more rebellious subcultures, that concern us most here.

These leisure-dominated, rebellious subcultures are of many kinds, but have rarely been studied or even noted by social scientists. No one has yet done a better job of studying and describing them than Tom Wolfe:

After World War II, a number of sets of young men in California began to drop out of the rationalized job system and create their own status-spheres. In every case they made a point of devising new fashions, *role* clothes, to symbolize their new life styles. These were the beats, the motorcycle gangs, the car kids, and, more recently, the rock 'n' roll kids, the surfers, and, of course, the hippies. The hell with the jobs they had or might ever get. They wanted roles, as Rebels, Swingers, Artists, Poets, Mystics, Tigers of the Internal Combustion Engine, Monks of the Sea, anything that would be dramatic, exciting, not powerful or useful or efficient but . . . yes! a little bit *divine*, right out of the old godhead of the hero.

They have all been able to pull it off, set up their own styles of life and keep them going and make them highly visible, because of the extraordinary amount of money floating around. It is not that any of these groups is ever rich. It is just that there is so much money floating around that they can get their hands on enough of it to express themselves, and devote time to expressing themselves, to a degree nobody in the netherworld position could ever do before.²²

The *entertainment subcultures*, which are often derided by adults as "crazes," have been prevalent for several decades. The "bobby-soxer craze" of the 1940's was possibly the most intense and widespread, though the earlier "flapper craze," the "Elvis Presley" craze, and the "Rock craze" and various dance crazes probably rivaled it in popularity. Aside from the physiological exuberance of youth, and the obvious overtones of burgeoning sexual feeling, some of these *entertainment subcultures* have had much of the appearance of mass movements.

In the last decade some of the most popular *entertainment movements* have been increasingly mixed with the ideologies and styles of the fully developed leisure subcultures, those which involve an attack on the work-a-day, middle-class, organizational way of life. For example, certainly one of the most widespread entertainment movements of any period has been the Beatles movement. Their entertainment has increasingly become *entertainment with a message*, a message that is critical of society, without being rebellious. Their style is more one of poking fun at, and, more recently, ridiculing the adult world than of seeking to overthrow it.

But some of the other entertainment youth movements have become more directly tied up with the leisure subcultures and some with the rebellious subcultures. The linkages between much of the youth

²² Wolfe, Tom, "The Pump House Gang," in *The Pump House Gang*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968, pp. 20-39.

music, poster art, and some drama and the hippie subcultures is especially clear. In recent years there has been a growing relation between the Rock movement in youthful music and various other forms of "entertainment" and the hippie subculture(s). This has been so much the case that it is probably not an exaggeration to speak of the rise of the Hip Culture among the young. We have already examined (in Chapter 2) the growing importance of this Hip Culture, especially as represented by Rock music, in the generalized youth culture; but it is important here to see the importance of the bridge between the hippie subculture and the generalized youth movement for youthful rebellion by analyzing the rebellious nature of the hippie subculture. It is certainly not true (or even worth thinking about) that the hippies are "seducing" a whole generation of American youth. Rather, increasing numbers and subcultures of the youth have found that the hippie subculture expresses certain of their own feelings, and it is this that has made them respond so favorably to the entertainment forms involving the hippie worldview that the professionals and merchants have created and sold. In this way they have helped to produce the burgeoning Hip Culture. (There are very complex relations between pop artists and mass audiences in our complex society in which so many groups and situational factors intervene between the creators and the consumers of the esthetic "product." But there has long been a very direct relation between the desires of the youthful audience and the products of the Rock artists and other artists involved in the Hip Culture. These art forms have been dominated by small producers, and the "products" sell in a highly competitive market with rapidly changing tastes and, hence, sales rates. For example, in 1941 the nearly monopolistic powers of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers were broken by court rulings, and since then the popular music field has been extremely decentralized, competitive, and changeable. The producers and distributors, some of whom today are young "rich hippies," move toward what will pay, which is what the audience is "ready for" or already wants.²³ They cannot dictate the messages, even if they wanted to do so. Even many of the famous Hip performers, including the Beatles and such folk singers as Joan Baez, have seemed for years to be running to keep up with the increasingly Hip orientation of their audiences, rather than pushing the audience in their direction. However, it seems very likely that the media do serve to spread the "message" of the Hip Culture to a much larger audience than would be possible without the marketing structure, advertising, publicity effect, and so on.)

The hippies, and their immediate antecedents, the Beats, were in good part direct descendants of the ancient Bohemian subcultures of

²³ Mooney, *op. cit.*

various kinds that have existed in Western cultures for centuries and can already be found referred to in Benvenuto Cellini's *Autobiography*. It would no doubt be possible to trace the direct lines of descent in terms of ideas and persons from the romantic Bohemian subcultures of early nineteenth century France²⁴ up to such present day groups as the hippies. While various schools of artists, who are very often intermingled with members of the Bohemian subcultures, have adopted both favorable and unfavorable orientations toward involvement in the work ethic and the rationalistic, bourgeois society,²⁵ the *Bohemian cultures, including the hippie culture today, are characterized by a basic rejection of this work-a-day world and an idealization of the opposite values of leisure, feeling, idealism, and so on.* Their attacks on formal education, industrial society, Christian purity, and the rationalistic discipline of scientific thought have been unrelenting; and, while we certainly have no reliable quantitative information on such things, there is no reason to believe that the (hard core) members of these leisure subcultures today are larger in proportion to the general population (indeed, they may be smaller today) or attract more general sympathy and public interest today than they did in the nineteenth century. Just as many hard-working, straight bourgeoisie today adopt hippie beads or smoking habits, so did 'bankers' wives read the romantic novels in the nineteenth century; and there were undoubtedly weekend Bohemians comparable to our weekend hippies. It is probably precisely because these leisure cultures have been so different from our everyday lives that they have always generated so much interest. As members of our society generally see such things, they are generally an "escape," not a program for the future. (This relation between our general culture and the hippie world-view is very much in line with the relation we earlier suggested exists between the Hip Culture of the young and the generalized youth culture.)

In recent years, however, these leisure cultures have begun to change, to become more oriented toward questions of "realistic" possibilities. They have begun to adopt more of the ideologies common to the rebellious subcultures, though without becoming activated by ideologies.

The hippies, being the dominant Bohemian subculture today, have been in the forefront of this development. Having inherited the Bohemian mantle in a period when industry was being automated and bureaucracy computerized at a rapid rate, the hippies and their audiences have suddenly realized that the traditional Bohemian anti-work ethic might be a realistic choice for those still committed to conventional ideas of material well-being and status. Perhaps be-

²⁴ Matza, *op. cit.*

²⁵ Silvers, R., "The Modern Artist's Construction of Associability," in *Deviance and Responsibility*, J. D. Douglas and R. Scott, eds., New York: Basic Books, forthcoming.

cause of this, they and their interpreters have strongly emphasized the leisure aspects of their world view and the consequent attack on current industrial-technological-organizational society. Perhaps this is also why they have been treated as presages of our common future by so many people.

As is probably true of most social movements with a minimal or zero degree of organization, the origins and actual nature of those who consider themselves to be "hippies" are very unclear. The hippies have so often been used as symbolic weapons by so many different groups, both Left and Right, that there is a great buzzing confusion about their messages. Very importantly, it is quite impossible today to weed out those messages they set out to communicate and those which they came to adopt as a result of their interaction with the rest of our society. But this does not matter too much. After all, we are interested both in the messages intended and in the messages as interpreted by the rest of society, especially by the youth who have responded favorably to them.

It has generally been agreed that the hippies are fundamentally a dropout subculture, a subculture that first and foremost rejects American society, a subculture whose members' primary response is one of rejection and withdrawal, even flight to the deserts and mountains to escape prying eyes. Though overdoing their uniqueness, Lewis Yablonsky has truthfully represented this aspect of the hippie movement:

The hippie movement's posture of *total rejection* places it in a unique position as an American social movement. Most small and even powerful social movements in America have been geared to modify only part of the social structure. The Townsend Plan movement, for example, was essentially related to a greater distribution of the wealth to older people. The civil-rights movement essentially has had the objective of acquiring equal civil rights for all people regardless of race or creed. Even the most militant 'black power' advocates live their daily lives American style. The new left and other campus political activist groups had and have limited political goals. The labor movement sought a particular kind of arrangement and relationship to management. *Unlike these efforts at partial changes in the society, the hippie phenomenon, although fetal and relatively powerless, emerges as the first American social movement that totally rejects the American social system.*²⁶

Because the work ethic has formed such a basic part of the cultures of all Western societies for centuries, the hippie rejection has

²⁶ Yablonsky, Lewis, *The Hippie Trip*, New York: Pegasus, 1968, p. 320.

been primarily focused on a rejection of the whole complex of values and ideas associated with work, the work-a-day world view. But this has merely been the focal point of a generalized rejection. Sex has obviously served the same functions of demonstrating rejection insofar as young people can reject the whole society by insisting on violating all the ordinary rules concerning sex. Again, drugs can be used even more strikingly to show this *total* rejection by showing that even the basic form of thought—"rationality"—is rejected, is purposefully destroyed by the ecstasy of drugs (though "ecstasy" is not normally the actual experience of the drug user). Sex and drugs more than anything else constitute an ancient symbolization of the Dionysian rejection of the humdrum world in which emotions are controlled for "practical" purposes. (The Bacchus cult used sex and alcohol—the divine grape; but the hippies cannot use alcohol because it is so intimately tied in with the social practices of the business culture and has so many ordinary status meanings.) "Dropping out" and "turning on" have been the two basic messages of the hippies, at least in the beginning.

This dominant sense of rejection made the hippies very much like the "alienated" college youth Keniston studied in the 1950's. Their emphasis on not-doing, on not-working, not-controlling, not-being-rational, not-being-part-of distinguished them very strongly from the more actively political youth who make up the youth protest movements:

... after having worked for several years with a group of undergraduates who *are* intensely repudiative of American culture, I am inclined to see most student protest not as a manifestation of alienation (as I have used the term), but rather of commitment to the very values that alienated students reject The activist seems determined to implement and live out his parents' values, whereas the alienated student is determined to repudiate them and find alternative values.²⁷

At this early stage probably the only positive side to the hippie world-view was that of being free—"doing free" or "doing your own thing." The rest of society was totally rejected because it was constraining, enslaving, dominated by a drive for power, which necessarily means that some or most are going to be less free, less powerful, whereas the positive goal one sought was freedom, doing what one wanted when and how he wanted—joy. In a *Berkeley Barb* article on the Haight-Ashbury way-of-life we can see both this description of the hippie life and the growing tone of justification

²⁷ Keniston, Kenneth, *Young Radicals*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968, p. 341.

(at least in material written to be published, hence read by outsiders—a reason why so many “real hippies” will not write anything or say anything to social researchers for publication):

From around September of 1966 until around April of '67, before all the national publicity and the coming of the tourists, in the free community part of the Haight-Ashbury, there were very few power, control, manipulation, and coercion games. When people do free they do free.

Millions of free events on individual and large novas scale have been enacted in the last year. These free actions have generated energies of free joy to tens of millions of people in the United States and the world. Tens of thousands of people have lived here during the last year, free from power games and almost totally free from violence.

Until April, we lived on the street for over a year, and we saw only one fight and heard of only five others (not counting incidents of police brutality). If you're wondering what this riff is about, the point is that it is totally believable that men can live in an almost totally free environment without power games or violent performances.²⁸

In the same way, the use of drugs became something more than simply a way to joy, a free doing-one's-own-thing, that was sometimes sex, sometimes Indian chants, and sometimes anything else—or nothing. As the pressures from outside became greater, as “social controls” of many forms, especially the informal ones of rousing and firing and showing contempt, were increasingly applied, the use of drugs, sex, and most other patterns of hippie activities were increasingly presented as superior to the ordinary American way of life, as a proof of the superiority of the hippie vision. This is very clear in the mystical rationale of drug use developed over the years by Timothy Leary, especially after his struggles with Harvard and the police. Leary's glorification of the drug-induced mystical experience came after his struggles, and probably largely as a result of them. There is, of course, a strong support for “real” mysticism and for religious experience in general—the “experience of inner, true, real Being—the Discovery of God”—in Western cultures, and Leary simply tapped this ancient cultural tradition to show in a culturally plausible fashion (to some) that his was a superior path to the “worldly” ways of most Americans, the citizens of Mammon (how many Americans publicly believe in being “materialistic”?), even though he denied the existence of such cultural support. Indeed, he argued that drug experience showed (even “scientifically”) that this

²⁸ Anonymous, “Mutant's Commune,” pp. 30-50, in *Notes From the New Underground*, Jesse Kornbluth, ed., New York: The Viking Press, 1968, p. 43.

"materialistic game" was not even "real"; it was all illusory compared to what the mystical experience induced by drugs (the "new game") revealed; and this new experience revealed the superiority of a whole new way-of-life, a way of freedom and equality:

Unfortunately the West has no concepts for thinking and talking about this basic dialogue. There is no ritual for mystical experience, for the mindless vision. What should provoke intense and cheerful competition too often evokes suspicion, anger, impatience. What can be holy and intensely educational in the action of CE drugs on the cortex finds no ritual for application. This is to me one of the greatest challenges of our times.

The nongame visionary experiences are, I submit, the key to behavior change. Drug-induced *satori* [Enlightenment]. In three hours under the right circumstances the cortex can be cleared. The games that frustrate and torment can be seen in the cosmic dimension. But the West has no ritual, no game to handle the CE drug experience. In the absence of relevant rituals we can only impose our familiar games. The politics of the nervous system. The mind controlling the brain. Physicians seek to impose their game of control and prescription. The Bohemians naturally strive to impose their games of back-alley secrecy. The police, the third member of the happy, symbiotic drug-triangle naturally move in to control and prosecute.

Clearly we need new rituals, new goals, new rules, new concepts to apply and use these precious substances for man's welfare. To give the brain back to the species.²⁹

Not very surprisingly, this whole justification of drug use by the argument that it induces a better self and better way of life was later picked up and repeated point for point by hippie propagandists:

In a communiqué distributed on Haight Street this spring by a group of Diggers, the statement is printed: "Enlightenment," described in many tongues and in many ways, teaches, among other truths, that truly to feel the unity of all men that is love requires the giving up of the illusion of game-playing abstractions. A perfection of inner self, sometimes attainable through LSD-25 or other psychedelics, reveals the failure of all political games . . . the failure to LET IT GO. Do you want to SHOW people a groovy way of life, or do you want to TELL THEM HOW TO LIVE

²⁹ Leary, Timothy, "How to Change Behavior," pp. 498-512, in *Interpersonal Dynamics*, Warren G. Bennis et al., eds., Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964, pp. 506-507.

and back it up with bottles, bricks, boards and even bullets?³⁰

Once a social movement is created, once it has distinctive features, it can be made use of by other members of society for their own purposes, in precisely the same way that personal styles of hair and dress can be used by new groups, independently of their originally intended meanings. In the case of the hippies, all kinds of people who wanted to attack American society, for whatever reason, began to expropriate the symbols of the hippie way-of-life. Those symbols came to be seen as powerful in American society today, as generators of publicity, of fear, hatred, and of many other things. "Flower power," the antithesis of the hippie message in the beginning, became a reality and social protesters sought to turn "flower power" to their own ends. As Ralph Gleason has argued:

The increasing attraction of the long-haired Haight-Ashbury hippies is in the obvious fact that what they do generate is power. You may call them flower children, call them The Love Generation, call them mindless LSD idiots, call them anything you please—they are the most powerful single social movement in the country amongst Caucasians. They generate psychic force; they accomplish things and they have created a community that is effectively functioning, surviving the guerrilla attacks made upon it by the Establishment, and within the ordinary society. And, as the hard reality of white politics is revealed to youth—the Free Speech Movement never had a chance and its leaders are in jail this minute, not for revolting against the stodgy University of California administration, but for trespassing, i.e., threatening property—more and more of them are simply turning away from the traditional forms of dissent because they find dissent meaningless.³¹

Being a power in the land, a powerful symbol of rebellion, the hippie social movement was increasingly reinterpreted by more politically oriented, more activist individuals and groups to suit their radical political purposes. Ralph Gleason's own "description" of the hippie movement is a good example of this social redefinition, this politicizing of the movement and its symbols:

"Turn on, tune in and drop out" is widely read as meaning drop out completely from society, which is what the beatniks did. This is not at all what is going on with the hippies. They are doing something else, much more constructive and

³⁰ Gleason, Ralph J., "The Power of Non-Politics or the Death of the Square Left," pp. 214-223, in Kornbluth, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-217.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

much more meaningful and infinitely creative. They are, in effect, the first creative social movement in decades among white people in the U.S.

The hippies are dropping out of the Madison Avenue, LBJ society in which a Hubert Humphrey can publicly put his arm around Lester Maddox and say there's room for him in the Democratic Party. They are dropping out of a society which condones napalm (and from the radical intellectual society which condones it in one country and condemns it in another).

But they are not just dropping out into Limbo or Nirvana. They are building a new set of values, a new structure, a new society, if you will, horizontal to the old but in it. . . .

Now the point of that is that the rock groups and the Diggers represent communal, low-pressure-on-the-individual organization in which the whole of the Haight-Ashbury hippie world operates, as opposed to plastic uptight America.

Communes, handcrafts, survival in the wilderness, farming, and other similar activities are a part and parcel of the movement. Maybe the Luddites did have a bad press, as E. J. Bogsbawn has suggested, and we may have to go back to them or even before, to take up the thread of history and straighten things out.

But the fact of the matter is that these people are trying, by demonstration, to show the world *how to live now*.³²

Once this redefinition had begun, the individuals who recruited themselves under the hippie banner—for the hippie movement is certainly a do-your-own-categorizing-thing—became far more complicated, more mixed. There were an increasing number with political goals—they were *political hippies*. The recruitment, then, had the same effect as the polarizing attacks of the officials and public: each drove the movement into a more rebellious position, at least insofar as the social definition of what constituted the movement was concerned. Those who still were primarily concerned with the rejection of American society and the freedom to do their own thing moved out—they “split”—to live in the hippie communes that now dot the countryside, the mountains, the forests, and the deserts of America. Others floated in various directions at different times. Some moved resolutely to create and use “flower power”—but by any means other than the sowing of flowers.

One of the most apparent effects of hippie cultural elements was

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 215-216.

in the college drug scene. Drugs, especially marihuana and, much less frequently, LSD, had become symbols of rebellion for American college youth, probably in good part for independent reasons but also in significant part because of the vast publicity concerning the relations between drug use and the hippie rebellion. The hippie ideas, especially their rationales for using drugs and their commitment to attacks on American "square" society, became standard parts of this vastly larger and more diffuse subculture of college drug users.

"Marihuana users" and users of other drugs in college range all the way from the "straight" sorority girl who secretly tries it "just once," or the occasional "recreational user," to the hard-core "head." But there are many thousands of students, especially in the "elite schools" like Berkeley, who systematically smoke pot or use other drugs as part of a generalized subculture of rebellion. For them, smoking pot has become symbolic of this rebellion, of this rejection of the work-a-day, square world; and as a symbol of that rebellious subculture, it becomes a way of taking part in the secret communion of believers, a sharing in the new freedom, and a demonstration of one's belonging in that amorphous, otherwise invisible group of rebels. James Carey, in his excellent study of *The College Drug Scene*, has argued that marihuana and LSD users have in fact almost always started in good part *because* they were dissatisfied with society in general:

The beginning for everyone seems to be some critical awareness of the way things are in society. A sense of disillusionment is strong. As a 24-year-old reformed head and laboratory technician put it: I guess it takes a dissatisfaction with—first you have to be dissatisfied with what you see around you in society. Because if you're satisfied with other people and yourself, and just whatever you see when you walk down the street or look out the window, then you'll probably never take it, because, because, if you're satisfied with it, then you accept all the norms. One of the norms is that you don't smoke pot. And, eventually somebody is going to come along and offer you some. And, eventually if enough people offer it to you, you are going to take some.³³

But the rebellious youth cultures, especially the hippie rebellion and the drug rebellion, have also flowed into more radical, more political forms of protest. The Yippies are the most extreme group of politicized, radicalized hippie-types. They make use of the hippie styles, the hippie strategies of personal encounters, the hippie expressions, the hippie ideas, and the hippie category in slightly revised

³³ Carey, James T., *The College Drug Scene*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, pp. 48-49.

form. But they use all of these as part of a radical, confrontationist movement with the general goal of "revolutionizing" American society, though what that "revolutionizing" might be is hard to say and among the Yippies the rebellious subcultures mingled with and overlapped the radical protest subcultures; youth who used confrontationist tactics were generally willing to take part in violent encounters, at the very least as the *dramatized victims*, in order to achieve their quasi-political goals of "revolutionizing" American society. But in some ways the Yippies also represent the outer fringes of the youth rebellions, a real "freak-out," a nongroup seeking to dramatize the necessary absurdity of the whole "social game." In some ways "revolution" to them means simply dramatizing this necessary absurdity and then watching the pieces fall apart as the players come to see through that drama that it is all only a game that is ultimately absurd. The Yippies are political-psychedelics *acting out* the message of drugs. As Abbie Hoffman has said in a "chapter" entitled "Revolution: The Highest Trip of Them All":

Revolution for the hell of it? Why not? It's all a bunch of phony words anyway. Once one has experienced LSD, existential revolution, fought the intellectual game-playing of the individual in society, of one's identity, one realizes that action is the only reality, not only reality but morality as well. One learns reality is a subjective experience. It exists in my head. I am the Revolution.³⁴

The Significance of the Rebellious Youth Subcultures

The Yippies, while important in themselves for certain reasons, were indicative of a far more important aspect of the youth subcultures, movements, and organizations: they show very clearly how *fluid* all such social categorizations of youth are, how vague the membership criteria and self-identifications are, how changing they are, how overlapping, how problematic are the meanings of the various symbols used in any given situation, and how any given subculture and organization flows into so many others. It is not even possible to say with *any* certainty whether any given group or subculture or movement is "revolutionary." In fact, it is often not possible to even be sure of the goals and the situational desires of any given (vaguely defined) group. This is, of course, true of any political movement or group, since the goals, values, desires, and so on, of the group are socially meaningful in many ways and become politically meaningful in vastly complex ways, helping to determine who will support or attack the group. Such goals, values, etc., become subject to *political definition* by many different groups for the

³⁴ Hoffman, Abbie, *Revolution For the Hell Of It*, New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1968, p. 9.

purposes they have at hand in the immediate situation, so that different groups are purposefully manipulating the meanings of these things and, hence, the meanings of the group and its significances for our society as a whole. This, for example, is perfectly clear in the immensely complex (and lurid) official reports concerning the goals of the Yippies at the Chicago Democratic National Convention, as reported by Jerome Skolnick in *The Politics of Protest*:

The variety of intelligence received by law enforcement officials is indicated by this listing of Yippie threats published in the mass media: "There were reports of proposals to dynamite natural gas lines; to dump hallucinating drugs into the city's water system; to print forged credentials so that demonstrators could slip into the convention hall; to stage a mass stall-in of old jalopies on the expressways and thereby disrupt traffic; to take over gas stations, flood sewers with gasoline, then burn the city; to fornicate in the parks and on Lake Michigan's beaches; to release greased pigs throughout Chicago, at the Federal Building and at the Amphitheater; to slash tires along the city's freeways and tie up traffic in all directions; to scatter razor sharp three-inch nails along the city's highways; to place underground agents in hotels, restaurants, and kitchens where food was prepared for delegates, and drug food and drink; to paint cars like independent taxicabs and forcibly take delegates to Wisconsin or some other place far from the convention; to engage Yippie girls as 'hookers' to attract delegates and dose the drinks with LSD; to bombard the Amphitheatre with mortars from several miles away; to jam communication lines from mobile units; to disrupt the operations of airport control towers, hotel elevators and railway switching yards; to gather 230 'hyper-potent' hippie males into a special battalion to seduce the wives, daughters and girlfriends of convention delegates; to assemble 100,000 people to burn draft cards with the fires spelling out: 'Beat Army'; to turn on fire hydrants, set off false fire and police alarms, and string wire between trees in Grant Park and Lincoln Park to trip up three-wheeled vehicles of the Chicago police; to dress Yippies like Viet Cong and walk the streets shaking hands or passing out rice; to infiltrate the right wing with short haired Yippies and at the right moment exclaim: 'You know, these Yippies have something to say!'; to have ten thousand nude bodies floating on Lake Michigan—the list could go on."³⁵

³⁵ Skolnick, Jerome H., *The Politics of Protest*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1969, pp. 285-286.

Today there are many social prophets who insist with complete certainty that *the* youth movement is this, that, or the other. In many cases these prophecies are very clearly made by radicals and radical sympathizers who are would-be leaders of a Second Great Children's Crusade (though they presumably expect the Crusade to be more successful this time than the first time). They are generally trying to make themselves and others believe that at last the Mighty Host has arrived in the land to set men free from the iniquities of the materialistic life of hard work, competition, and repression. They use wild generalizations about the unity of "the youth movement" and its "totally revolutionary nature" to create an image of strength that will flag floundering spirits, urge the unconvinced to join up before the bandwagon leaves them in the dust (or the "dustbin of history"), and scare their ancient foes into submission: as the bumper sticker says, "America: *Change It Or Lose It.*" These prophets have hailed the new *Swarmings* of rebellious youth, such as the vast swarming host that turned on and tuned in to the Woodstock Rock Festival, as a third coming, the rise of the New Christianity (only better than last time) that will sweep irresistibly across the land and down through the ages; and, in fact, the radical youth and their adult supporters and users do very frequently make precisely this parallel between the suppressed state of early Christians and the "suppressed" state of youth today (with Chicago as the modern Coliseum), a parallel which even so balanced an analyst as Daniel Moynihan has seen as worthy of consideration in his essay on "Nirvana Now."

At the other extreme, those who are committed to opposing and repressing the rebellious youth movement, as are a large percentage of the older generation and their official agents of control, see the rebellious youth movements as a rising tide of anarchy. They, too, make wild prophecies about the "anarchic hordes" and their growing strength, but for opposite purposes. Presumably, they seek to create a nightmare image of invading hordes that will galvanize the true bulwarks of social order and democracy to repress these hordes before it is too late, before they have overrun us all and—what? At this point, even the enemies of the movements cannot decide just what the enemy is like or just what he is after. Some are obviously simply fighting ancient enemies who have taken a new form and grown stronger: they see only Communist conspiracies in every nude party, every braless breast, every joint of marihuana, every strand of long hair or dirty feet exposed to public view. Others see a new religion. Some believers in the old religion see the revival of the old. Others see the final, long-delayed death rattles of the family.

This great buzzing confusion over the meanings of the rebellious youth subcultures, movements, and situational events only shows how

fluid they are, how rapidly changing, how amorphous, how overlapping. But all of this does not mean that there are not some discernible patterns to them, however tentative we must be in evaluating those patterns. Most important it seems very clear that a generalized youth subculture involving significant elements of "alienation" and incipient "rebellion" has been growing throughout American society (and with vague relations to developments in other nations), though this subculture is only very situationally participated in or made use of (mainly on Rock occasions) by the great majority of American youth, who remain "straight"; and that this generalized youth culture is tied in with far more specific and far more rebellious youth subcultures, such as the leisure cults and the hippies, who provide many of the symbolic styles used by youth to set themselves off from the adult world and most of the ideas of rebellion. This generalized youth culture and even the rebellious youth cultures are not in themselves revolutionary in any way. That is, they are not setting out to overthrow the government or any other part of our society by concerted political action. For the most part, they have been apolitical. But they do flow into far more political subcultures with more revolutionary ideas and goals; they provide some of the ideas, styles, publicity-getting image, and (cross-over) recruits (who can go both ways—this is, some revolutionaries go apolitical, just as the apoliticals can go politico). Very importantly, the generalized and slightly rebellious youth culture and, most especially, the rebellious youth cultures provide the vaguely favorable social context for the evolution of the more political protest movements. It is these rebellious cultural elements that are so widely shared that prepare a great number of American youth, especially college youth (for reasons we shall see), for the far more political protest movements when the situations that elicit and emotionalize these rebellious ideas arise; and it is this vague, generalized sense of rebellion against the adult world, especially against those seen as the official representatives of that adult world (the oppressors or suppressors), that provides an everyday social context for political protest that is implicitly supportive and rarely involves any informal controls. Without this generalized social context the student protest movements would prove ineffectual. With it, they have proven very effective in some ways, if not exactly in the ways intended.

Chapter 4. The Changing Social Position of College Youth and the Growing Student Subculture

This has been like a Greek tragedy from the beginning. . . . Everyone is playing a predetermined part. Everybody speaks the lines he is supposed to speak and we go plodding on to the inevitable outcome.

Charles E. Young, UCLA Chancellor
(Quoted in *The Los Angeles Times*)

Changes in culture, in the shared meanings of any unit of population, are almost always the result of some change in the social or physical position of those involved. The development of a subculture within any given society is normally the result of some significant change in the social position shared by some of the members of that society. There are two general types of social change that produce such shared social positions that in turn can produce such developments of subcultures. For want of any better names, we can call these the *shared interests* changes in social position and the *shared problems* changes. Social scientists have normally concentrated on shared problems when analyzing the development of deviant subcultures, such as delinquent subcultures, but this is, apparently, simply because they have tended to see political activity as positive—hence having interests as its reason for existing—and deviant activity as negative—hence having problems as its reason for existing. Subcultures can in fact develop both because of shared interests, or “positive” factors, and shared problems, or “negative” factors. Some subcultures can be built on little more than a shared celebration of common membership; and we have already seen that there exists a very important element of this “mutual admiration society” in the current art forms shared by American youth. Others can be built primarily on some very practical problems or set of problems shared by a group; such political action groups as the Townsend Movement seem to have been built on such problems. But most social movements that produce subcultures involve both common problems and common interests.

Youth in general seem to have developed only a minimal subculture primarily because they have not come to share more than a minimal social position with minimal shared interests and minimal shared problems. But more specific groups of American youth, such as the urban Black youth and college youth, have come to have far more

common social positions and have, as a result, more shared interests and shared problems that support the construction of a more highly developed subculture.

College youth have come to share an ever more similar social position for an ever longer period of time. Not only does this period continue to expand further into the late twenties for a growing percentage of "youth," but it has also started at an increasingly early age as the college-bound youth have started their *college-preparatory life* at an earlier age and with growing commitment. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman have described this continuity very well:

Today's students are quite different from those who entered college a generation or two ago. They have lived in a very different sort of adolescent subculture before matriculating, and college occupies a different place in their overall life cycle. There was a time in the not-so-distant past when a middle-class high school boy could goof off in class or get in trouble on his block with almost complete confidence that his misadventures would not be held against him. If he decided to go straight, he could do so simply by applying to a reputable college. If his parents could pay the tuition his other failings would usually be forgotten. No more. Today's high school student is told that his future position in life depends on getting good professional training, that this depends on his getting into a good college, and that this in turn depends on his performing well in high school. A misstep in high school may, in other words, count against him forever. (Or so the myth says. In reality America still offers a great many second chances.)

The effect of such assumptions is difficult to chart, but they appear to hasten a kind of maturity. High school students seem to feel that they are more on their own and that their fate depends more on what they do and less on what their parents do for them. Success seems to depend on what they have in their heads, not what kinds of property their parents have in the bank. Partly as a result, many children feel less obligation than they once did to maintain strong ties with their parents or to conform to their parents' standards.

Breaking out of the family circle has always left the young uncertain where their loyalties lay and what limits still restricted their behavior. They have therefore tended to get involved in all sorts of quasi-familial groups which aroused at least temporary faith in something larger than themselves. The residential college, with its fraternities, football games, and general emphasis on school spirit, was once such a group. Today the suburban high school often

plays this role, at least among the middle classes, just as the junior high school is now the scene for many early adolescent dramas once associated with high school. Thus by the time today's young people reach college some have already been through the family break and are ready for a more mature role.¹

Until the last few decades, college education for most people was simply an extension of one's family and personal involvements. The average college student was a young man who expected to make his way in the world on the basis of his previously existing social ties, his father's business position, his friendships, and his general class position. College life was an extension of this set of social relations and the center of college life was that specific part of college in which these outside relations were focused—the fraternity (or sorority, as women increasingly entered the college), the secret club, the key club, the eating club, or whatever specific name this lifelong membership group went by at any given college.

Students under these conditions had many shared interests, but few of them had much to do with the college life they were leading. Their shared interests were class interests, professional interests, and so on. There were few shared social interests that could form the basis for the development of a very distinctive college subculture.

College itself was not even important enough to constitute much of a shared problem for the students. This was the age in which college was more of a finishing school, a rite of passage into upper class life, even for the males. This was the age of the "gentlemanly C," the fraternity hazing, the football weekend, and adolescent high-jinks. All of these activities and views of college life still exist in most American colleges, and at some backwater colleges they are still the order of the day for most students, but they have decreased very rapidly in their prevalence and in their importance. Secret clubs began to wither several decades ago, hazing is seen as childish, fraternities are dying, football and all sports are being deemphasized (and replaced by professional sports), the gentlemanly C has been largely replaced by the combined panic over the GPA and the attempts to coerce the GPA ratebusters.

The growth of the industrial-technological meritocracy and the increasing part played in the meritocracy by college education and, even more, by the college degree, have changed the earlier traditions of colleges and universities in American society and in much of the Western world. College life is no longer simply an extension of family ties and friendship ties. College life is no longer simply a time of adolescent high-jinks, of fun and games. Unlike elementary and high

¹ Jencks, Christopher, and Riesman, David, *The Academic Revolution*, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968, pp. 41-42.

school education, which are still very largely felt by the students to be "unreal" and to be fun and games, college life is now part of the "real world." It is no longer an "identity moratorium." It is a very practical activity for most people and is seen as having great bearing on their whole social identities. (A study by *Fortune* found that at least three-fifths of college students were there for very practical reasons.) As we have seen in Chapter 1, college life has come to be seen as increasingly important in the lives of the students, as increasingly the source of status, and not merely as adjunct to status. It is no longer an ivory tower, but a place of very practical work. Rather than a time in life for songs of youthful *Weltschmerz* and moonlight serenades, it is increasingly a place of hard work and of anguish over status, of anguish over whether one will get into graduate school or professional school, or will get the "right" government or corporation job. College has increasingly become a source of shared interest and shared problems *in itself* for students. Rather than being an extension of outside social relations and social status, the college and university has increasingly become a way of transforming outside social relations and social status. The outside world has become more an adjunct to the college and university, at least *as students see it*, whether it is true or not. There is every practical reason for taking one's membership in the college community, one's *identity* as a "college student," as increasingly important. As a result, these shared interests and shared problems that one has with other students become an increasingly important part of one's social position, as the individual himself defines that social position, and, therefore, becomes an increasingly important basis for the development of a subculture—and a class.

The New Leisure Class

College students have also come to have many of the attributes of a *new class*. That is, not only do they have many general interests and problems in common, but they have many economic interests and problems in common, both as students and as individuals bound for certain kinds of jobs and styles of life. Their problems are probably the most important to most of them, especially in these times of rapidly rising costs and rising "taxpayer revolts." Since college is no longer a rich man's game, or even a game played predominantly by the upper-middle classes, most of the college students have significant financial problems (as they see it) and these problems tend to be roughly the same from one student to another and to have similar causes—such as rising college fees and other costs. In the most general way, most college students today come to share the problem of being economically poor, while being from a family of higher (middle-class and up) status, and being in a dependent and pre-

carious economic position, either dependent on their families or on the colleges—or, as frequently happens today, on both. As a class group, students are caught in economic situations fraught with conflicts that create important elements of anxiety for many of them, conflicts and anxieties which are *easily blamed on others and on the nature of their social position in general*. As a class, college students are marginal men, with all the elements of ambivalence and aggressive searches for new “solutions” to their problems which that status can produce. One of the obvious ways to “solve” such a status problem is to reject the old status criteria and create and enforce new criteria in terms of which one can succeed. These new criteria in terms of which they can succeed would have to be independent of and against success in terms of money, power, prestige (in the general community), and the other criteria of adults.

But this is precisely where the immediate economic class interests of the college students dovetail with and reinforce their broader class interests, their distinctive style-of-life interests. This is not merely a new class, it is, more specifically, a *new leisure class*. College students, especially those from the upper and upper-middle classes, who predominate at the “elite colleges,” have been the first large group of people in the history of American society—and the world—to be truly affluent. As they themselves so often insist, they are the affluent generation—the post-depression, post-war, welfare generation. They have been free of work and free of most economic worries all their lives. They have spent much of their lives lolling before television sets, dating, going to the beach, and doing whatever seemed like fun at the time: “If it feels good, do it.” Fun and freedom have become their gods, their values, their way of life. They have lived in leisure cultures and devoted themselves to entertainment cultures for most of their adolescent lives, though those bound for the “elite schools” have in recent years had to resentfully devote some more time to competing for grades during schooltime. They have not merely been treated permissively by their parents; they have been indulged, freed from almost all household tasks by hard-working mothers who spent considerable time driving them around to their parties when they were children and helping them prepare for dates or parties when they were older.

It is little wonder that as youth in their later teens or early twenties they have become devotees of “living for the moment,” “tripping,” “doing your own thing,” and of all attacks on discipline or authority. They have always been so much freer from all these (erst-while?) “nasty necessities of life” that they have almost no understanding of them; and the adult idea that one can find self-fulfillment in work, or any kind of value at all, seems totally absurd.

The demands of academic discipline and their sudden (if rela-

tive) poverty must surely come as a shock to such a group, as a vicious attack on ("class") privileges that have been so unchallenged that they have become taken for granted by them and by adults. As college has become more integrated with the adult work-world, more "real," it has placed increasing demands of work, and the discipline of work, on its students, especially in the "elite schools" which have been the ones to be most rapidly transformed into appendages of the meritocracy. But *these students are precisely the people least prepared and least adapted to these demands of work and discipline.* These students, therefore, have been the ones to respond with the greatest sense of "moral" outrage.

All of the shared interests of this new leisure class are best served by attacking the old values of work and authority and substituting in their place value criteria that emphasize freedom over authority, doing-your-own-thing over discipline, leisure over work, entertainment over study, tripping over problem solving, youth over age. "Being uptight" is the worst, "letting go" the best. "Spontaneity" is "beautiful"; striving for long-run goals is ugly. "Feeling" can be trusted; reason is suspect. "Youth power" is right; "adult power" is corrupt. We are "idealistic"; they are "immoral." We are "honest"; they are "hypocritical." All the rhetorical attacks and transformations of a class struggle are apparent in these attacks on the adult world and in these self-eulogies. The new leisure class is necessarily also a counterculture—counter adult work-world. It is this counterculture that Samuel P. Huntington has described even at Harvard, where the new leisure class has been displacing the intellectually oriented students who were dominant in the 1950's:

[This counterculture combines] commitments to expressionism, participation, passion, feeling, subjectivism, relevance, and commitment. It is essentially a (capital R) Romantic culture. It seems to oppose any distinctions among people. Thus there is the assault on the institutions which separate men from women—dress styles, hair styles, living arrangements—as well as those practices inherent in the academic culture which separate the scholarly from the non-scholarly: grades, honors, specialization. The counterculture is, in this sense, a culture of homogenization. . . .

. . . faculty members cannot help but be somewhat wary of students, and it is not because we think they may disrupt our classes or burn our files. The cause is much more fundamental. It is because the consensus which did prevail on the purposes of the university community is now breaking up. It is because students and faculty increasingly tend

to worship at different altars and to judge by different codes.²

For well over a hundred years members of the Western societies have progressively pushed back the age at which the harsh demands of the adult work-world are made upon individuals. First child labor was eliminated, then teenage labor. First children and the teenaged were subjected to work standards in schools with harsh standards, then schools up through high school became progressive. Today the harsh demands come suddenly—shockingly—in the colleges, at least in the elite ones. The youth are suddenly thrown into a harsh, impersonal, huge world in which they are no longer the center of attention, no longer doted upon by affluent parents too busy working (to remain affluent) to even demand work of the young, no longer *the* important people, but rather, suddenly IBM card numbers. It is too much to endure. The frustration and anger are immense. The world must be changed—now! The administrators are to blame. The faculty, the military-industrial complex. The machine. The world. Them. Eradicate the infamy! The new seeds of a generational revolt are partially born in the sweat shops of America's universities. As long as the universities first administer the rod of work to the leisure class, they will be an object of frustration and anguish. Certainly the revolt would not have broken out in the virulence we have seen in recent years without some more substantial sense of anguish, born primarily of the race issue and Vietnam, but it would have simmered and grown until it did begin to boil over in many ways. As it is now, by putting the lash or work to this new class, the universities help to prepare most students for mobilization by the radicals.

The Ambivalent Status of the "Yeung Adult"

At the same time college life has become more "real," more important to the students, and to our society in general, it has come to take up an increasing part of a student's life. The demands of college take a greater part of each day and each week and each year because it is taken more seriously, because the knowledge to be accumulated is ever more vast, because attendance at summer school has become increasingly common, and because of promises (or threats) to make college a year round form of work; but, most importantly of all, college life has come to take a greater part of an average student's life by being extended. More college students go on to finish their college careers but most importantly of all, an ever greater number of those students go to graduate school so that the most rapidly increasing percentage of students is at the graduate level. This development seems important in leading to the extension

² Anonymous, "Harvard's Three Cultures," *Newsweek*, September 29, 1969, p. 77.

of the social category of "youth" to an ever greater age. It is increasingly common for individuals in their late twenties who are graduate students to consider themselves, and to be considered by others, to be "college kids," or "youth." (Because of this there may be less arbitrariness than most people think to the use of the age of 30 as the cutting point between the young and the old, or the young and the adults.) This extension of the student age has meant that not only is there more time for membership in the college community to become the basis for one's identity, but there is also more time for common interest and problems to develop, to be defined as common by the individuals, and, very importantly, there are more educated and experienced individuals around who can organize any social movements based on any student subculture and who can integrate that *student movement* with outside "*adult*" movements.

All of this has had the profound effect of transforming the very meaning, to the students themselves, of "college student" and of "youth." In the nineteenth century, students were on the average much younger than they are today and were still predominantly involved in the family, so that the college was primarily an extension of family life. They were still seen as "children" for most important social purposes, although they themselves quite apparently rejected this whole idea and used drinking and other symbolic resources to demonstrate otherwise. The colleges treated them as children and maintained strong controls on their whole lives. Colleges became the surrogate parents, legally *in loco parentis*. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman have described this nineteenth-century college very well:

The nineteenth-century college was in many ways a logical extension of the nineteenth-century family. Colleges tended to be small, financially shaky, and extremely authoritarian. The life of the mind was not unknown, but neither was it usually central. The curriculum was largely prescribed, and the pedagogy consisted mainly of daily assignments and recitations. Extracurricular life was also closely regulated, and an enormous amount of energy seems to have gone into keeping unruly students from misbehaving. Corporal punishment was common, and the students often responded with violent rioting. While students undoubtedly had great influence on one another both socially and intellectually, their lives were circumscribed and the youth culture had nothing like the autonomy of its modern counterpart.³

In recent years, the "Child-student" has become a "young-adult-student" and, as such, has come to have a set of shared interests and

³ Jencks and Riesman, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

problems independent of the family and derived from and focused on the college experience. But the "young-adult-student" is by no means identical with the "adult." He is increasingly involved in the "work" of the "real world," but there is still a real difference: he is involved but not by any means totally a part of that "real world." His social condition is much more a combination of child and adult status. His is an in-between condition, while he himself rejects any conception of himself as a child. To him "youth" means full adulthood—and better, for he sees himself as better than most adults or, at the least, as the best of the adults. (Surely there is an "overdriven" striving involved here because of his continuing uncertainties, but that can only add emotionalism to his insistence that he is a full-fledged adult.) But his continued social definition as part-child means that he is denied the full rights and responsibilities of adulthood. This social situation provides him and all other students with a very important shared problem and, very significantly, it provides those among them who take the initiative in seizing full-fledged responsibilities an excellent opportunity for creating those responsibilities by organizing their fellow students. One becomes more "real," more "adult," by "doing" something in his social world, by "acting" rather than simply "taking" what you're given. Again, Jencks and Riesman have seen some of the important reasons for this development:

At the same time certain kinds of responsibility come later and later. While young people still hold various kinds of temporary jobs during adolescence, they find it hard to embark on a career in the traditional sense before they reach twenty-two. The most interesting work usually requires professional training beyond the B.A. and often is not begun in earnest until twenty-five or more. This means not only that the young are denied the kinds of responsibility that go with many jobs, but that they often depend on their families for money until at least twenty-one and often even later.

Thus while adolescence begins earlier, it also continues longer. Students must begin making good records sooner, yet these records bring tangible results later and later. This combination of precocity and enforced dependency encourages students to create a make-believe world in which it is "as if" they were grown up. To achieve this they must organize their own lives, define their own limits, set their own ideals, and deny the authority and legitimacy of the adult world which they cannot join.⁴

The very ambivalence of their status, their very inability to just quit the old ways, to walk away from it all, becomes a reason for

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

violently rejecting the old ways, for attacking them. While we must certainly avoid making too much of any such psychologistic explanations, for fear of winding up evading the real issues posed by the youth, there do seem to be some such "counteractions" involved in some of their actions that could be partially the result of such ambivalence.

Insofar as this younger generation does accept older American values, and shares the feelings of their elders, they have "good" reason (as typical members of our society would see it) to feel guilty about their situation in life. The whole traditional ethos of giving rather than receiving, of giving more than you get, of giving in return for receiving, of service to others, of getting only what one has actually deserved, of getting only what one has a right to because one has put in enough work to deserve it, and of striving hard to overcome challenges, seems so obviously to be violated by an affluent generation which has received so very much for so very little, however unintended the "violation" might be. The present college generation has received so much for so little that they are in default of the traditional values of work, fairness, kindness, and worth. Not only have most of them been extremely affluent from the time they were small children, but it is a status they did nothing to achieve and one they are reluctant to give up. There are, then, some very important reasons why they *might* feel guilty about their situation, why they might feel both guilty and useless. It is precisely this kind of guilt which can lead to a kind of self-hatred of what one has been which we see so much of in the present day rejection of adult bourgeois society by college-age youth. It may also be that much of the sense of anguish, the sense of bitterness, of irrational hatred which we see in the youth movements is related to such a deep, subconscious feeling of guilt. At the same time, there is ample evidence from what these young college radicals say that they are aware of such feelings of guilt. By reviling their parents' entire bourgeois society, and by demanding a commitment of the whole society to the purpose of eliminating the poverty of a small minority in the society, they would seem to be trying to expiate their feelings of guilt about having been members of the affluent leisure class.

To the parents of these young people, this entire attitude, this feeling of guilt and the consequent demands for expiation, appear to be totally "irrational" because the parents as children and youth were not members of an affluent leisure class. The great majority of today's upper middle class, middle-aged people lived through periods of relative poverty in American society. Probably the majority of them experienced not only "hard times" but considerable "immiseration" during the depression decade. They also carried the great burden of the Second World War and the Korean war. Having lived through

a period of great poverty with relative difficulty, having sacrificed many years of their youth and sometimes some of their health and blood to "our country" during the "best years of their lives," they have no feelings of guilt about having become affluent. They feel that they have worked extremely hard for what they have and have made very great sacrifices both for what they have and for the society as a whole. They made those sacrifices both for the United States and, as they saw it, for the rest of the world. In addition, they feel that they have built the most affluent society in the world and a society which has done more, both absolutely and proportionately, to build and rebuild the rest of the world than has any other society in the history of the world. In addition, at no times in their lives have they been in the leisure class. When they were teenagers they normally worked and they worked hard. As young people in their twenties they worked even harder and most of them did not go to college. There were no government scholarships. There were relatively few free State universities. They have continued to work hard throughout their lives or they would not have been affluent in this work-oriented society; and, most importantly of all, they feel that their hard work has provided material support which has allowed the present college generation to be a leisure class throughout their childhood and teenage years and sometimes throughout their college careers. They feel in many ways that the youthful idealism of the present college generation has been built on their sweat and toil and that they largely sacrificed their youth for this present generation. Given this point of view, it should not be hard to understand why so many of them experience profound anguish and anger when their children revile them and seek to destroy their entire way of life. Both the guilt feelings of those in the ambivalent class and the anger of the elder generations have contributed greatly to the polarization process (see below).

The Welfare State Generation

At the same time that college students have come increasingly to share these general interests and problems as a result of sharing the general social position of "college student," they have quite inadvertently come to share certain other general interests as a result of their age group in our society, certain interests that have set them off from older groups in our society, especially older groups of college graduates, and have increasingly brought them into conflict with these older groups, thereby producing in turn an increasingly shared problem for college students. These shared interests are the social values which they have been taught by their parents and the general society to accept and act in accord with. These are the values of the welfare state, for the present generation of college students is part of our first *welfare state generation*.

Just as few people have noted the obvious fact that the War Babies have come of age in the sixties, so have few noted the obvious fact that these War Babies were all born and entirely socialized during the first era of the American welfare state. They were born to that generation which supported the Roosevelt New Deal programs by great majorities; they were born immediately after the New Deal programs had become the basic facts of everyday life in American society. Throughout their lives the Federal Government has come to bear an ever greater responsibility for the welfare of all citizens, and by the time they reached college these programs had become moral rights of every American citizen and basic parts of our society. At the same time that this generation was growing up and entering college, the population of American colleges was coming more and more to be made up of all strata of society. Rather than being the havens of the rich, they became the schools of the middle classes, the lower middle classes, and, increasingly, though slowly, even of the lower classes. This meant that the proportion of college students coming from families in which the parents supported the basic programs of the welfare state was growing steadily as the present generation of college students was growing up.

In general, college students seem to have moved steadily toward more liberal (welfare state) values in the last ten to fifteen years. The evidence on this subject is complex and mixed, but, on balance, seems very much to justify this conclusion. All too much of the evidence is based on questionnaire studies which can be so easily "biased" by the types of questions asked, the wordings of questions, the types of analysis used, and so on. Many of the conflicts over the interpretations of these studies is simply the result of using different wordings of questions and different questions. But a reasonably clear pattern emerges when we look at all of these various studies in detail and when we put them in the context of the many things we know from other sources about college students.

When we look at the values, beliefs, and patterns of actions of the mass of college students in the early 1950's we find that they were still predominantly conservative about most things, especially politically. While his conclusions are undoubtedly too sweeping and, possibly, too colored by the then pervasive belief in (and contempt for) the "passive generation" or the "conformist generation" (the "other directed, lonely crowd"), Philip Jacob's conclusions from an extensive study of colleges was probably right about the definite majority of students at that time:

The values of American college students are remarkably homogeneous, considering the variety of their social, economic, ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds, and the relatively unrestricted opportunities they have had for free-

dom of thought and personal development.

A dominant characteristic of students in the current generation is that they are *gloriously contented* both in regard to their present day-to-day activity and their outlook for the future

The great majority of students appear unabashedly *self-centered*. They aspire for material gratifications for themselves and their families. They intend to look out for themselves first and expect others to do likewise.

But this is not the individualistic self-centeredness of the pioneer. American students fully accept the conventions of the contemporary business society as the context within which they will realize their personal desires. They cheerfully expect to conform to the economic status quo and to receive ample rewards for dutiful and productive effort. They anticipate no die-hard struggle for survival of the fittest as each seeks to gratify his own desires, but rather an abundance for all as each one teams up with his fellow self-seekers in appointed places on the American assembly-line.⁵

On the surface of it, if these conclusions regarding the mass of college students in the early 1950's can be taken as even remotely true, we would have to conclude that there has been some almost instantaneous change—indeed, revolution—in the values of college students in the past few years. Actually, such revolutions in values, even in expressed “attitudes,” seem very rare, if they ever do occur. Behavior and operational “interpretations” may change drastically overnight, and certainly they do in such situations as have come to be called “crises” and “confrontations”; but what we would normally think of as value commitments change far more slowly.

First of all, it is reasonably clear that even in the early 1950's and before, there were in fact some important complications not noted by Jacob. For one thing, there have always been various groups of students devoted to highly liberal, socialist, and even radical goals. This was especially true of such colleges as the University of California at Berkeley, which has a long tradition of liberal and radical groups, though generally they have been quite small. There have also always been the Bohemians. For another thing, there is significant evidence indicating that at some schools there was a real pluralism of political views and that this pluralism was closely related to pluralism of group associations. This, for example, is what Rose Goldsen, *et alia*, found to be true in the '50's at Cornell, which was basically conservative but which had a very large and well en-

⁵ Jacob, Philip E., *Changing Values in College*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, pp. 1-2.

trenched (and growing?) minority of liberal students:

In short, one could conclude that there are at least three types of spheres of circulation on the Cornell campus. There are the fraternities which reinforce conservatism in two ways; they insulate their conservative members against change and socialize their liberal members away from liberalism. There are the spheres of social circulation that attract the liberal students, encouraging their point of view, strongly reinforcing it, and insulating them against the impact of conservative norms apparent elsewhere on the rest of the campus. Finally, there is the rest of the Cornell campus, with many organizations and social sub-systems, that provide spheres of social circulation whose norms are undoubtedly at least as conservative as fraternity norms. They serve to insulate their participants against liberalizing influences, but they do not necessarily socialize them away from liberalism as explicitly—or perhaps the point is, as effectively—as the fraternity system does.

There is no reason, of course, why the pattern reported here for Cornell should be assumed to have prevailed as well in the other universities which participated in the research. We are aware that other investigators have reported that college students tend to develop political and economic beliefs and attitudes that are compatible with the consensus of their own campus.

Theodore Newcomb's now classic study of students at Bennington College, for example, showed that students at this college in the thirties when the climate of opinion was generally liberal, became socialized toward liberalism. A recent study of students' political beliefs at UCLA reported that liberal political beliefs and attitudes on current political issues associated with liberalism tend to be more prevalent among seniors than among underclassmen, suggesting that the college years might now be reinforcing liberalism on that campus, rather than conservatism.

Yet our analysis shows that at least as far as economic philosophy is concerned, and at least during the conservative period of American history during which our data were gathered, liberal opinions were less prevalent among seniors. At all the universities we studied, even at such relatively liberal campuses as UCLA, the same trend seemed to occur. Had we been able to observe the development of opinion among all these students as we did at Cornell, we suspect that a similar pattern of socialization toward conservatism,

particularly among fraternity men, might have been found at these schools as well.⁶

At other schools, especially at some of those, such as Harvard, that are central to public and student attention, there were basic changes taking place in the nature of the student body that received almost no public attention during that period. For several decades these "big name" institutions have been steadily shifting toward becoming the primary *gatekeeper institutions* in our American meritocracy. This was most apparent at these schools in the steady shifts toward increasing reliance on meritocratic criteria for admission, such as high school performance and (ETS) test results, as opposed to the older criteria of family and ability to pay; the resulting increase in the percentage of students from high schools, as opposed to those from "prep" schools; the increasing competition for grades; and the increasing percentages of students using their college performance as a way into graduate schools. The old-school Republicanism gave way increasingly to the welfare state values of liberal Democratism. Sometime in this period the scales were tipped against the old-school conservatism and the tide of homogenization ran the other way.

It was during this period that an increasing number of students seem to have become "uncommitted" to American society. Some of them became "the best" young men in Ginzberg's generation, at times "howling" their bewilderment in the streets, but more often "howling" in low key in the halls of academia. It was in the late 1950's that Ginzberg and other "Beats" received so much attention on the campuses, including well publicized "poetry readings" at such conservative haunts as Princeton. This was also the beginning of the great folk-singer "craze" at colleges that presaged the later "rock" phenomenon that has become such an important expressive part of the generalized youth culture.

At some colleges, such as Bennington, and especially at some of the universities that were to become very important centers of the student protest movements in the 1960's, there was already a very clear trend toward liberalism in the 1950's. In some of these institutions, liberal values became so dominant that there was a very clear homogenization trend toward liberal values among faculty and students alike, each reinforcing the other. This homogenization trend was especially clear at Berkeley even in the early 50's, as Seymour Martin Lipset concluded from his research:

The university takes in students of varied social backgrounds and attitudes. The differences in attitudes are steadily reduced, so that the graduates are appreciably more homogeneous than is the general public. University educa-

⁶ Goldsen, Rose K., et al., *What College Students Think*, Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960, pp. 121-122.

tion 'declassifies' students (and then usually reclassifies them). As long as they live with their parents and attend high school in their home communities, the students automatically assume the social position of their parents. But entering the university is like moving to a new town, even for those who live at home and commute to the campus, and students become aware that they will ultimately acquire their own statuses. . . . No longer surrounded primarily by people of the same social background, they take on some of the dominant values of their new environment if these were not present in their pre-university environment. Since both the faculty and the students are predominantly libertarian, the result is a marked lessening of the effects of father's occupation as students move through their four years.⁷

It was in the middle 50's that Kenneth Keniston did his now famous study of twelve "extremely alienated" Harvard students, *The Uncommitted*, and concluded that these educated "rebels without a cause" were in some way representative of a far larger and growing group of college students who were deeply but uncertainly disturbed about American society as they found it at that time.⁸ His "composite picture" of "elite youth," the college youth at the center of national and collegiate attention, was clearly drawn from his own wide experience with such youth and is an all too rare glimpse of what was happening at the center, the top, of the college student world in the 1950's:

Few of these young men and women have any doubt that they will one day be part of our society. They do not actively or enthusiastically *choose* to be part; rather they unreflectively assume that they *will* be part; and problems of "choosing" conventional adulthood, so central to the alienated, rarely even occur to them as such. They wonder about where they will fit, but not about whether. They take it for granted that they will one day "settle down"; and if it troubles them, they push it out of their minds or consider it a problem to be solved by finding a suitable wife and career. By and large they "approve" of American society if asked, though normally they do not think in these terms. Society is simply there.

But at the same time, these young men and women often show a lack of deep commitment to adult values and roles.

⁷ Selvin, Hannan C., and Hagstrom, Warren O., "Determinants of Support for Civil Liberties," pp. 494-518, in *The Berkeley Student Revolt*, S. M. Lipset and Sheldon S. Wollin, eds. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965, p. 505.

⁸ Keniston, Kenneth, *The Uncommitted*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965.

They are not alienated as are beatniks, delinquents or our group of alienated students. Rather, they view the adult world they expect to enter with a subtle distrust, a lack of high expectations, hopes, or dreams, and an often unstated feeling that they will have to "settle" for less than they would hope for if they let themselves hope. . . .

Most youths approach the wider world, social problems, political events, and international affairs with a comparable lack of deep involvement. . . . almost no one thinks that he, even in concert with his fellows, could alter the irrevocable course of events by so much as an iota.⁹

By the later 1960's the college students had been raised entirely inside the American welfare state. The liberal values that supported and derived from that welfare state were supported by a strong majority of college students throughout the country, though there certainly continued to be a strong difference in this respect between the "elite schools" and the smaller, more religiously oriented and more regional (especially Southern and Southwestern) schools. In many fundamental ways *most of the demands of protesting students and students in general were only demands for extensions of the rights and benefits of that welfare state*, though they also wanted changes in the ways they were to be administered. The strongest and most widely shared of these liberal values among college youth was probably that of racial equality. The sympathy and support for Negro civil rights, equality, had grown steadily throughout the whole population and reached a majority in the 1960's; but this growth was especially strong and emotional among the educated, the parents of college youth, and even more among students themselves. These shared values and feelings were to play key roles in the early stages of the protest movements. But there were many other shared liberal values that played supporting roles. These widely shared values had, by the 1960's, become a strong source of support for many of the demands of the student protesters, even when students as a whole remained strongly opposed to the violence that sometimes grew out of such protest movements. While the evidence on such matters remained very skimpy, any available evidence showed the same thing. While polls and interviews on values are generally useless in themselves, they too found the same things. As George Gallup reported in his syndicated column on May 25, 1969:

Those who comfort themselves that the trouble on the college campuses of America is caused by only a "handful of students" and that the majority is completely out of sympathy with the goals of the militant few would be disabused

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 396-398.

on this view if they were to talk to students across the nation, as 75 representatives of the Gallup Poll did recently. . . .

Attitudes vary from college to college and region to region on specific issues such as the ROTC, special courses and facilities for Negroes and college defense contracts, but at the heart of the discontent over these and other matters is the feeling that society as a whole is seriously ill and that changes are imperative

The important difference between college students of today and those of earlier years is their great desire for change, supported by the conviction that change can be brought about without waiting for years or decades

This campus study shows that 28% of all students say they have participated in a demonstration of some kind, while 72% say they have not. But even among "demonstrators," only a very few support the tactics of the militants.

Deploring violence, students nevertheless are in sympathy with the basic goals of those who create the noise on campus and many accept the precept, 'the end justifies the means.'

Answers to one of the many Gallup Polls queries included in the survey provide some basis for this observation. No fewer than four college students in every 10—and six in 10 among those who have participated in demonstrations—say that students who break laws while demonstrating should not be punished by being expelled.¹⁰

The in-depth national interview study done for *Fortune* magazine found roughly the same thing, although they concentrated on studying the attitudes of those two-fifths of the students who seemed (though by self-report) to be relatively unconcerned with money-making and other practical values of a college education. Of these nearly two and one-half million college students, whom they called the "forerunners" because they believed these students constitute a lasting and growing generation gap, *Fortune* found the following:

Half of the forerunners (versus only 25 percent of the practical group) said that none of the three major presidential candidates in last year's election held views close to their own. All three actually ran behind Che Guevara in a list of "personalities admired" by the forerunners.

About two-thirds of the group believe it appropriate to engage in civil disobedience to further causes they support. Almost 10 percent say they would support civil disobedience

¹⁰ Gallup, George, "Most Students Agree With Aims of Campus Militants," *The Los Angeles Times*, May 25, 1969, p. 47.

no matter what issues were involved. (Presumably, a good many in this group don't really mean what they say; it is hard to envision many of them supporting disobedience by, for example, the Klu Klux Klan. Still, the response suggests a strong predisposition to nihilist attitudes.)

Two-thirds of the forerunners support draft resistance—i.e., efforts to disrupt and refusal to cooperate with the Selective Service System.

Well over half, when shown a list of reasons that have been advanced to justify going to war, registered doubts about all of the following: protection of "national interests," preserving "our honor," "protecting allies," and "keeping commitments"; only 14 percent said it was clearly worth going to war to keep commitments.

About half of the group indicated that they have less faith than their parents in democratic processes.

About half believe that the U.S. is a sick society.¹¹

In general, then, throughout the 1950's there seems to have been a steady movement of college youth, especially of the "elite youth" at the centers of public attention, toward liberal values. At some time in this period the balance that had always been strongly in favor of conservatism among the college youth tipped in favor of these liberal values and at some of the most important institutions, such as Berkeley, a general process of homogenization set in so that even those students who entered as conservative freshmen began to move progressively toward more liberal values. Among the "elite youth" there was even a very visible move in the general direction of a feeling of malaise and alienation, a vague, generalized dissatisfaction with American society as they found it. By the time the great wave of War Babies entered the colleges, many of the elite institutions were firmly dominated by a student subculture in which liberal values played a very important part. For many different reasons, the first welfare state generation had become the dominant student group in these institutions and those students from very conservative backgrounds who would once have been vociferously conservative became the quiet ones, either being swept along in the liberal homogenization process or, as I suspect we shall come to see better in the years ahead, choosing not to openly oppose these groups as long as they seemed so powerful.

The 1950's as a whole constituted the Great Age of Impotence for the liberal forces in American society. Adlai Stevenson, the symbol of American liberalism during this period, and the one man who retained the devotion of liberals throughout it, became something of a symbol of powerlessness and ineffectuality, a man most remembered

¹¹ Seligman, Daniel, "Youth Rebellion," *Fortune*, January, 1968, p. 68.

for his dreamy yearning for a better world and his greatness in defeat. In the social sciences it was the age of the mass society, of powerlessness, affectlessness, loneliness, and meaninglessness—the age of *The Lonely Crowd*. Among the intellectuals and literati, such works of alienation as Colin Wilson's *Outsiders* were given instantaneous acclaim, an acclaim to be regretted and withdrawn in a new age. In politics it was the age of *The End of Ideology*. Among the well educated and those becoming well educated it was a time of growing frustration, but also a time of withdrawal and resignation, not of angry protest and revolutionary activity. The cultural preconditions of angry protest had arisen and were being nurtured, but they would not be realized until a new sense of urgency and a new feeling of power had inspired their carriers.

The Polarization of the Young and the Old

As the student subcultures at these elite institutions became more liberal, they came into increasing conflict with the older generations in our society, especially the pre-welfare state generations. It is often forgotten that in terms of the simple facts of everyday life, the older members of our society grew up in an almost completely different social world. Those approximately fifty million Americans who are over fifty years old were born to parents who were only once removed from frontier America, whose parents had been frontier America. These fifty million people grew up in an age when American society was still dominated, however marginally, by the rural, small town ethic, as seen so clearly in the passage of the Prohibition amendment,¹² and by the ethic of self-reliance and distrust of big government, as evidenced by the political leaders of the 1920's. Almost twenty million of these fifty million had come of age before the Great Depression and the others were old enough to be very mixed in their feelings about the coming age. This older group, then, was essentially a pre-welfare state generation and many of them have supported welfare measures at various times, especially in the crisis of the depression. But they are generally profoundly disturbed by the continued growth of the welfare state, and by the continued concentration of power in Washington that is both necessitated by, and an outcome of, this growth of power. Even when they themselves have greatly contributed to the growth of specific, large programs of the welfare state, such as the continued growth of social security, Medicare, and so on, through their political activity and voting, they have been very much against the general development of this new kind of America. (There is an all too ready form of self-deception among most important groups in American society by which they can define government help to other groups as "welfare" and

¹² Gusfield, Joseph R., *Symbolic Crusade*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966.

"charity," hence morally reprehensible, while defining the same kinds of help for themselves as "sensible social investment" or something else equally high-sounding. America's very conservative farmers, for example, are solidly in favor of "Parity not Charity," so they make nonnegotiable demands for billions of Federal dollars each year to support not growing food, "soil banks," and a wide array of such gimmicky programs, while at the same time denouncing the nonnegotiable demands of "welfare mothers" for more AFDC money to feed their children as "totally immoral relief" or "charity for the lazy." The rich men who own and run the oil industry solidly demand billions in "oil depletion allowances" of 27 percent, rather than 20 percent or some lesser figure, because this is a "necessary investment in national security," while at the same time attacking such "welfare" measures as job training for the young that might in the long run produce far more returns in taxes from the newly trained than they originally cost.)

The old have been singularly neglected by social researchers, so we cannot be certain of much about their views of the world. But they have made themselves reasonably clear on certain points and, from these and from our own impressionistic forms of evidence gathered by the "bits-and-pieces" strategy (see Appendix I on the evidence available on youth), we can draw certain general conclusions about their views of the world and, specifically, their views and actions toward the young, especially the developing college subculture.

Those among this older group who are still active, and most are, have in many ways made many great adjustments to the basic changes that have taken place in American society in the past fifty years and less. In fact, the changes of most of these individuals in their patterns of actions and, perhaps, even in their world views, have been so fundamental as to demonstrate an extreme plasticity of human personality. But on the whole this group remains obviously far more "conservative" than younger members of our society. They are certainly far more apt to be against most welfare measures than younger people. And many of them apparently have a growing feeling that their American society, the society they lived in and helped to create and maintain, is being destroyed, especially by the "young, smart-aleck college kids." It is this conviction and fear that seems to have given much of the fervor to their support of the Goldwater presidential campaign, which was based so strongly on opposition to the growth of the American welfare state over the last several decades.

As Marvin Koller and other students of the old have noted, among the twenty million or more who are over sixty-five there seems to be a growing subculture based on their common problems, a growing

"consciousness" of their similar situations, and a growing sense of alienation. Their common conservative values also serve as shared interests to support the development of such subculture (*or contra-culture*) of the aged. It is especially these much older people, some of whom have quite literally come from the American frontier, who form the core of such right wing groups as the John Birch Society. While these "little old ladies in tennis shoes" (and old men in make-believe buckskin) are often derided, even by some social scientists, as "paranoids," "kooks," "bigots," and "charlatans," they are often simply insisting on and acting on very old American beliefs and values. As John Redekop has argued:

One of the most important shortcomings [of studies of the right wing] is the widespread failure to evaluate the significance of Christian fundamentalism, or even orthodox Christianity, as a contributing factor, especially in conjunction with traditional Americanism. Another is the general tendency to view the contemporary Far Right as something totally outside of the American tradition, to see it as an isolated phenomenon. . . .

It has become customary to dismiss all Rightists from serious analysis by describing them as seditionists, native fascists, hatemongers, paranoiacs, and schizophrenics. Such an approach is inadequate. It is too frequently forgotten that agitators and demagogues, crusaders and extremists, may also be intelligent, honest people. Thus, at least from an academic point of view, the need is not for more ridicule and discrediting, but for understanding and dispassionate study.¹³

Their sense of outrage over the "communist takeover in Washington" and their demands for an end to the welfare state and all of the liberal beliefs and values that support it are quite obvious. For many of them the "Great Crusade" is a direct outgrowth of their fundamentalist Christian beliefs and values. Billy James Hargis has expressed these convictions for millions on the Far Right:

Most of the devil's brew, mixed by the Moscow clinic to slide us painlessly into the mental coma which is communism, has two basic ingredients, (1) the progressive income tax and (2) foreign aid. (March, 1962)

There is no need to fear. God is guiding us . . . I am convinced that this is the time for God's conservatives across the nation to step up their attacks against liberalism and/or communism . . . accept the challenge of God. We

¹³ Redekop, John Harold, *The American Far Right* (Preface), Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1968.

are conscious of His leadership. (January, 1963)¹⁴

The Far Right is, of course, an extreme, just as the Far Left is an extreme of the liberal point of view that has been increasingly dominant among the college-student subculture. But, just as the Far Left is vaguely indicative of the general direction being taken by the student subculture, so is the Far Right vaguely indicative of the general direction being taken by the subculture of the old; and the Far Right may be more indicative of the direction of the old than the Far Left is of the young. In general, there appears to be a growing polarization between the young, especially those who are members of the liberal college-student subculture, and the old, especially those who are members of the subculture of the old (mainly over sixty-five), but including large percentages of the somewhat younger old people. (There may even be a decrease in the percentage as one moves down the age ladder.)

As Eisenstadt and many other social scientists have long realized and have shown in some detail, *conflict between generations* is very common in the world's cultures, presumably because of the necessary bio-social cycles in human life:¹⁵ the young and the old are physically different, with resulting differences in physical needs and desires; and these differences are generally so related to social relations that the old and the young have some patterned conflict of interests. While there is a great deal of variety in the kinds and degrees of conflicts of generations found in different cultures, in Western societies over the last century there has apparently been a growing conflict of generations that, as we have seen, is largely related to the growing separation of their lives resulting from the industrial-technological revolution and the use of formal education. This separation has been partly spatial as a result of work and life patterns. But it has been even more a meaningful separation. This has resulted in general from the kinds of social change we have just investigated, something which Kingsley Davis and other sociologists were well aware of several decades ago:

Extremely rapid change in modern civilization, in contrast to most societies, tends to increase parent-youth conflict, for within a fast-changing social order the time-interval between generations, ordinarily but a mere moment in the life of a social system, becomes historically significant, thereby creating a hiatus between one generation and the next. Inevitably, under such a condition, youth is reared in a milieu different from that of the parents; hence the parents become old-fashioned, youth rebellious, and clashes occur

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Eisenstadt, S. M., *From Generation to Generation*, New York: Free Press, 1956.

which, in the closely confined circle of the immediate family, generate sharp emotion.¹⁶

As technical training and college degrees have become evermore important in getting jobs, promotion, and financial success in our society, the newly educated young have in many ways come to have a growing advantage in their competition for these things with the older people, something which millions of older Americans deeply resent ("smart-aleck college kid" was probably coined to fit precisely this competitive situation). In his important studies and analyses of *Youth and the Social Order*, Frank Musgrove has concluded that the elders' resentment of the young for these reasons is even an important cause of the prolonged segregation of the young in school and their exclusion from the rights that come with adult status:

The hatred with which the mature of Western society regard the young is a testimony to the latter's importance, to their power potential and actual (sic). The adolescent has not enjoyed such economic and social power as is his and hers in mid-twentieth-century Britain, Europe and America, since the early days of the classical Industrial Revolution, when rapidly declining rates of mortality among the young made them worth taking seriously, and technological change and the reorganization of industry gave them a strategic position in the nation's economic life.

Provided they were fortunate enough to escape an apprenticeship, whether 'parish' or otherwise, the young enjoyed status then as today in the sense of actual social and economic power: they had a large measure of control over their lives (for instance, where they lived and when they married); their parents were often more dependent on them than they on their parents. They may not have enjoyed 'accorded status,' in the sense employed by present-day sociologists; then as now they received only a grudging recognition by their elders of their real social significance. Today their seniors protect their own position with a variety of stratagems, planned ostensibly in the best interests of the young: prolonged tutelage and dependence, exclusion from adult pursuits, interests and responsibilities, in order to 'protect them from themselves'; extended training schemes of negligible educational content which effectively delay the open competition of the young worker with his seniors.

But in spite of the spirited rearguard action which their elders fight, the young achieve power:

. . . In general adults regardless of age and social class

¹⁶ Davis, Kingsley, Adolescence and the social structure, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, November 1944.

consign the young to a self-contained world of juvenile preoccupations; they strongly resist the notion that in their late teens they might qualify for entry into adult pursuits and rights: they resent their 'precociousness,' their tendency to earlier marriage and to higher earnings; they reject the idea that perhaps the young might end their legal minority before the age of twenty-one, enter into full citizenship and exercise the vote.¹⁷

Much of the intensity of the feelings of resentment toward the young found in many older people is also probably due to far more secret beliefs, deeper thoughts and feelings that they might hardly admit to themselves, let alone others. Not only do they have fears and resentments about the real competition from the young, especially the technically trained and credentialed young, but they may also have deep resentments about the "privileged, leisured status" and the "sexual freedom" of the young. It is quite obvious to anyone that the young today, especially the middle and upper-middle class college young, have led very privileged, leisurely lives compared to the lives led by the older members of our society. Rather than toiling from dawn to dusk, the young today go surfing or do hundreds of other leisurely activities that even in some cases form the basis of the leisure cults we have analyzed earlier. Rather than receiving meagre wages for toiling long hours, the youth today receive lucrative allowances for little or no work, sometimes even from the government. While school may be a bit more difficult these days, it is easier to go because there are fewer money worries; and any close look at the nature of school life today, including the university level, as has been done in the book *Making The Grade* by Howard Becker, et al., shows that all the talk about immense pressures with little time for the more normal leisure activities of the young is nonsense. In any event, this seems to be the way the older members of our society see it and they profoundly resent this *leisure generation*. Perhaps even more deeply, many of the older people seem to resent the supposed "sexual freedom" of the young, a feeling that can be especially profound for individuals who are facing the many emotional problems of decreasing sexuality.

But the *polarization of generations* with which we are now dealing is something quite different from the earlier forms of conflicts of generations. The earlier forms were much more individual, much less subcultural and, as a result, involved far less *politicization of the conflict between generations*. As the generalized youth subculture and, most importantly, the college student subculture has come into increasing conflict with the subculture of the old, we have had a

¹⁷ Musgrove, Frank, *Youth and the Social Order*, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965.

conflict that is more and more one between groups with greater degrees of organization and, very importantly, with increasingly sharp differences in shared interests and problems which are politically defined and, consequently, lead to further organization for the purposes of political action to achieve one's goals and defeat the efforts of the opposing group.

This recent politicization of the conflict between generations has been of fundamental importance in producing the polarization of the generations. Polarization consists not merely of being different from the other group, but of *becoming more different precisely because one is different*. Because they have turned to political action to defeat the other side, *the young and the old have each become a vitally important shared problem for the other in themselves, independently of any specific differences*. As a result, the existence and political action of each becomes a prime reason for the other's becoming stronger, for seeing oneself as more distinct and needing more political action to achieve one's goals in opposition to the other. *The more either one acts to defeat or repress the other, the stronger the other gets, the more they move apart—that is, the more polarization there is*. (There is undoubtedly some outer limit to such a relation so that we would get a reversal of this effect, such as would happen if one were able to increasingly eliminate the other; but we are certainly nowhere near such a reversal of the polarization effect. After all, this is not yet some kind of internecine struggle.) There are certainly many other factors that each side, each individual involved in the struggle must consider. For example, young people must consider the grave danger to their careers that could result from "getting a record." But the polarization effect has become a very important aspect of the relations between the young and the old, a very important cause of the growing strength of the student subculture and the subculture of the old.

Those of us who have seen this polarization taking place over the past six years between the University of California and the voters, especially the older ones, could never doubt its importance in explaining much of the virulence of student protest in the past several years or the way in which it is increasingly determined by political motives and political activities. We have seen the immediate polarization of older voters that followed the 1964 Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, a polarization that came about in spite of the fact that the FSM was a relatively minor movement and was almost entirely restricted to Berkeley. (Attempts to "get something going" at other campuses, such as UCLA, were almost complete failures.) The older voters elected by a great majority a governor who promised to end "student anarchy." At that time students were very much divided about the events at Berkeley and about the new governor, who un-

doubtedly had considerable support among those students from traditionally Republican and conservative families. But the attempts by this governor and his older constituents to end the student violence became a symbolic issue that united the students during repeated attempts to "shut it down." Each attempt by the government to stop the violence, which even most students admitted was evil, was met by wider and more angry protest, and each protest was met by wider and more angry attempts to stop it. The polarization effect was in full force, and the move by students to more extreme positions on each side has thus far been irresistible. Within five years there were few students to be found on any of the nine campuses throughout this huge State who would *publicly* support the program of the governor or the governor himself, even when they recognized how totally destructive the radical actions were; and there were very few nonstudents in the State, especially among the older people, who did not support the governor, his program, and the other politicians who tried to stop the violence. In the sixth year, in 1969, there were mass protest movements on every campus of the University, the movement had spread with great virulence to the more massive State college system, where the worst confrontation yet to occur took place at San Francisco State; the movement had become far more organized; and most campuses were temporarily disrupted by intermittent strikes. At the end of the sixth year, with the growing support of the older generations, the police used shotguns on crowds of rioting students in Berkeley, wounding many and killing one, and gassed the campus at Berkeley from a helicopter. The student response, as in all previous cases, was swift; but this time it was more extreme than ever before because they identified themselves with those shot and gassed. Widespread disruptions and "strikes" occurred on most campuses, including UCLA, which had not previously experienced any serious "strike" attempt. Voter support for the use of force to stop the violence soared; student anger and hatred soared. The future of the University was in grave doubt. But there was little doubt that the radical students would find new causes for confronting their enemies and new strategies for attacking them.

Chapter 5. Comparative Theories of Student Protest Movements

All of these agitations, upheavals, intrigues, and conspiracies were part of one great movement. It was not simply a question of the "spread" or "impact" or "influence" of the French Revolution. Not all revolutionary agitation since 1918 has been produced by the Kremlin, and not all such agitation in the 1790's was due to the machinations of revolutionary Paris. It is true, and not without contemporary significance, that persons of revolutionary persuasion were able to install revolutionary regimes only where they could receive help from the French republican army. But revolutionary aims and sympathies existed throughout Europe and America. They arose everywhere out of local, genuine, and specific causes; or, contrariwise, they reflected conditions that were universal throughout the Western world. They were not imported from one country to another. They were not imitated from the French, or at least not imitated blindly. There was one big revolutionary agitation, not simply a French revolution due to purely French causes, and foolishly favored by irresponsible people in other countries.

R. R. Palmer,
The Age of the Democratic Revolution

As Durkheim argued long ago, all social science knowledge must be comparative: without comparisons of different and at least partially independent cases, there can be no social science knowledge, no valid scientific explanation of social phenomena. The reason for this is simply that systematic similarities and dissimilarities are basic to the most rudimentary categorization or conceptualization of phenomena which must come before there can be any more nearly complete explanation; and certainly the more nearly complete explanations, the so-called causal explanations, must build on these conceptualizations and involve further comparisons of similarities and dissimilarities. The question, then, is not whether we should have comparisons, but what comparisons we should have, cross-cultural or intra-cultural.

Cross-Cultural Comparisons

Because comparisons are so basic to any social science knowledge, they are normally taken for granted in all cases except one, the one

case in which determining basic similarities and dissimilarities even for the rudimentary purpose of conceptualizing the phenomena is so obviously problematic: the case of cross-cultural comparisons. It is clear that some form of rudimentary understandings are possible across cultural boundaries, simply because it is clear that men do reach agreements (including agreements to disagree) across cultural boundaries, both through the use of the simpler, largely non-verbal communications of the sort Malinowsky found so prominent in the Kula Exchange of the Trobriand Islands and through the use of bilingual translators. The existence of such cross-cultural understandings assures us that there are some basic, common elements to the meaningful experience of human beings regardless of the culture in which they live. But the developments in anthropology in the last few hundred years have also progressively convinced us of the fundamental problems involved in getting at such common elements. We have become increasingly convinced that cross-cultural comparisons are exceedingly problematic, that we are rarely correct in assuming the existence of underlying meaningful similarities simply because we perceive some external, formal similarity. The days are long since past when social scientists easily divined universal patterns of meanings in "dances" or "religious practices." Indeed, the days are long since past when social scientists felt sure that there were any universal (cross-cultural) phenomena similar enough in their meanings for the members of different cultures to warrant the use of any one term, such as "dance" or "religious practice," in referring to them. The basic question has become: are there any experiences similar enough to one another in different cultures to warrant using one term, such as "dance" or "religion," to refer to them? Most of us strongly expect today that there are almost no unified or homogeneous meaningful experiences across cultural boundaries, so the question is one of degree of similarity or dissimilarity; and we have become increasingly convinced of the importance of the dissimilarities and of the dangers of misinterpretation resulting from assuming basic similarities by uncritically using one category to cover the different cultural experiences.

Unfortunately, the theoretical discussions of the cross-cultural similarities and dissimilarities of student protest movements have rarely been informed by this long tradition of considerations of the fundamental problems of cross-cultural comparisons. Perhaps this is due partly to the fact that those concerned with the students have rarely had an anthropological background. This failure has led some to totally overlook all of the basic problems and to then proceed to spin out universalistic theories of student protest movements that commit all of the egregious mistakes of Freud's theories of universal Oedipal conflicts, totemism, etc. Fortunately, however, most

of the comparative analyses of student protest movements do not make quite so basic a mistake as this, simply because most of them choose to remain primarily within the general context of Western societies, where there is certainly far more similarity than would be found if we were to consider all student movements. Yet even these Western-based theories face such a basic problem, and deal with it so inadequately that they arrive at very different conclusions about the similarities and dissimilarities of the student protest movements, even when they are concerned only with trying to get at the similarities and dissimilarities between American and European movements in recent years.

On the one hand, we have those theorists who see American student protest movements as basically different from those of other cultures. These theories have rarely been concerned with the different meanings that might be associated with being a student or with any kind of activity that the "students" might undertake. (For example, they have rather glibly taken student movements in general to be "political.") Rather, they have concentrated on differences in what they see as the "shared (or not shared) structural situations" of students in different cultures. They have argued that most student protest (political) movements have taken place in the underdeveloped, transitional societies, especially those moving toward modernization, industrialization, economic development, and so on, primarily because there are some very real "social problems," especially those preventing social change that would lead to an elimination of such "social problems" as their own unemployment, economic stagnation, etc. (These structural theorists almost always fail to consider what it is that leads students in some nations to define their situation in society and their society's general situation as a "social problem" requiring "solution" by their own activities, while other students do not so define their situations or the situations of their nations. Why, for example, do we get almost no publicly recognizable student protest movements in the Soviet Union, which is certainly more repressive than most of the governments in the underdeveloped societies, while we get a powerful *student support movement*—supportive of Mao Tse Tung—in China? There are apparently various factors at work leading to the development of a *subjective sense of problem*—of something being wrong that requires correcting by student action—that is quite independent of the "objective structural factors" on which these structuralists focus all of their attention.) They then argue that in the United States there have been only small or weak student protest movements because these structural variables are largely absent. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, argued in this way in 1966 and earlier, before the student protest movements in the United States had grown to the

great proportions they did in the next few years:

. . . the student movement has not succeeded in mobilizing a really significant segment of the student population, or in substantially influencing either its educational environment or the broader society. Some of the causes for this weakness have been presented in the contrast between the developing areas and the United States. Basically, in the United States, with its relatively stable social system and a fairly long tradition of political tranquility, radical social movements of any kind have had difficulty in establishing themselves. Many of the developing nations, however, face major social problems and are trying desperately to transform their societies, to modernize, and to industrialize. There is often real ambivalence about roles in rapidly changing societies. Major segments of the society may be impatient at the rate of change, or feel they are suffering from its consequences. In such an atmosphere, radical social movements have a greater opportunity to grow.¹

In *Young Radicals*, Keniston has made a very similar argument to the effect that the student activists in American colleges in the 1960's are fundamentally different from those in the underdeveloped nations, but then suggests that there might be a developing similarity:

In other nations, and in the past, student protest movements seem to have been more closely related to immediate student frustrations than they are in America today. The "transformationist" (utopian Marxist, universalistic, or democratic) aspirations of activist youth in rapidly developing nations often seem closely related to their personal frustrations under oppressive regimes or at "feudal" practices in their societies; the "restorationist" (romantic, alienated) youth movements that have appeared in later stages of industrialization seem closely connected to a personal sense of the loss of a feudal, maternal, and "organic" past. Furthermore, both universalistic and romantic youth movements in other nations have traditionally been highly ideological, committed either to concepts of universal democracy and economic justice or to particularistic values of brotherhood, loyalty, feeling, and nation.

Today's activists, in contrast, are rarely concerned with improving their own conditions and are highly motivated by identification with the oppressions of others. The anti-

¹ Lipset, S. M., and Altbach, Philip G., "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States," pp. 320-349 in *The Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 10, 1966, p. 346.

ideological bias of today's student activists has been underlined by virtually every commentator. Furthermore, as Flacks notes, the historical conditions that have produced protest elsewhere are largely absent in modern America; and the student "movement" in this country differs in important ways from student movements elsewhere. In many respects, then, today's American activists have no historical precedent, and only time will tell to what extent the appearance of organized student dissent in the 1960's is a product of locally American conditions, of the psychosocial effects of a technological affluence that will soon characterize other advanced nations, or of widespread changes in identity and style produced by psychohistorical factors that affect youth of all nations (thermonuclear warfare, increased culture contact, rapid communications, et cetera).²

Nathan Glazer, in one of the most insightful analyses of the Berkeley situation, has carried this theory of the dissimilarities much further by arguing that the student protest movement in the United States in the 1960's is definitely unique:

In summary, Berkeley to my mind is the first example of a student rebellion that occurs in conditions where students are privileged, their future is assured, where liberal, parliamentary democracy prevails, and where the principal ideology of the student rebels is neither Marxism nor liberalism but rather the effort to create a participatory and somewhat communal democracy. It is the first student rebellion to have considered what is still wrong in a liberal, democratic, and permissive society, and by what tactics and strategy revolutionaries can bring larger and larger numbers to agree with them that a great deal is wrong.³

On the other hand, others who have done comparative studies of the student protest movements have concluded that there *must* be a basic similarity between Western movements and those in other countries, so they have concluded that in some way the Western societies, including American society, must be in "transition" in some way that pits the students against the established authorities. In *The Politics of Protest*, for example, Jerome Skolnick generally agreed with the above analyses of protest movements in underdeveloped nations and then argued that there must be some very basic similarity between these and recent Western protests, an argument

² Keniston, Kenneth, *Young Radicals*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968, pp. 318-319.

³ Glazer, Nathan, "Student Power in Berkeley," pp. 3-21 in *Confrontation*, Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, eds., p. 5.

that turns the Keniston and Glazer dissimilarities into an underlying similarity:

This analysis might lead one to expect that advanced industrial societies of the West would be the least likely places for radical student movements to emerge. In these societies, it is said, the move to modernity has been made, and sharp value conflicts are absent; Western nations are not ordinarily seen as "developing" or "in transition." Yet such movements have appeared with increasing frequency in Western societies during the past decade. How can we understand this?

The American situation differs from classical ones in that it does not arise from the standard problems of modernization. But the existence of a student movement in America and other advanced industrial societies forces on us the conjecture that these societies, too, are "transitional"—not in the same terms as developing countries, and perhaps more subtly, but just as meaningfully. While educated youth in developing countries experience the irrelevance of traditional, religious, prescientific, authoritarian values for modernization, industrialization, and national identity, educated youth in the advanced countries perceive the irrelevance of commercial, acquisitive, materialistic, and nationalistic values in a world that stresses human rights and social equality and requires collective planning.⁴

We also have the theorists who believe there is a far more nearly complete similarity in the student protest movements around the world, especially a similarity of causation. The best known of these is Lewis Feuer's theory, which sees an underlying "unconscious motivation" for every student movement:

The conflict of generations is a universal theme in history; it is founded on the most primordial facts of human nature, and it is a driving force of history, perhaps even more ultimate than that of class struggle. Yet its intensity fluctuates.

Under fortunate circumstances, it may be resolved within a generational equilibrium. Under less happy circumstances, it becomes bitter, unyielding, angry, violent; this is what takes place when the older generation, through some presumable historical failure, has become de-authorized in the eyes of the young.⁵

These theories that assume a high degree of similarity will be

⁴ Skolnick, Jerome H., *The Politics of Protest*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1969, pp. 84-85.

⁵ Feuer, Lewis S., *The Conflict of Generations*, New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1969, pp. 527-528.

dealt with below in the sections on the psychologistic and structural theories. Their reason for seeing a fundamental similarity between recent student protest movements in the United States and movements in completely different cultures are basic to their whole method of theorizing about human society, and their reasons are as unjustified as their fundamental theoretical assumptions. Those which see basic similarities between nineteenth century European movements and recent ones, such as we find in Roszack's theory,⁶ have simply generally failed to consider the basic problems of cross-cultural analyses and have strongly emphasized any similarities while deemphasizing all of the dissimilarities. (There may be some vague similarity between Russian "Decembrists" or "narodniki" who tried to overthrow the Tsar and the Columbia students who overthrew the University administration, but their differences seem far greater—and more important.) But those which see some important similarities, along with important dissimilarities, between movements in Europe and the United States in recent years are based on better grounds and must be taken more seriously.

The Recent Student Revolts in Western Nations

The obvious fact is that in the 1960's, especially in 1967 and 1968, there were closely related student protest movements—student revolutions—in many different nations of the Western world. These movements were related in at least several obvious ways. First, and most strikingly for most observers, they occurred in very narrow time sequences, one after another in relatively short periods of time. Second, while there were some movements outside of the Western nations during this period, these others appeared to be largely extensions of earlier movements in those societies; and there was no significant bunching of them in the time period during which the Western revolutions took place. Consequently, there was apparently something about what was going on in the West in general that led to these movements. Third, the participants in the different revolutions believed there was an underlying causal relation and looked at the other revolts going on for inspiration, ideas, and tactics. Fourth, some of the ideas expressed and tactics used were very similar throughout the Western societies. Fifth, some of the personnel were even the same; the gadflies of revolution, such as Herbert Marcuse, Cohn-Bendit, and "Red Rudy," made similar ideological attacks and recommended similar "throwings of bodies onto the line" in such spatially and culturally disjunct places as Berlin and San Diego. American, French, German, and Italian student radicals watched each other admiringly and at times copied each other's methods.

⁶ Roszack, Theodore, "The Counter-Culture: Part 1, Youth and the Great Refusal," pp. 400-407 in *The Nation*, March 25, 1968, p. 406.

But the important question is whether these apparent relations are truly indicative of an underlying, causal relation. Some historians have tried to show that some earlier bunchings of revolutionary movements in European societies were related in just these apparent ways and that underlying such apparent relations there were indeed some basic causal relations, some basic factors common to each society. (The best example would undoubtedly be Palmer's masterful analysis of the spate of revolutionary movements in the latter part of the eighteenth century.) And many social scientists have certainly argued that this is precisely what is happening today in the European societies, even though they seem to disagree about what it is that is common to all of these societies that might be causing the student revolutions. In a more recent article on activists, for example, Lipset has argued that:

Any effort to account for the rise of student activism in the United States during the 1960's is faced with the fact that we are obviously dealing with a world-wide phenomenon. This, in turn, suggests that the sources of political activism among students must essentially be found in politics itself—in the changing world-wide climate of political opinion. Students as a stratum are more responsive to political trends, to changes in mood, to opportunities for action than almost any other group in the population. They also are the most easily mobilizable stratum; ideas which arise as a response to a given issue may move readily among them, and may move them more readily, since they have fewer responsibilities in the form of commitments to families and jobs.⁷

Lipset then went on to argue that the important changes producing these movements now, as opposed to the quiescence of the 1950's, have been the changing international climate, which he believes has favored the development of social criticism within each Western nation. Other social scientists have attributed this bunching of revolutions to underlying changes in attitudes toward the Cold War, boring bureaucracies, and so on. (Any number of these can, for example, be found in a published discussion between Richard Lowenthal, Lewis Coser, and Irving Howe.)⁸

Certainly there are some basic changes taking place in almost all of the Western societies; and certainly some of these are fundamental changes that are now *beginning* to become very disturbing to many groups in these societies, especially when they consider some of the possible dangers of these changes to individual freedoms. Very

⁷ Lipset, S. M., "The Activist: A Profile," pp. 45-57, in *Confrontation*, Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, eds., New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969, p. 45.

⁸ Lowenthal, Richard; Coser, Lewis; and Howe, Irving, "The Worldwide Revolt of the Young," pp. 214-224, in *Dissent*, May-June 1969.

importantly, for example, we are all rapidly creating a new kind of society, a technological society in which the nature of work, the relations between production and ownership, and so on, are being transformed.⁹ Some of these changes have, in fact, been given serious consideration in some of the pronouncements of activist students in the different societies. But there are many other messages as well, many conflicting completely with this kind of message, such as those which propose doing away with "capitalism" or "bourgeois selfishness" or "boring bureaucratic work," all of which are precisely the kinds of things that are being most rapidly changed and eliminated by the development of the technological society (although there would no doubt be some disagreement about this).

The message against "bureaucratic boredom" is one of the most widely expressed messages of the revolts in the different Western nations and really serves as an excellent example of most such messages from the protesters. In the United States it has certainly been a constant theme. In France it also appears to have been among the more common messages:

But the aims and state of mind of these revolutionaries were of a totally different nature from those of the thousands of French intellectuals who fervently joined the protest movement. Theirs was a painful awareness of the deprivations which organized society imposes on human beings. They rebelled against the humbug of French intellectual life, the pomp of officialdom, the social pressures of a bourgeois society. They wanted to throw everything over and think it all out anew. Their thirst for freedom from meaningless constraints broke out into high-minded manifestos and found practical expression in scores of action committees whose only common philosophy was that society as at present organized was intolerable and had to be remade. The unrest reached the professional classes, changing its nature once more because it was directed against the rigid, archaic, over-centralized structures in which most highly trained Frenchmen have to work. In this form, it was a revolt against ruling bureaucracies, administrative machines, professional apparatuses. It found expression in an urge to run one's own affairs—a need to dispose of oneself in the face of petty tyranny in office and laboratory, in hospital and university.

This aspect of the disturbance was specifically French—because French professional life is more hidebound than most—but it was also this which suggested that what hap-

⁹ Douglas, Jack D., "Freedom and Tyranny in a Technological Society," in *Freedom and Tyranny*, Jack D. Douglas, ed., New York: Random House, forthcoming.

pened in May was the first full-scale challenge in a Western state to the inhuman efficiency of modern industrial life. It was compared to the utopian rebellions against the first Industrial Revolution.¹⁰

It is, of course, precisely such dull, boring, routinized work that is rapidly being eliminated by computers; and the most dull, boring, and routinized are going first, for they are precisely the ones that are most easily programmed for computers. It may be, as a few of the dissidents have argued, that it is precisely because they are rapidly going out, precisely because the people doing such things no longer feel that they are necessary, that we get such a revolt against them—which would be a reality-inspired factor. Yet, if this were the real reason, and some of them were conscious of it, why would they not say that they are revolting because things are about to get so much better in precisely the way they want them to get better? Presumably, because that would make the whole thing absurd. There is a clear disjunction, perhaps even a topsy-turvy relation, between most of the fundamental changes taking place in Western societies and most of the messages of the protesters in the different nations. While this does not at all mean that the messages are irrelevant, or even that there may not be some very complex and involuted relations between the new developments and the messages, it does mean that we can't take any similarity of messages as *prima facie* grounds for inferring similar underlying causes.

The similarity of messages and much of the dissimilarity as well, is easily explained by the existence of hard-core, though small, groups of communists and other dissidents in each of the countries; and by the existence of a reasonably small group of ancient Gurus who have provided much of the intellectualization of the movements, men such as Herbert Marcuse and Paul Goodman, whose ideas pop up in many different movements even when they don't agree with each other. (The Gurus of the New Left seem to agree with each other primarily in their vitriolic and total opposition to our Western societies, especially American society. They agree less in their basic analyses of those societies or their plans for improving them—or withdrawing from them, since some of them, especially Marcuse, have analyzed themselves into an impasse from which it is hopeless to try to do anything.) The messages, and the Gurus themselves, seem to be shared more as symbols of total opposition, as are black flags and black armbands, rather than as meaningful expressions of the same basic point of view. These hard-core messages are important to the protesters and their Gurus far more because they may

¹⁰ Seale, Patrick, and McConville, Maureen, *Red Flag/Black Flag*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1968, p. 231.

mobilize support among the natives than because they themselves believe the messages.

When we look closely at all of the messages of the students in the different nations, I think we can see that the messages that really count for the activists in the different nations are quite different. In American society they are clearly the racial and Vietnam situations, as we shall argue in Chapter 7. In French society they seem, though less clearly, to be very much related to the unpleasant situation of students in the university and in French society in general:

The heart of the problem is the French open-door policy to university entrance: Anyone who scrapes through the fear-some baccalaureate—summit of the secondary school system—can go on to a university. No further exam is required to get a place. This extreme liberality, coupled with the postwar demographic boom, caused a staggering inflation in student numbers: in 1946, 123,000; in 1961, 202,000; in 1968, 514,000. These hordes, marching inexorably into cramped lecture rooms, were the nightmare of the planners. "The dam will break one day if we do nothing," warned Christian Fouchet, Minister of Education, addressing a national Congress on education at Caen in November, 1966.¹¹

It is conceivable that the bunching of student revolts in the major nations of the Western world is the direct result of some underlying, basic forces that are now beginning to be felt as we move evermore rapidly into a post-industrial, technological society (or in some other direction, for that matter). It is even possible that they are the beginning, the vanguard, of a Time of Troubles that so often afflicts societies as they undergo such vast transformations. But there seems to be no compelling evidence of this. The similarity of messages, and some of the dissimilarities, can probably be accounted for just as well by the factors we have considered. The bunching itself could conceivably be coincidental or even an artifact of the news media, since reporters and publishers begin looking everywhere for similar events to report and play up as soon as something rivets the public's attention—and makes sales go up. There is certainly a major element of this *publicity effect*. It is very easy to see that the news media report vastly greater numbers of accidents and "near-accidents" of planes immediately after a major plane crash has caught the public attention. The same thing is true of student protests. Immediately after an occurrence such as the FSM movement at Berkeley they actively search out every little sit-in, including the sit-in involving nothing more than 20 students seeking better food for their upper-middle class palates. Since there is always some-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

thing going on, and there are always people who are willing to start anything—including eating live goldfish—for the sake of publicity, this publicity effect can lead to a very distorted view of things in the modern world. But there also seems no compelling reason to see it as *all* coincidental or *all* an artifact of this publicity effect. The major revolts in the United States, France and Germany in one year, as well as the slightly more spreadout revolts in Britain and Italy, make coincidence a very thin thread on which to hang the many events.

Rather than underlying transformations of society as a whole, or coincidence, or a simple artifact of the publicity effect, it seems likely that there are at least two major factors underlying the bunching of student revolts in the Western nations. Most importantly, it seems clear that many of the same forces are at work within higher education itself in each of the societies. Higher education is at the center of the meritocratic technological society in all of these nations, though to varying degrees. As a result, the development of this new kind of society has led directly to the vast expansion of higher education, though nowhere else has the rate and absolute size of this growth approached that of the United States. At the same time, the increasingly alienated youth subculture seems to have been developing in each of the societies, partly as a direct result of the increasing separation for ever longer periods of time of the youth from families and adult society. Since there is already much more of a tradition (culturally transmitted within the colleges) of political, ideological activism in the European schools, especially in France, Germany, and Italy, the lack of such an emotional issue as Vietnam has been made up for in these societies by other factors. We have, then, the same kind of base for student protest movements in each of the major nations. In addition, we have a second basic factor that is related to the publicity effect just considered. One of the things that seemed very clear about the major revolts in the United States, Germany, and France is that the students, certainly the "leaders," as designated by the mass media and by other outsiders, were very tuned in to the events in the other nations, as reported through the mass media. This is an age of mass and instantaneous communication of such events and this has some very important implications in itself. As Kenneth Keniston has noted, this has helped make students very "sensitive" to world events:

Several factors help explain this sensitivity to world events. For one, modern means of communication make the historical world more psychologically "available" to youth. Students today are exposed to world events and world trends with a speed and intensity that has no historical precedent. . . . This broadening of empathy is, I believe, part of a

general modern trend toward the *internationalization of identity*. Hastened by modern communications and consolidated by the world-wide threat of nuclear warfare, this trend involves, in vanguard groups in many nations, a loosening of parochial and national allegiances in favor of a more inclusive sense of affinity with one's peers (and non-peers) from all nations. In this respect, American student activists are both participants and leaders in the reorganization of psycho-social identity and ideology that is gradually emerging from the unique historical conditions of the twentieth century.¹²

The student participants themselves seem to have become "aware" of any underlying similarities of causation of the revolts in different parts of the world only after the events. For example, as Kunen notes in *The Strawberry Statement*:

Back at the apartment I read a mimeographed paper by Tony Papert called *The Mass Strike*. It began: "The coincidence of Columbia and Paris should dispel the dominant illusion of the left in this country: That our radicalism is derived mainly from the particular issues of the Viet Nam war and racism. . . . In fact, our Viet Nam and racism issues are only particular manifestations of far deeper forces simultaneously energizing mass actions in diverse parts of the advanced capitalist sector."

That may not be terribly surprising, but it hit me kind of hard. Like it dispelled my dominant illusion.¹³

This sudden "awakening" to the "fact" that it's all "one great world-wide revolution of youth" is treated by Cohn-Bendit as really obvious and simple; it must all simply be moral revulsion against the bourgeoisie:

But now it has become world-wide: Berkeley, Berlin, Tokyo, Madrid, Warsaw—the student rebellion is spreading like wildfire, and authorities everywhere are frantically asking themselves what has hit them. The answer is really quite simple. The remarkable phenomenon of student opposition was due to several factors, chief among them what so many people call sneeringly "the revolt of modern youth." Now this revolt, which involves ever larger numbers of young people throughout the world, must not be confused with the old "conflict between the generations." The latter, as we know it, particularly in earlier forms of bourgeois society, reflected

¹² Keniston, Kenneth, *Young Radicals*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968, pp. 319-320.

¹³ Kunen, James S., *The Strawberry Statement*, New York: Random House, 1969.

the impatience of the young to step into the shoes of the old. This impatience often took the form of an attack on the fossilized thinking of the older generation and sometimes crystallized into a liberal, radical or a reformist attitude. In the current revolt of youth, however, very much more is being questioned—the distaste is for the system itself. Modern youth is not so much envious of, as disgusted with, the dead, empty lives of their parents. This feeling began among bourgeois children but has now spread through all levels of society. Daniel Mothe (*Socialisme ou Barbarie* No. 33) has shown clearly how opposed young workers are to both the “values” that capitalist society has to offer them and also to working class values and traditional forms of organization (political parties and trade unions). Factory work, trade union “militancy,” verbose party programmes, and the sad, colourless life of their elders are subjects only for their sarcasm and contempt.¹⁴

But why this sudden awakening of youth? (And why the sudden awakening to the sudden awakening?) Why now rather than during the 1930's? Why awaken to the evils of the German government today, but not to those of Hitler? One cannot really use a concept of universal and constant morality or immorality to explain revolutionary change.

Kunen, Cohn-Bendit, and all the others who choose to see one basic, underlying cause seem to be primarily concerned with using this to show how evil the whole “System” is and how strong its enemies are getting to be. Just as the right wing insists on seeing One-Monolithic-Communist-Monster opposed by a world-wide movement of righteous Christians, so the left wing insists on seeing One-Monolithic-Capitalist-System opposed by a world-wide movement of righteous youth.

The instantaneous communication of revolts elsewhere (especially when combined with the publicity effect) is a strong encouragement to revolt at any given place for a number of reasons. Probably most importantly, the fact that other “mere students” have been able to humble what had previously seemed to be all-powerful administrations makes it all look suddenly possible. Any dissident, regardless of the source of his discontent, sees it as more realistic, more rational to revolt. Secondly, it is immediately obvious in such a situation that the whole world will be watching anyone who does pull off such a revolt, however unsuccessful it finally proves to be. (Every insignificant graduate student or undergraduate realizes that he might suddenly become a Mario Savio, Mark Rudd, or Cohn-Bendit. By put-

¹⁴ Cohn-Bendit, *Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

ting his body on the line for a few days, and then going home, he might become a historical personage to be puzzled over, dealt with, analyzed, debated, attacked, and eulogized by all the scholars and reporters writing books on the revolt for many years to come.) Thirdly, such a focusing of public attention on the "ills of education" and on the students makes students more *mobilizable for action*, both because their complaints and sufferings have been "rubbed raw"—as one professional radical calls the process—by the focusing of attention on them, and by the fact that everyone knows that everyone else is thinking about them and about the possibility of revolt over their "causes." *In the modern world the mass media have their most profound effect by putting the frame around public thought and discourse, by providing a generalized context within which public thought and discourse must take place because their messages alone can be assumed by all involved to be available to all others involved. The media are the structure of thought, for they alone come at the individuals from all the angles of his everyday life and they alone are shared by all the members of society (when they are in fact massive enough).* This massive focusing of attention on the "ills of the university" and on the "Great Revolution" against the ills refocuses the students' attention far more than that of anyone else in society, for the simple reason that this is where he lives—inside education. It refocuses it in such a way that the "Corrupt and Dying Administration" becomes the background, the dull and lifeless repressor, which is being actively fought by the striking figure of the young revolutionist, who flails about in all directions, taking strong, heroic action against the dull nonface that emits bland statements about Grand Principles.

These important effects of the mass media on such events have certainly never been overlooked by the McLuhanesque generation bred on television. They have always been aware of it and have often manipulated the media with brilliant style. Some of them, especially the Yippies, have formulated the best theories of the media effects yet available, though the messages of McLuhan are often discernible in these theoretical treatises. Abbie Hoffman has published what is probably the best theoretical formulation of their tactics in *Revolution For the Hell Of It*. He first notes the crucial importance of the media in the whole idea of the Yippies:

Is that why the Yippies were created? To manipulate the media?

Exactly. You see, we are faced with this task of getting huge numbers of people to come to Chicago along with hundreds of performers, artists, theater groups, engineers. Essentially, people involved in trying to work out a new society. How

do you do this starting from scratch, with no organization, no money, nothing? Well, the answer is that you create a myth. Something that people can play a role in, can relate to. This is especially true of media people. I'll give you an example. A reporter was interviewing us once and he liked what we were doing. He said "I'm going to tell what good ideas you guys really have. I'm going to tell the truth about the Yippies." We said, "That won't help a bit. Lie about us." It doesn't matter as long as he gets Yippie! and Chicago linked together in a magical way. The myth is about LIFE vs. DEATH. That's why we are headed for a powerful clash.¹⁵

He then analyzed exactly why the protester becomes *the* focus of public attention:

It's only when you establish a figure-ground relationship that you can convey information. It is the only perceptual dynamic that involves the spectator.

Our actions in Chicago established a brilliant figure-ground relationship. The rhetoric of the Convention was allotted the fifty minutes of the hour, we were given the ten or less usually reserved for the commercials. *We were an advertisement for revolution. . . .*

That underlying tension builds up and the viewer becomes totally involved with what we are doing **EVEN IF HE CANNOT SEE OR EXPERIENCE IT DIRECTLY.** He makes up what's going on in the streets. He creates the Yippies, cops, and other participants in his own image. He constructs his own play. He fabricates his own myth.¹⁶

Comparisons Within National Societies

Cross-cultural studies and, especially, explanations of student events, then, seem clearly unjustified at this time. There may be some remote relations, but they have not yet been demonstrated; and, if they ever are, they will probably not be very important for our purposes. There is almost certainly nothing so similar about students around the world, or even about adolescents and generational conflict, that we can find any elements common to "studenthood," or common to adolescence or generational conflict, that will enable us to explain some disparate collection of events categorized as "student protests." Again, while there are some very clear relations between recent student revolts in the major Western nations, these seem to

¹⁵ Hoffman, Abbie, *Revolution For The Hell Of It*, New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1968.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

be explainable in terms of factors other than fundamental changes in the whole nature of Western society itself. These factors are partly common to higher education in Western societies (which are related in various ways to the fundamental transformation of our societies into a world-wide technological society) and partly the result of the nature of the revolts themselves, and above all, their communication throughout Western societies by the mass media.

As a result of this, even cross-national studies of student revolts that do not go beyond the Western societies are of relatively little help in explaining student protest movements in any of the particular societies, except, perhaps, in-so-far as they do show the importance in each society of the rapid growth in student populations and related factors in leading to the protest movements. The most important comparisons must be made within each society, not between it and others.

Chapter 6. The Theories of the American Student Protest Movements

In the end, one must judge whether the student radicals fundamentally represent a better world that can come into being, or whether they are not committed to outdated and romantic visions that cannot be realized, that contradict fundamentally other desires and hopes they themselves possess and that contradict even more the desires of most other people. I am impressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski's analysis of the student revolution:

Very frequently revolutions are the last spasms of the past, and thus are not really revolutions but counterrevolutions, operating in the name of revolutions. A revolution which really either is non-programmatic and has no content, or involves content which is based on the past but provides no guidance for the future, is essentially counterrevolutionary.

The student radicals come from the fields that have a restricted and ambiguous place in a contemporary society. They remind me more of the Luddite machine smashers than the Socialist trade unionists who achieved citizenship and power for workers. This is why the universities stand relatively unchanged—because despite their evident inadequacies the student radicals have as yet suggested nothing better to replace them with.

Nathan Glazer,
“‘Student Power’ in Berkeley”

One of the most striking things about student protest movements over the last several years has been the great profusion of explanations of the movements, especially of those in the United States. There has, of course, been a vast literature written on the student protest movements precisely because the people most directly affected by them—the academics and the intellectuals—are the people who do most of the writing in this society. In addition, the journalists who do most of the rest of the writing have become increasingly oriented toward the academic and intellectual world in the last few decades. It would sometimes appear that every journalist and every academic in every individual interview by the mass media has his own favorite explanation of the student protest movements. They have been attacked—or joined—where they live and they have responded by writing about it.

Sometimes it is quite apparent that particular individuals are using the protest movements for their own political purposes—that is, they prefer to see in the protest movements things which they themselves have long been in favor of. This has been especially true in some of the romantic statements about the student protest movements that one finds expressed by certain radical or extremely liberal intellectuals. In many instances these “analysts” warmly identify with the protesters. In a few instances, they have joined the students. To them the student protest movements appear to be the dawning of a new day, the realization at last of their long dreamed of utopian movements, a new Children’s Crusade, only this time destined for greater success. Lewis Feuer has described some individual instances of this identification among the Berkeley faculty:

For a while the elders of the faculty subscribed to a New Cult of Youth, according to which the student activist was the Community’s Prophetic Conscience. A professor of English poetry departing on a leave of absence delivered a farewell address in which he spoke of the “beautiful and strong Mario Savio.” A chairman of a department of science, who happened to be a member of a religious sect, became convinced that Mario Savio was a reincarnation of Jesus; even his militant colleagues were discomfited by this unusual theology. The philosophers were not far behind the scientists; their chairman told an excited student assemblage after the Greek Theater microphone seizure that they had all the power. Professors of biochemistry included such questions as the definition of “civil disobedience” on their examinations.¹

We can see this strong identification with the protesters and a rather unanalytical acceptance of anything they allege in such statements as that by John Seeley, who has long taken similar positions concerning American society:

The more finicky of my friends send me, with their approval, just as they did during the 1964 Great Overture at Berkeley, columns and clippings critical of the behavior of Columbia students: not, of course, those students who violently sought to starve out the occupants of the citadel, but those who, momentarily at least, sat down in the seats of power. “How,” one good lady asked me in horror, “are we going to save a free society now?”

That’s a good question, though belated. But it’s a tricky one and misdirected: tricky because it assumes we have a free

¹ Feuer, Lewis, *The Conflict of Generations*, New York: Basic Books Inc., 1969, p. 463.

society now to "save"; misdirected because its address should not be through me to the students, but through Grayson Kirk to Mr. Kirk's "military-industrial-intellectual complex" . . .

The leading issues are crystal clear, and no amount of diversionary chatter about purloined and copied documents should make us glance away from them for even a footnote-instant. . . . Where is the showing that Columbia—potentially more fully informed than most as to the criminality in substance and form of the war, the evils of the draft and selective service, and the adverse effect on education of Mr. Hershey's "manpower channeling"—moved earnestly, actively and massively to clear its skirts, in fact and appearance, of all involvement in what many judge to be crimes against humanity? "Where?" I ask, and Echo answers, "Where?"

People always ask, "even though mistakes have been made, doesn't such a great center of learning deserve to survive?" My answer is "Yes, if . . ." Yes, if it can now, in sackcloth and ashes, having rid itself of its administration and board, go to the students it proposes to impugn, not merely with amnesty and guarantee of safe passage, but with bay and laurel, its highest accolades, its gratitude forever, its most honorary degree. When Columbia holds a new Commencement awarding these its new LL.D's (Doctors of Liberties), only then will we know it has commenced anew and aright, and deserves the tentative support of those who love what a university ought to be.²

But even those who apparently agree completely with the student protest movements, and identify with "the cause," see very different things in it and very different causes. This is very apparent in the article written by Bernard Steinzor that appeared in the same journal as that by Seeley. Steinzor, a psychiatrist, sees a mental health message—and justification—in the Columbia movement:

This is again a decade of reformation, especially compared with the '50's, when we castigated the students for their apathy. Today's students are making a heady mix of the values we have stood for and the current condition of men. Raised on Spock, they have been joined by him in civil disobedience—a rather lovely happening. The generation gap was thus overcome; the father and son together were doing a selfless thing. This is a new and stirring development:

² Seeley, John R., "Plantation Politics," pp. 16-21, in *Psychiatry and Social Science Review*, July 1968, Vol. 2, No. 7.

young activists are risking much in a cause for others. Helping the individual climb out of his self-centeredness is what we psychotherapists try to do. We recognize that narcissistic careers are expressions of a deep sense of helplessness. And powerlessness, we know, precludes love . . .

. . . The protesting students at the universities, and those who joined the so-called "Children's Crusade," do not require referral; the aura of violence which surrounds their ideology and tactics must be understood as the reaction of people who have been taken for granted too long, treated like babies, when, indeed, they had outdistanced their elders in sensibility and understanding of the vital issues of the times. We cannot ignore the lessons of our own history: social justice never has been attained without some damage to aspects deemed worthy by authorities. . . .

The Students have been doing our thing. Partly because of the faith we and our parents have placed in the possibility of a progressive order ever expanding the coordinates of love and justice, they do it better. We certainly can become slightly nervous at their audacity, but—let us hope—so will they when the next generation comes of age.³

When we then consider all of the descriptions and analyses of the same protest movements that do not involve this kind of agreement and identification with the protesters, but are either neutral, which is unusual, or antagonistic, we find that the variety of both descriptions and analyses is extremely great. When the different people with different orientations to the events look at "the same thing," if it even makes sense to assume this, they "see" different things and their analyses of those things they see take them to completely different conclusions about the goals, values, and significances of the protesters. For example, Sidney Hook, looking at the same events at Columbia and writing in the same journal, sees and understands completely different things from those things seen and understood by Seeley and Steinzor:

Not many weeks ago, as Dr. David Truman, Provost of Columbia University, walked to his office on the campus, one of the striking students strode up to him and spat in his face. Nothing happened to that student. No protest was heard from the other students. None of the faculty members who pleaded for complete amnesty for the students rebuked the action when it became known. It was received in almost the same matter-of-fact way as the streams of abuse, of profane and foul language that the rebellious students have

³ Steinzor, Bernard, "Coordinates of Power and Intimacy," pp. 24-26, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

hurled at those who expressed disagreement with them.

In some ways it is events of this character which are more significant than the differences over the specific issues, like the building of a gymnasium or the nature of legitimate academic research. For they reveal a situation altogether incompatible with the idea of the university as conceived until now.

The unspoken allegiance of the community of scholars has been to civility of mind. Respect for the rights of teachers and students to differ with each other and among themselves has been taken for granted together with the presumption of good faith and goodwill on the part of intellectual dissenters and heretics. All this has been fractured at Columbia by violence, obscenity and hysterical insult. The language and behavior of the gutter have invaded the academy.⁴

However, when we look at these many different explanations more carefully and begin to more systematically compare them, we find that these apparently vast differences, this apparent profusion of individual explanations, is more apparent than real. We find there are actually a number of basic dimensions to these analyses and basic factors which most of those involved in the academic world and the intellectual world have made use of in many different ways with many different nuances to explain the basic aspects of student protest movements. The important differences in the explanations seem to be primarily differences in the perspectives adopted and in the ordering and emphases on factors, rather than in the factors that are seen as relevant. It is especially the differences in perspectives that are of basic importance to anyone trying to explain the student protest movements, especially since the perspective problems must be solved at the beginning, before one can decide on how to go about handling the factors considered important.

The Evasion of the Issues

The theoretical perspectives adopted to explain the movements show all too clearly the ways in which professional disciplines determine one's views of such concrete events and the ways in which theoretical perspectives are adopted long before one comes to such concrete events, so that the theorists have already assumed that they know the general nature of the phenomena and their causes before they come to the concrete phenomena. In the great majority of these works there is an academic presumption that the analyst knows the general truth before he begins. Indeed, in all too many instances there is not merely the assumption that one knows the general nature

⁴ Hook, Sidney, "Symbolic Truth," pp. 22-23, *Ibid.*, p. 22.

of the truth, which is certainly more defensible in terms of the impossibility and undesirability of always starting from ground level in trying to understand the world, but there is also the assumption that a great deal is known about the specific nature of the phenomena to be studied. For example, when a structural sociologist comes to study the events of student protest he is very apt to assume completely implicitly that the only valid explanation of the events will be found in the family backgrounds, class associations, or in some other traditionally recognized "structural" factors. In the same way, when a psychologist comes to study the events he is very apt to assume completely implicitly that the only valid explanation of the events will be found in the earlier, especially childhood sexual, family relations of the protesters. The only thing that saves us from a complete war of theoretical perspectives is the willingness of many of the theorists to adopt a multi-factored approach by which they recognize the partial, if subordinate, validity of other perspectives. In this way we get a live-and-let-live approach to the theoretical explanations of the phenomena, but we do not get any closer to the phenomena. The events are forced into the Procrustean bed of preestablished theories and all too often neither the theory nor the events leads to any improvement in the other.

One of the crucial results of this whole approach to the events has been an apparent *evasion of the issues*. The students are in some cases profoundly angry about certain aspects of American society and policy and they talk endlessly about what they see as the sources of their anger. But in many of the theories there is a complete evasion of this anger and of the issues which the students argue lie behind their anger. In a review of two of the better known books on the student protest movement, Michael Rossman, one of the members of the Free Speech Movement Steering Committee, has expressed very well the strong feeling of the students that the academics have consistently evaded the "real issues":

"What do you feel about the FSM Books?" I asked my friend Steve Weissman, who was on the FSM Steering Committee with me.

"The Academics are at the dungheap with their forceps again."

"You can tell the bird by his droppings?" I suggested.

"Maybe. But you can't tell the way he flies."

Those who were FSM will understand this, will understand how I struggle without poetry to say something about these books, which is not in their image and dead names, missing the point as they miss theirs; to articulate the indelible sense of unreality, of irrelevance they leave me with. The sense is



familiar, the conflict was cloaked in fog: were these writers talking to us, hearing us, even seeing us? How ironic, how fitting, to find it again, from the same sources and for the same reasons. I can only say—with the same strange Chaplin humor that infused every action of the FSM, yet finds no notice in these books—that the Failed Seriousness Quotient is very high.

FSM happened at the locus of Modern Scholarship. The entire armament of analysis hung poised and desperately avoiding contact with the Perfect Chance that shook a fist in its face; while we sang, "I write theses/about fescues/and it greases/my way up the line."⁵

The tendency to *evade the phenomena* is itself so powerful that we find it a dominant tendency even in those cases in which the analysts are trying very hard to deal with the issues as defined by the students. There are almost innumerable articles and many books that purport to deal with the "way students see it today," or "why they do it," that make almost no reference to *concrete, living-and-breathing, real-life students*. The students, even the very vocal activist students, become *the silent subject generation*, an object of aloof adult discussion and argument, a *cause celebre* for many different points of view—but unheard, unseen. In some peculiar way, the analysts, even some of the best and some of those most interested in the student points of view, take other analysts as the official spokesmen of the younger generation. As unbelievable as it may seem to some of us, this evasion of the phenomena has gone to the extreme of taking Edgar Friedenberg and Paul Goodman, two of the more unusual and romantic critics of American society in the name of "youth," as such official spokesmen of "youth," even though they have often provided excellent documentation of their lack of experience with the youth they were trying to write about.⁶ There is almost never reference to what a concrete student has said, but there are often concrete references to what Friedenberg and Goodman have said.

Part of the reason for this lack of explicit reference to real students is probably the scholarly bias that sees more *reality in print* than in what can be seen or heard in everyday life. Paul Goodman has *print-reality*; the student at the lunch table does not. Closely related to this is the greater *hierarchical reality-value* attributed to the "recognized authority," the "professor," or any other man of authority. For both reasons, as well, the analysts would want to avoid

⁵ Rossman, Michael, "Barefoot in a Marshmallow World," in *The New Radicals*, Jacobs, Paul, and Landau, Saul, eds., New York: Vintage Books, 1966, p. 209.

⁶ Friedenberg, Edgar Z., *The Vanishing Adolescent*, (Preface), New York: a Delta Book, 1964.

giving the impression of "being journalistic" that would come from using the "human-interest" style of "as one distraught freshman at Stoney Brook put it over a Coke."

But it is probably most important that the evasion of the phenomena, including the issues, has been so complete that until recently there were almost no published *real-word statements* by real students. There were plenty of surveys and attitude studies of the sort done by Coleman or Katz, in which real students were collapsed into the 12 percent who responded in a given way to a multiple-choice question and got scaled-up very neatly, all methodologically prearranged to screen the reader from the real-person, the real-student. But only after the student revolts made some students saleable in print did we get any real-word statements by students. While some of these are helpful, and will be used in some of our descriptive and explanatory sections, there is now the grave danger that these print-realities, carefully screened by the saleability criterion, will come to be taken as representative of *the* students, whereas in fact the writing and publishing of a book or essay is itself such an unusual situation, so removed from the "barricades of student revolt," that the writer himself is probably in many cases screening his own thoughts and recollections to such an extent that they become distortions of what actually happened, what could have been observed to happen and be said had one been on the scene.

In some of the better instances we do find, fortunately, that this evasion of the phenomena is only partial. In a work such as Martin Meyerson's essay on "The Ethos of The American College Student: Beyond the Protests"⁷ we find no explicit reference to what real-students said, though we do find some good uses of slogans taken from buttons. But there is clearly a great deal of experience with real-students lying behind most of his statements. Nevertheless, the dangers of evading the phenomena are apparent even in this work. For example, Meyerson argues that the present college students suffer from a "strain of being part of neither the elect nor the electorate," presumably because they recognize the way in which the vast increases in college enrollment have decreased their elite status. But from my own experience I would suspect that this is a complete "misreading" of the way the students today define their situation. I have heard graduates and seniors looking at their job possibilities express such feelings, but the vast majority of undergraduates seem oblivious of this state of affairs. They seem quite convinced that college is absolutely necessary in order to have any chance of being in the elite and they generally seem to feel that having made college

⁷ Meyerson, Martin, "The Ethos of The American College Student: Beyond The Protests," pp. 266-291, in *The Contemporary University: USA*, Robert S. Morison, ed., Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966.

they have gone a long way toward making it all the way. This is certainly very much the case in the elite schools where college is seen as *the* beginning of a whole new life. For example, this is excellently described in a rare essay by a student on how it looks to him:

The first task in trying to understand college students is necessarily to consider the context in which they play out their undergraduate years. For Harvard students—and a good many others around the country—that context is undeniably clear. They conclude very early in college that society asks of them a fixed role in life, a career in which they will become specialists—for the whole of society appears to their newly opened eyes to be built out of small, die-cast parts. And they conclude soon thereafter that almost any career with passably attractive possibilities will require a graduate degree, in some size, shape, or form—for the chance of finding an interesting career without such credentials seems hopelessly slight. . . . Many come to see their four years as only a brief respite before their serious work begins. Others search frantically for that proverbial “last fling” before their “real” lives get underway. Whatever the results, the attitudes with which a student looks ahead to graduate school can have an immense impact on his attitudes as an undergraduate. It would be superficial to tackle the substance of those four years of college without some sense of the shades of student approaches to graduate school.⁸

While this is an important point in itself, the importance of it here is that the analysts have a strong tendency to substitute their own understandings of the “real situation” for the students’ understandings of those situations and, thereby, to quite misunderstand how the students see it and why they do anything, such as revolt.

But the social scientists and other analysts of the student protest movements have found it possible to evade the phenomena and the issues even when they gave some consideration to the kinds of things students say and do, simply by insisting on imposing their preconceived theories on whatever phenomena or issues they do consider, so that they come up with “real” meanings for what the students say and do that just happen to fit the general ideas held by the analysts before there were any protest movements. The most common of these unintended strategies for evading the issues and phenomena are the psychologistic and structural theories.

The Psychologistic Theories

The first half of the twentieth century has been an Age of Psy-

⁸ Gordon, David M., “‘Rebellion’ in Context: A Student’s View of Students,” pp. 292-313, in Morison, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

chology in Western societies, especially in American society in which the traditional commonsense ideas of individualism fit in very nicely with the individualistic perspective of psychology. In the last few decades this psychologistic bent, this insistence on explaining everything people do in terms of "psychological factors," has crested and has definitely begun to recede and be replaced by an opposite tendency, that of structuralism or sociologistic theories; but in the interim the mass media have continued to be dominated by the psychologistic theories. As we should expect in this situation, there have been many different psychologistic theories proposed to explain the student protest movements.

One of the more extreme "psychologistic" theories of the student protest movements is that of Bruno Bettelheim.⁹ Bettelheim makes use of some very important observations of the kinds of things the radicals have to say in their everyday lives, at least when they are being observed in those lives by outsiders, but he uses them to show that it all goes back to the parents, and that the "messages" emitted by the radicals are "really" only messages from their own inner "chaos" and "need for external controls" (which is a typical psychological description of paranoid schizophrenics, a label which Bettelheim graciously refuses to invoke).

He notes first of all that, as a Harvard senior had earlier observed, SDS members very frequently respond to questions about "the sickness of society" with remarks about "well, take my father for example. . . ." He concludes from this that ". . . it is indeed in the changed ways of rearing children in the upper-middle class home that we have to look for some additional answers." I suggest there are two completely different reasons for this frequent reference to one's family members. First of all, and most obviously, the radicals, like any other young people, know their parents far better than they know any other adults. Indeed, in many instances, their parents are the *only* adults they have seen to any significant degree *behind the public fronts* which are so essential for successfully navigating the enemy-filled territory of highly competitive social groups found in the American upper-middle class. Their parents, then, are some of the only good evidence they have about the strains, hypocrisies, etc., which they are talking about. When they are concerned with things about which they have other "good examples" (as they see it) from the public domain of the mass media, they refer to those at least as often. For example, the extreme radicals were concerned with ridiculing Lyndon Johnson in *MacBird* and in other statements of their great hatreds, rather than with ridiculing their parents. Secondly, when the radicals refer to their parents as the "causes" of their own

⁹ Bettelheim, Bruno, "Student Revolt: The Hard Core," pp. 405-10 in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, April 15, 1969.

anguish, being "mixed up," and so on, they are generally simply making use of the psychologistic theories of the aetiological causation of emotional states and of behavior which they and the general public have learned from the psychologists, especially from the psychoanalysts. Surely it could not have escaped Bruno Bettelheim's attention that this is the Great Age of Psychoanalysis in American society and that the upper-middle class, especially the highly educated of the large urban centers, are precisely the people who have dedicated themselves to psychoanalyzing every aspect of life. Surely he could not be ignorant of the fact that psychoanalysis has for years been the One True Religion for the upper and upper-middle class people of our great cities, especially of New York City, which has long been the worshipped Mecca of psychoanalysis. Surely he could not be ignorant of the fact that even many of the mass media, especially the movies, have been suffused with the psychologizing of personal problems. And surely he could not be ignorant of the fact that many of these radicals themselves, like many other college students in the wealthy universities, have themselves "been through analysis" of one sort or another where they have been patiently taught (by indirection, or nondirectively, of course) to analyze the most minute childhood experience, especially those in which they experienced any hatred, animosity, distaste, or petty pique against their parents, especially their fathers, to see what the "real causes" of their "symptoms" are.

Bettelheim is using a very blatant form of *ex post facto validation* to "prove" his point. That is, he and thousands of other psychologizers, in and out of the universities, have taught the educated, upper-middle class to explain their adult feelings and behavior in terms of their childhood relations with their parents, especially their animosities against their parents. And then the psychologizers have used the fact that their "patients" and the children of their "patients" have learned their lessons well enough to repeat almost verbatim these theories as *proof* that the theories were right all along. In a very real and important sense, these psychologizers have taught the present generation to believe in the essentials of the "generation gap," the all important element of animosity, and then have helped further to expand it by now arguing that "Yes! Yes! Now you can see that we were right all along, that Oedipal conflicts really are necessary, that sons must inevitably turn against their fathers."

The psychologizers have taught the upper-middle class the *Oedipal perspective* on their problems in precisely the same way that sociologists and other social scientists have taught them to look at our society almost entirely in terms of the *social problems perspective*, the narrow view of our society which focuses entirely on the problems and excludes consideration of the beauties and virtues (which even

the radicals would agree are beauties and virtues in other contexts). This teaching has been so highly effective in this increasingly education oriented society that today even the least educated militant talks about his problems and ideas in terms of the sociological jargon of "power structure," "institutional racism," "bourgeois way of life," "social system," and so on; and radical proclamations about "black power" take time out in the early parts of the call to arms to discuss the sociological distinction between "social structure" and "social system." It is clearly time for all social theorists to become aware of how powerful the *ex post facto bias* has become in our society. In a very real sense our entire society has become so "tuned in" to the mass media and "turned on" by the "scientific experts," who teach the mass-mediaists and who in turn teach the masses through the trickle-down system, that our whole society has become a "biased sample," or one in which the expert's teaching methods and observation become a primary determinant of what he will observe: the expert winds up studying himself and what he has created!

Bettelheim goes on to argue that:

The mainspring of their action is their wish to prove themselves strong, rather than any particular political convictions, which are superimposed on their self-doubts and a hatred of a society they feel has left them out in the cold.

In many ways, at the same time, a student who revolts is reflecting a desperate wish to do better than the parent, especially in areas where the parent seemed weak in his beliefs. In this sense revolt also represents a desperate desire for parental approval. Even more, it is a desperate wish that the parent should have been strong in his own convictions.

This is the reason why so many of our radicals embrace Maoism, why they chant in their demonstrations "Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh." Both Mao and Ho are strong father figures, with strong convictions, who powerfully coerce their "children" to follow their commands. While consciously they demand freedom and participation, unconsciously the commitment of rebelling students to Mao and other dictators suggests their deep need for controls from the outside, since without them they are unable to bring order into their inner chaos.¹⁰

We can see from this example that Bettelheim has chosen to draw in the "unconscious" forces to explain what appear to him to be "irrational" contradictions between calling for freedom and supporting Mao and Ho Chi-Minh, rather than seeking any "rational" explanation in terms of the messages they are consciously communicating, such as their political beliefs. There is a perfectly obvious

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

political explanation of their support of Ho and Mao: they support them, and wave Vietcong flags, and resist the draft, and attack the Pentagon, and spill blood on draft board records, and ban ROTC from the campuses, and do a great many other things in good part because, remarkable as it might seem to Bettelheim, they are in fact very angry at the United States over the Vietnamese war and because they see Ho and Mao as their best hope for defeating the United States in that war. They attack their political enemies and support their friends in precisely the same way that a rational psychologist, such as Bettelheim undoubtedly is (in spite of what the radicals would say), might do; and this in itself is not really a remarkable fact requiring the immense machinery of the unconscious, the id, the superego, the ego, and various other mechanisms and complexes to explain it.

There are also a large number of obvious facts that could not be explained by this supposed paranoid need for "external controls" to "bring order into their inner chaos." For example, the insistence of SDS on an almost totally unstructured "non-organization" to carry on the movement is in total contradiction to this paranoid symptom theory. The lives of the individuals, the way they have unstructured their nearly "non-group," and the way they try to arrive at non-group decisions through universal consent makes the whole movement more like a celebration of anarchy than a celebration of Mao-tyranny.

The psychologistic theories are singularly given to a venting of the analyst's own darkest fears, his nightmare anxieties, and his own antagonisms toward the youth, perhaps because they involve such a total evasion of the issues resulting from the almost universal insistence of the "irrational forces," the "unconscious forces" which the actor himself must be unaware of by their very nature. (Declaring your opponent-subject to be "irrational" and to be "necessarily unconscious of the truth" before you begin attacking-analyzing him is extremely effective in undercutting his inevitable counterattacks, at least for all of those who see the attack-analysis as "scientific" and who are not put off by the unfairness of such a tactic.) Bettelheim's analyses of youth seem to have been haunted primarily by the nightmarish fear that we are witnessing a return of the Nazi Youth (though we must avoid getting too psychologistic in our own analyses). But the most important psychologistic theory of the protest movements, that proposed by Lewis Feuer in *The Conflict of Generations*,¹¹ is haunted more by ancient Freudian forces, the dark forces of Oedipal conflicts which are so infinitely subtle that they can be found lurking in the shadows behind the most far-flung and opposite forms of conflicts between groups of youth and groups of adults, from Tokyo to Buenos Aires, from Lagos to Ithaca.

¹¹ Feuer, *op. cit.*

Lewis Feuer's work on *The Conflict of Generations* is not only the most scholarly work yet published on student protest movements, but is also probably the most scholarly psychoanalytic theory of universal historical forces yet published. It will undoubtedly receive wide attention from scholars and the general public on both counts. While it certainly deserves this wide consideration, and while some aspects of it are excellent, it suffers from most of the same things that Bettelheim's unscholarly work does. It, too, is fundamentally an evasion of the issues, an evasion based from the very beginning on the psychologistic insistence on the irrationality of the other person's point of view.

Taken as a whole, Feuer's theory is a rich and convoluted one, with many open ends and many dangling hypotheses. But its central points are very few and very simple. In fact, they can probably very fairly be reduced to four basic points: (1) generational conflict is universal because of the nature of Oedipal conflicts and the nature of adolescence (the young must give up a part of themselves, which is necessarily painful); (2) generational conflict only breaks out into youth revolt when the older generation has been de-authorized by some crucial, symbolic events (which is the most important and original of his particular points); (3) the students are the ones who revolt in more complex, civilized societies because they form an intellectual elite of the young; (4) youth revolts are always a mixture of youthful love and hate, and ambivalent reaction full of unconscious emotions which the young cannot face, providing the motivating force for the movements, so they are always largely destructive.

The basic problem which any universal theory of any such thing faces is that of explaining why it is that something that is universal only pops up here and there in history, rather than being there all the time. Michael Miller, who lived inside the student movements at Berkeley, made this point very well when he accepted the theory, but then pointed out that it could not explain what happened at Berkeley: "Generational conflict, however, is so ancient and archetypal a social mechanism—certainly it functions in almost every revolution, political or artistic—that it affords little insight into the campus turmoil."¹² Recognizing this obvious difficulty far better than almost any other psychologistic theorist, Feuer proposed to explain the relatively rare outbreaks of active revolt from the young by the crucial social mechanism of *de-authorization* of the elders: "Every student movement is the outcome of a de-authorization of the elder generation. This process can take place in small colleges as well as impersonal universities, in industrialized countries as well as underdeveloped ones, in socialist as well as capitalist ones."¹³

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 528.

Yet it is clear that de-authorization does not simply happen. Feuer argues that there must be some *dramatic event* that de-authorizes the elder generation:

As we have seen, a struggle of generations, in and of itself, however, will not give rise to a massive student movement. What is always required, in addition, is some signal event in which the de-authorization of the older generation, as a collective whole, is vividly dramatized. The May Fourth Movement, the turning point in modern Chinese history, arose from such a conjunction of generational conflict with the de-authorization of the elders.¹⁴

But the danger of any such ex-post facto analysis is that one can always find something after-the-fact that looks like de-authorization unless he is very clear about what constitutes de-authorization. What does produce de-authorization in Feuer's analysis? Unfortunately, Feuer is never very clear about this. But a few examples of his analysis appear to make it clear. In the Chinese case just referred to, it is clearest of all, for he immediately concludes after the above statement that it was the acceptance of a humiliating defeat by the elders that served as this dramatic event that de-authorized the elders:

The immediate incidents which ignited the May Fourth Movement brought about a crisis in the relations of the generations. It was at the end of April 1919 that the news reached Peking of the humiliation of the Chinese government at the Paris Conference. The elders had submitted abjectly to the Japanese; they had acquiesced in the surrender of Shantung to Japan. A group of student study circles resolved to call a mass demonstration on May 7, National Humiliation Day, the fourth anniversary of Japan's so-called Twenty-One Demands. These student circles were small; the influential New Tide Society, for instance, had only thirty-seven members, all of them students at Peking University. They became leaders, however, in the May Fourth Movement. Then the official student bodies of the colleges and universities in Peking voted to join the demonstration—25,000 in all, according to their own claims, probably exaggerated.¹⁵

From this example it is apparent that the de-authorization of the Chinese elders came from their "unmanliness," something Feuer keeps talking about, in accepting a humiliating defeat from the Japanese. But does this mean that de-authorization generally follows only from lack of strength and courage in battle? Apparently

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

not, for Feuer finds the "same kind" of de-authorization taking place in generation after generation of Russian fathers and sons:

It was not the strength of fathers which made their sons react by becoming revolutionary activists. Rather it was their weakness, their failure, their femininity

It was this de-authorization of the older generation (this dethronement of the superego) which was the root cause of the Russian student movement. The inventory of grievances, usually adduced, the restrictions on student political action, the formality of the university, were all secondary. Angelica Balabanoff, as a student revolutionary, was dismayed, for instance, by the absence of a German student movement when by all her Russian criteria there should have been a most militant one

But the basic fact was that the German elder generations enjoyed a series of political successes in the Bismarckian era which gave them pride and prestige in the students' eyes.¹⁶

De-authorization, then, takes place when there is a lack of prestige, manliness, strength, victory, and so on, among the elders. The same theme is repeated for the American Jews of the early part of the twentieth century:

The young students inhabited a cultural universe which their parents could not comprehend. Often their mothers and fathers were illiterate; and if they could read Yiddish, they were still alien to the American culture and language of Emerson, Bryant, Whitman. With their lack of dignity and their seeming acquiescence to persecution and poverty, with their lack of manliness and resistance, they were depreciated by the standards of the new literary-philosophical culture which the sons imbibed in school. They were at the lowest rung of society, defeated, always fleeing, and their lips could not form the words that schoolteachers spoke. The sons were ashamed of their parents and prone to accept a redemptive philosophy which would acknowledge the claim of intellect to leadership and which would usher in social justice.¹⁷

But when is a group collectively a failure or a success? When is a group taken-as-a-whole, across all of life's vicissitudes, a victor or a victim? A winner or loser? Most groups' lives are made up of some of both, this-and-that. If we are to have a universal, cross-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-154.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 425.

cultural explanation, then we must have a universal way of knowing when it is there and when it is not, the positive and negative cases of "de-authorization" and, if this formal theory is to be anything more than an *ex post facto argument of plausibility*, then it must specify for us when it will occur and when it will not. Feuer not only does not do this, while purporting to do so, but does not even look at all of the obvious negative cases. In a world of super-powers, or even a world of imperial powers, which is the way our world has been for the last several centuries, most national groups of elders are losers, bad losers. And, relatively speaking, those losers are certainly not the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union or most other nations of the Western world—all of which have student protest movements, according to Feuer. In a world of hierarchical societies and competitive struggles, most groups within any given society are losers. And, relatively speaking, those losers are not the fathers of the middle and upper class students—whom Feuer tries in this first chapter to show are the fathers of the students and the protesters. Feuer has even asserted that these sons-of-losers are not the ones who give way to generational conflict: "The engineering and working-class students, who so often have been immune to the revolt-ardor of middle class humanistic students, stand as dissenters to the doctrine of generational privilege. They have held more fast their sense of reality"¹⁸

The problems become even worse when Feuer gets around to considering the one case he knows best of all, the place where it all started for him and for most of the rest of us—Berkeley. Feuer has a whole section (from page 462 to page 466) devoted to the "Elder Generation De-authorized" at Berkeley, but, unfortunately, he has no significant mention of just what constituted this de-authorization. We can only conclude that he wishes us to determine what constituted de-authorization at Berkeley from the earlier discussions of unmanliness, etc. And, indeed, this does fit his discussion. This is even shown in the title of the section: "The Berkeley Faculty Capitulates: An Elder Generation De-authorized."¹⁹ He then goes on to give details on the "capitulation," speculates on the various reasons for doing this, and so on. But there is something profoundly disturbing about this argument. For all that we may join him in denouncing the kind of "unmanly, emasculated" faculty who cave in under such threats (or however one might wish to put it), any de-authorization resulting from that cave-in can hardly be used to explain why there were those threats—that student protest movement—to begin with. It might lead to further de-authorization, but it could hardly be the beginning. Most especially, it could not be the beginning be-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

cause the Berkeley faculty were mainly winners, men of great academic and worldly prestige—and income and power. Their only defeat was at the *hands of the students*. Moreover, why would the faculty or the administration be significant in creating their sense of de-authorization anyhow? Why not their fathers? After all, Feuer has argued very strongly, and rightly, that a large percentage of the student rebels came to Berkeley “looking for a generational battlefield.” Many of them were already rebels, so surely it would have had to be their fathers who were de-authorized. Yet it couldn’t be their fathers in general, since Feuer knows as well as anyone else that their fathers were very generally successful men, not lonely failures skulking around skidrow. Their fathers were often significant participants in the machinery of the most powerful nation in the history of the world, men of financial success in the most wealthy nation in the world, men of power in a mighty nation that had won two world wars and innumerable little ones, men who could be heard in a nation that could destroy the world. What could these men or the faculty and administration at Berkeley possibly have in common in the way of collective “unmanliness,” “failure,” “effeminency,” and “demeaning poverty” with the Chinese losers, the inept Russian fathers, and the Jewish immigrant fathers (who had shown the courage to move their families halfway around the world to start a new life in a difficult world of intense competition and who had shown the decency of raising their children to want something better)?

The whole theory fails on this crucial point, this inability to specify just what constitutes de-authorization, the crucial independent variable in the theory. In the end, the implicit meaning of de-authorization is circular: de-authorization comes to mean “whatever mental state it is that precedes student rebellion.” What Feuer fails to see is that the fundamental problem is precisely that of specifying *why* they no longer are willing to accept the authority of the older generation. Why, for example, do they choose one kind of group or standard in terms of which they judge their fathers and the collective older generation rather than another group or standard? Why do they see them as failures or successes? Feuer has avoided the fundamental problem of specifying the reasons for the meanings given by the students to their elders’ situations and actions. The work is based on the assumption that some way has been found to solve problems of specifying why things mean what they do to some group, and that this can even be done cross-culturally; but what this way might be is never stated. It seems clear from an analysis of the details of the work that in fact no way has been found.

It also seems clear that any psychological approach, either cross-cultural or intra-cultural, will face the same basic inability to deal

with the meaning of things to the participants. The approach seems inevitably to lead to an evasion of the phenomena, and, consequently, an evasion of the issues that are important to the participants. The same thing seems true of the sociologicistic, or structural, theories that have been proposed by so many sociologists.

The Structural Theories

Most sociologists are inveterate structuralists, in the same way that psychologists are inveterate individualizers: they have built structuralism into the very basic public rationales for their professional existence and they have trained generations of students to look at any given events in the world in those terms. When they come to explain events such as student protest movements, they automatically adapt a structural point of view. In the case of the student protest movements, this has meant that they try to provide the structural background of the movement and the participants and implicitly assume that these constitute an "explanation." For example, they commonly put great effort into determining by "scientific" methods the family backgrounds of the participants in any protest event, and then they provide just any old speculation that they happen to like to "explain" how it is that these backgrounds, which are never anything more than rough statistical sharings of factors, can produce these events, these protest actions. Lipset,²⁰ Flacks,²¹ and others, for example, argue that those who were involved in very specific protests at Berkeley and Chicago tend to come from upper-middle-class families with liberal values; and they try to show that, indeed, more of those involved report such backgrounds than do those who are not involved (some lesser structuralists don't even provide control samples). They then concentrate on "speculating" about the relations between this one most frequent background factor and the kinds of meaningful definitions they might give to the situations that would lead them to engage in the protest movement at that time. Some of them then treat this one factor *as if* it were explaining the whole thing (all the variance), even though they know on methodological grounds that it could not possibly explain more than a small part of the variance and that such correlations can never validly be assumed to be causal relations without evidence that there is no more general causal factor(s) producing both of them, which can only be done by far more extensive and detailed investigations of the many things taking place in the situation and in the backgrounds. (For example, it is perfectly possible and plausible to argue that those of higher status are far more apt to take part in public demonstrations simply because being thrown out of school seems less im-

²⁰ See Lipset and Altbach, *op. cit.*, Lipset, "The Activist: A Profile," *op. cit.*

²¹ Flacks, Richard, "The Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1967.

portant to them—and less likely—than it would to students with lower family status, for whom expulsion would be far more costly over the long run. The nature of their families may have little more to do with it than this. Structural correlations cannot prove it one way or the other, especially when they take into consideration so very few factors as they normally do in these studies of student demonstrators.) Again, such structural speculations are based on only two or three such studies at the most “elite institutions,” a sample that is not very likely to prove representative. Most of the structuralists, and certainly the more sophisticated of them, such as Flacks and Lipset, do not try to explain everything by any one structural variable, such as the status of one’s family of origin. At the very least, they consider a number of “structural variables.” But they do tend strongly to take one of these structural variables, generally the status of one’s family, as the starting point around which they build their theories. This one variable then becomes the cornerstone upon which the rest of the theory is built. In some cases it even becomes the basis for formulating all the other basic questions, and, thence, the basic hypothesis of the theory. This, for example, is true of Flack’s work on the student protesters. After presenting his evidence on some protesters at the University of Chicago, he then asks:

How, then, can we account for the emergence of an obviously dynamic and attractive radical movement among American students in this period? Why should this movement be particularly appealing to youth from upper-status, highly educated families? Why should such youth be particularly concerned with problems of authority, of vocation, of equality, of moral consistency? Why should students in the most advanced sector of the youth population be disaffected with their own privilege? ²²

In addition, such structural points of view face the terrible problem of not being able to deal with the “positive negatives,” those who fall in the one category but not the “right” one. For example, what of all those high-status students at Vassar and Wellesley, at Williams and Haverford? After all, the average status of students at USC makes Berkeley students look like AFDC specimens. Why did protest not start and become most virulent at the schools with the highest status students—such as Princeton or USC? Why Berkeley, years before Harvard? The structuralists will argue that there are “other” structural factors—there always are. Berkeley before Harvard because of the “West Coast effect”? But, then, why Berkeley rather than Stanford or USC? Or is it because there are

²² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

more liberal Jewish students at Berkeley? The structuralists who insist on finding some common background factors will no doubt go on searching for some set of factors that will provide a "plausible explanation" of the events, but they will be plausible only to those who are true believers in the structural point of view to begin with.

Certainly there are some structural factors of crucial importance in explaining these events. That is, there must be some patterning of events that lies behind the observed pattern of student protest movements; for surely such a mass of similar events does not just suddenly appear on the historical scene by chance or by some random confluence of events. But the crucial question is what kinds of structural events or factors? The traditional structuralists in sociology are also generally traditional positivists, especially those who do research rather than "general systems analysis." As a result they implicitly start their investigations with the assumption that those structural factors that will be of crucial importance in explaining the events will in fact be precisely those factors which the researcher can *count*, or get quantitative measures on a beautifully simple, linear, and monotonic scale that can very easily be analyzed by the simplest forms of mathematical thought devised for handling functions of a real variable. (The whole thing is terribly convenient and every positivistic structuralist of this sort must be eternally grateful to the Great Artificer who so graciously built the world with the researcher's convenience in mind.) Since so many of these positivistic structuralists studying student protest movements have also been deeply concerned with stratification, some from the Marxist standpoint and some from a more conventional standpoint, they have implicitly assumed that the stratification "variables" that are subject to simple counting procedures will be the crucial ones—hence self-reports on family income and occupation, rather than self-reports on fears of death, love of life, and so on. But, since they do recognize in some way that such variables can hardly be expected to "explain" more than a small part of the variance, they generally use a multi-factored approach, throwing in any other variables that meet the *convenience test*, without trying to see how the various structural elements might be related to each other.

What they almost always fail to see is that the crucial (historical) structural factors are (1) the existence of certain general subcultures, specifically, the youth culture and the student culture, which form the general background for all students of the protest movements and provide much of the meaning for the students of such things as their parental status, and (2) the "structural," nonnegotiable aspects of their situation as students in our society today, that is, the racial situation, the Vietnam situation and their draft status, and many lesser aspects of their situation which most members of

our society, or government officials, are not willing to negotiate in determining the individual situations of students. In addition, they apparently fail to see that, even with these general structural factors existing, there is certainly no guarantee, no certainty, that student protest will appear at a given university, at a given time, or in any given form. There are a great number of important factors in the immediate situations, that is, in the situations faced by students and others involved at the time any series of events occurs, that are very much negotiable. These factors are negotiated by the various participants, and determine whether a protest movement arises, whether protests occur, what they are like, what their effects are, whether they recur, and so on.²³ These immediate-situational, concrete phenomena are the ones which are very much determined by the free choices of the individuals involved. It is undoubtedly true that as the situations encountered in protests become typified—especially as they become stereotyped by the structured communications that take place through the mass media—and as the sides become increasingly polarized into “enemy” camps, the amount of freedom of choice, of individual negotiation, that can take place in any given situation involving that typified protest is greatly decreased. The participants in such typified, polarized situations come increasingly to respond to what “everyone in this kind of situation knows is true,” very largely because the existence of such a typified set of beliefs puts a frame around the activities which no one can easily go around because anyone involved is likely, and is known to be likely, to be thinking in those terms. But even in such typified, polarized situations, which the student protest movements have been rapidly approaching and which have given recent confrontation that aura of inevitability, of necessity, found in Greek tragedies, there is still an important element of free choice that helps to determine the direction and intensity of events, even when they cannot be reversed or prevented.

Evading the Theory

But there is another danger faced in explaining student protest movements, one that is the opposite of evading the phenomena. There are some social scientists today who would argue that we must not “give” any meanings to social phenomena. To them the entire purpose of “social science” is to determine only how the members involved see such events. To try to go beyond this is, they believe, only to impose our own meanings on them and, thus, to distort them. This is the opposite point of view to those who evade the issues; this point of view *evades the explanation*, at least to the extent of

²³ Douglas, Jack D., “The Social Construction of Moral Meanings,” in *Deviance and Respectability*, Jack D. Douglas, ed., New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970.

evading any explanation other than those which the involved members give for the events. This point of view submerges any "social science" in commonsense, makes "social science" the captive of commonsense, and denies that it is possible to achieve any form of knowledge or understanding that goes beyond the *cultural wisdom* of the members. While this point of view is in many ways a valuable corrective to the rampant structuralism and assumptions of irrationalism of ordinary people made by earlier social scientists, it has its own fundamental weaknesses. Most importantly, it undercuts the whole idea of a "social science." Without any adequate justification, it denies the efficacy of human reason in gaining a better understanding of human affairs through systematic studies and analyses of the sort that the man acting within commonsense never has time for, even if he has an inclination for it.

What is needed is a more middle range approach. It is of vital concern to the social scientist to determine what the members of society think and feel, for without this there is no source of information. Human actions are the result of the meanings of things to the individuals involved: human action is meaningful action. Few of us would doubt that there is a great deal of subconscious motivation, rhetoric, lying, and so on in ordinary human action. Certainly we must not take everything the members say or do at face value. For example, it is certainly true that in many instances student protesters are "playing to the galleries," "motivated by box office," "simulating commitment to liberal causes" in order to "radicalize" the rest of the students, and lying to the press. But we must carefully observe all of their activities that we can in order to determine what is "substance" and what is "shadow," what is simulation or lie, and what is sincere commitment and concern. To sweep all of this aside by declaring that it is all "really" irrationalism, "really determined by forces beyond the conscious realization" of the participants, or that it is all merely the epiphenomena of basic structural determinants that only the social scientist can divine, is the most rampant form of irrationalism and overweening expertise. Without closely studying what the participants say and do, and using this to unravel the truth about their internal states, the true meanings of things to them, where is the social scientist to get any information on the real world—any "data"? If he does not do this, he is left with nothing other than his own speculations and his own irrationalisms.

Rather than evading the issues, we must recognize that the issues are of vital concern to the participants, that they have real significance in leading them to undertake protests. The important question is not whether we should be concerned with what they say about their own actions, but what they "really" mean; not whether the

issues are important, but what the "real" issues are. This is a fundamental problem for which there are no easy solutions and for which, as yet, we can hope for little more than partial solutions.

While I have concentrated thus far on the important failings of certain fundamental perspectives that have been involved in most of the previous theories of the student protest movements, it must not be concluded that these earlier explanations are irrelevant to constructing an adequate explanation of these events. This would be far from the truth. As will be apparent in the next chapter, these various works have provided us with what I believe are the crucial elements in explaining the protest movements; and there are few of them that have not been at least partly right, for the simple reason that most of them are very much mixed theories, multifactored theories. The primary problem has been in not seeing these various factors in the right historical context, especially the context of the basic changes taking place in the social positions and meanings of youth and college students, and the political context of youth today.

Chapter 7. The Rise of the American Student Protest Movements

The style of student protest which has emerged from all this—its ends and its means—is no longer a political style, properly speaking, but a “happening” or drama, conformable to the lineaments of an esthetic mode. Politics has never wholly eschewed violence, but what defines politics is a set of ideas about goals or ends, and what defines rational politics is the question whether the means used are proper or proportionate to the ends. Means which are inadequate render a movement feckless; means which are ends in themselves become grotesque. But for the radical student body, circa 1969, there is no authentic interest in such rational politics, for there is really no conception of clear goals which can be fought for, negotiated, or compromised. For the “politics of confrontation,” the goal is not really the satisfying of grievances but the destruction of authority itself. Sometimes this is put into the language of democracy or populism, i.e., the desires of students to have a voice in the decisions that affect them. (And the question of what voice a student should have is, in and of itself, a genuine one.) But more often this is simply preliminary to the demand for a voice in everything, as a “right,” with little willingness to consider the question of differential responsibilities and obligations, questions of technical competence and the like. This sweeping demand for “participation” usually masks, simply, a desire to disestablish and render illegitimate all existing authority.

Irving Kristol,
Confrontation

Columbia was a truly liberating experience for many of us. Five buildings and five days forced people beyond the mere academic exercise of building a radical movement and into the more relevant experience of building a radical community. White radicals must begin the development of radical communities near universities and supported by sympathetic students. The experience of being in a radical movement lasts until the degree is handed over. The experience of living in and constructing a radical community is of a much more durable quality.

Abbie Hoffman,
Revolution For The Hell Of It

As we have already seen, by the later 1950's and the 1960's the meaningful position of youth and, most especially, of college youth in American society had changed greatly from what it had been only a few decades earlier. There were many complex strands of youth cultures that came from and fed into a generalized youth culture that consisted not only of a growing conception of youth as different from, and better than, adults, but which also contained a great deal of generalized "alienation" from the social world defined by them as the adult world, "the system." Some of these strands ran into very radical groups. Very importantly, some of the delinquent youth cultures were being radicalized by the militant movements among Negroes; and the political issues arising from the use of marihuana were helping to politicize and radicalize hundreds of thousands of youth, especially college youth. At the same time, the growing numbers and general importance of youth, especially of college youth, had changed their position in our society, making them more an object of general social attention, of political power for adult groups, and a source of far larger groups of recruits for any purpose whatsoever.

The stage had been set for the first great wave of student protest movements in American history, for, while there had certainly been earlier student protest movements in American society, all the previous ones had been localized and short lived compared to the Great Wave of the 1960's. But all of this stage setting did not constitute a recognizable drama into which individuals could throw their lives. Something far more was needed to focus the vastly complex shifting feelings and thoughts of these many different groups. Some sharp force would be necessary to order all the wayward currents, to bring together a great confluence of protest with recognizable, if still vague, dimensions and boundaries. As is so generally the case with minority groups in a mass democracy, this force was provided by the outside, the majority forces in the society.

The Beginning of Organization

When youthful rebellion is spoken of in American society it normally calls up only ideas of a very lonely, individual form of rebellion. As the many urban, technological, educational, racial and other social "revolutions" have swept our society in rapid succession, the rejection by sons and daughters of the parents' way of life has become extremely common. The disowning of children, while usually temporary, has long been common, and so has moving away from parents. But these forms of rebellion and counterattack have been seen by almost everyone as individual problems, rather than as social problems. Consequently, neither youth nor adults have come together to make common cause against the problem. There are no

Antiparent subcultures or Control Rebellious Children Associations.

At the same time, for well over the last half century there have been some very important youth subcultures devoted to rebellion, or revolution (which is simply a more generalized and violent form of rebellion) against the dominant institutions of our society. While some of these subcultures have been closely cooperative with adult subcultures of the same sort, similar to the Young Republicans, they have very generally involved some significant anti-adult world orientation. They have generally believed that adults have made a mess of the world because of their immorality and hypocrisy and that only the young, the pure in heart, and the oppressed poor, who had nothing to do with making our society, can save and rebuild our society. They have generally been highly "idealistic" for the reasons we have previously seen (in Chapter 3). This idealism has often made the youth rebellion take a socialistic turn. Most of this has probably been in the direction of Christian socialism of the Norman Thomas sort, since there is a message of antimaterialism in this kind of socialism that to many of the young seems clearly related to the antimaterialism of their Sunday School lessons. Much of this socialistic and antiselfishness orientation of the young has been expressed in the strong social movements of populism, progressivism, new dealism and new frontierism (Peace Corpsism) in which the young have been such important parts for three quarters of a century. But this same kind of orientation has led some youth to become involved in groups demanding more radical changes in American society and willing to use more radical means to bring about such changes. Beginning in the late part of the nineteenth century and the early part of this century, a minority of the "idealistic" youth have formed the core of the few socialist and communist organizations devoted to radical changes in American society. While the leftist organizations have almost always attracted the most attention, probably because of the great Bolshevik scare and the sympathies of writers, the rebellious ("idealistic") subcultures of youth have probably normally been as common on the right as on the left (Birch cells, Nazis, racist groups, etc.); but the leftist groups have been much less cooperative with adults, and much more strictly youth oriented and anti-American (adult) society.

For a long time now, each generation of core members in highly liberal and radical groups, both left and right, have passed on their ideas and values to a new generation of core members, often their own children. They have traditionalized the ideas and values, seeing them as the light, the hope of the world, that must be passed on to the next generation—and the next. In many important instances, such as the Aptheckers—radicals from the heyday of the thirties—they have passed their ideas on to their children, who then become

members of the small organizations in the relatively few universities where they have continued to exist over the years. This is precisely the conclusion reached by Lipset from his extensive analyses and reviews of the literature on the family backgrounds of the student radicals:

The major conclusion to be drawn from a large number of studies in the United States and other countries is that *left-wing students are largely the children of left-wing or liberal parents*. The activists are more radical than their parents; but both parents and children are located on the same side of the spectrum. Conversely, studies of those active in conservative student groupings, such as the Goldwaterite Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), indicate that they are largely from right-wing backgrounds. Students are more "idealistic" and "committed" than their parents—but generally in the same direction. In line with these findings, the available data indicate that the student left in the United States is disproportionately Jewish. This is not surprising since adult Jews in the United States are overwhelmingly liberal or radical for all sorts of historical and sociological reasons.¹

As these political youth groups have become more exclusively student groups, they have become more predominately leftist groups, for the simple reason that the universities have been far more dominated by extremely liberal groups who give more hearing to Marx than to Burke. (How many college students know who Burke was, as opposed to the number who know very well who Marx was and what he stood for? Indeed, how many more know the details of Marxian theories than know the details of Jeffersonian theories?) The "elite" universities and their surrounding communities became the gathering point of older leftist revolutionaries, and of "alienated" intellectuals of all types, who sought to recruit new cadres from among college youth. Berkeley, the cradle of the great wave of student protests, was the focal point for these gatherings of leftist would-be organizers. Feuer has given us an all too rare view of such activities at Berkeley:

Berkeley and its environs during the years had become the last sanctuary for the defeated activist of the thirties. In Berkeley they found a liberality of spirit which revived their flagging revolutionary ardor; they even found jobs in the university institutions, institutes, and adjacent operations, and such part-time employment gave them a base for commencing a new agitational career among the students.

¹ Lipset, S. M., "The Activist: A Profile," pp. 45-57, in *Confrontation*, Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, eds., New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968, pp. 51-52.

An able former editor of a New York Trotskyist magazine, *Labor Action*, after the demise of his magazine and movement, turned from labor action to student action; he secured part-time employment in the university library, and in 1964 conducted a notable University Socialist School with a course entitled "Ten Revolutions That Shook the World." . . . The hundred or so activists who attended the school heard lectures on the value of the revolutionary experience; revolution seemed the culmination of one's life, the moment of heroism, the moment of meaning. A few months later the same activists were seeking their own revolutionary experience on the Sproul steps and the plaza. As the French revolutionists had stormed the Bastille and occupied the Tuilleries and Versailles Palace, as the Bolshevik-led masses had occupied the Winter Palace, the students would surge forward to occupy the open administration building, Sproul Hall.²

Lipset has summarized a good deal of evidence showing, without exception, that certain schools, especially Berkeley, not only have long traditions of liberal and radical political activism, but are also in some key instances surrounded by consistently liberal and radical communities from which larger percentages of the students are drawn.

The political traditions and images of certain universities also may play an important role in determining the orientations of their students and faculty. In the United States, Madison and Berkeley have maintained a fairly long record as centers of radicalism. The University of Wisconsin image goes back to before World War I, when the strength of Progressive and Socialist politics in the state contributed to the university's political aura. Berkeley is a particularly interesting case in point. The San Francisco Bay area has a history, dating back to the turn of the century, as one of the most liberal-left communities in the nation. A history of student activism during the 1930's by Hal Draper credits Berkeley with one of the largest reported anti-war demonstrations of the time. Various pieces of data pertaining to the Berkeley campus since the end of World War II point up the continuity of that university as a center of leftism. . . . Berkeley was the only large university in the country to sustain a major faculty revolt against restrictive anti-Communist personnel policies in the form of the loyalty oath of 1949-1950. The data collected by Paul Lazarsfeld, in a national opinion survey of the attitudes of social scientists,

² Feuer, Lewis S., *The Conflict of Generations*, New York: Basic Books Inc., 1969, pp. 439-440.

conducted in 1954 to evaluate the effect of McCarthyism on universities, indicated that the Berkeley faculty was the most liberal of any of the schools sampled in this study.³

Roszak has rightly argued that the old left turned to the young in good part because they had no place else to go:

The final ingredient that goes into this ebullient culture of youthful dissent is the adult radical who finds himself in a fix that much resembles that of the bourgeois intellectual in Marxist theory. Despairing for the timidity and lethargy of his own class, Marx's middle-class revolutionary at last turns renegade and defects to the proletariat. In postwar America, the adult radical, confronted with a diminishing public among the "cheerful robots" of his own generation, gravitates to the restless middle-class young. Where else is he to find an audience? The working class, which provided the traditional following for radical ideology, now for the most part neither leads nor follows but bogs down to become the heaviest ballast of the established order. If the adult radical is white, black power progressively seals off his entree to Negro organizations

On the other hand, the disaffected middle-class young are at hand, suffering the "immiserization" that comes of being stranded between a permissive childhood and an obnoxiously conformist adulthood, experimenting desperately with new ways of growing with self-respect into a world they despise, calling for help. So the radical adults offer to become gurus to the alienated young, or perhaps the young draft them into that service.⁴

Roszak is also right in seeing this influence as a two-way stream. The Old seek out the New and the New seek out the Old in various ways; and the needs of each become a determinant of the nature of the borrowing that takes place in these exchange relationships. On the campuses, for example, the young radicals feel a strong need for the "academic respectability" of Old Leftists like Herbert Marcuse and they follow him around like a large family—or a clique to laugh down his opponents and fawn upon his proclamations—but these Old Left warhorses like Marcuse also need the young radicals, for they are their only near-hope in a "One-dimensional" world, the only "open minds" that can see the "truth." This relationship between the Old and the New, then, has generally been a symbiotic one.

These older, committed revolutionaries were not very successful in

³ Lipset, S. M., *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁴ Roszak, T., *op. cit.*, pp. 401-402.

organizing college youth. But they did provide some of the important guiding ideas and organizational know-how that went into the organizing of very leftist, even Maoist-oriented, student groups at Berkeley and probably at a few other schools with old socialist traditions, such as Wisconsin, in the later 1950's.

In the formal sense SDS is a direct descendant of the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), organized in 1930 by the League for Industrial Democracy, a Fabian group closely linked to the Socialist Party. During the thirties SLID had been a Socialist opposition to the Communist-dominated National Student Union (NSU). SLID and the NSU merged to form the American Student Union, which died a few years later, torn apart by an internal struggle between the Socialists and Communists.

After the end of World War II, SLID was revived under the leadership of James Farmer, who later became national chairman of CORE. But the new SLID suffered from the deadening effect of McCarthyism on campus, and by the end of the fifties its membership had dwindled. It was revived by the new activist radicals, mostly from the University of Michigan campus, who took it over in 1960 and gave it an action orientation.

SDS maintained a formal but steadily weakening link with the SLID, for purposes of tax exemption and for an aura of respectability, not from any common ideology but on January 1, 1966, there was a break. SDS is a new radical group with few ties to any of the older left groups in America. In the views of SDS, SLID, once an active and vital socialist education organization, is now dominated by aging trade unionists whose anti-Communism outweighs old commitments to socialism. In turn SDS's radical critique of American policy goes too far for most of the SLID board, especially since SDS does not frame its analysis from an anti-Communist premise.⁵

While almost nothing systematic is known about most of these early radical youth groups, they were strong enough by the early 1960's to send out students to distribute leftist oriented newspapers at some of the "elite" schools in the East and it was at that time that most young academics around the country probably had the first invigorating experience of arguing with some Berkeley leftist, perhaps even a Maoist.

One of the most important of the radical youth organizations

⁵ Jacobs, Paul, and Landau, Saul, *The New Radicals*, New York: Vintage Books, 1966, pp. 28-29.

(or quasi-organizations, as I shall later call them), the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS), was formally organized by individuals with old-left ties and first existed under the legal aegis of an old-left organization. While there is great dispute about the facts of these matters, Jacobs and Landau have given the best account thus far. There were leftists at other universities, probably at all of them, and some did have small organizations; but the leftists at Berkeley were more radical, more ideological, more committed to attracting American society with their bodies, more numerous, and far better organized for political action than at *any* other university in the country. This was the reason why Berkeley became the first great battlefield of the rising student protest movements in American society. Above all, this was why Berkeley, and the San Francisco area in general, was the scene of the first "student demonstrations," which came before the emotional shock of the Vietnam situation and before the Free Speech Movement, but which fed members and tactics directly into the first wave of protests, the racial protests, and into the FSM. Again, Lipset has summarized the best available facts about the Berkeley situation:

The first major well-publicized student-manned demonstration of the 1960's was the one directed against the House Committee on Un-American Activities in San Francisco in 1960 ("Operation Abolition"). In 1963-1964, the year before the celebrated Berkeley student revolt, San Francisco Bay Area students received national publicity for a series of massive and successful off-campus sit-in demonstrations designed to secure jobs for Negroes at various business firms. Prior to the emergence of the Free Speech Movement (FSM) protest, the Berkeley campus probably had more left-wing and activist groups, with more members than any other school in the country. The vigor and effectiveness of the FSM must in some part be credited to the prior existence of a well-organized and politically experienced group of activist students. A study of the 600 students who held a police car captive in the first major confrontation of that affair, in October 1964, reported that over half of them had taken part in at least one previous demonstration and that 15 percent indicated they had taken part in *seven or more!*⁶

It would almost certainly be a mistake to see these various splinter groups, which were probably not very well organized, as very influential in producing even the core groups which were to become important in the later protest movements. But they probably were quite important in helping to produce and spread the ideas of re-

⁶ Lipset, S. M., *op. cit.*, p. 54.

bellion, the rationales for generalized social protest by the young, and in putting them in their modern context, making the older ideas relevant to the modern American situation. These were the kinds of groups that fed into the chaotic development of the New Left in the later 1950's. But only a few of these groups, generally those with Old-Left ties and ideology, set out to purposefully create a New Left at the "elite" universities:

As McCarthyism waned in the late fifties a group of university intellectuals, much like the British New Left although less vigorous and certain, began to develop around the universities of Wisconsin, California at Berkeley and Chicago. At Wisconsin the Socialist Club was formed by ex-LYLees and younger undergraduates who had never experienced Communist Party schooling; at Berkeley a similar group called SLATE formed a student political party; at Chicago a student political party founded in the early fifties was revived.

At Wisconsin the success of the Socialist Club and the inspiration of the British New Left were combined with the teaching of William Appleman Williams, the historian, who attempted to use Marxism creatively to understand American history. The result was the publication of *Studies on the Left*, a journal of research, social theory and review. Several months later at the University of Chicago a group of graduate students began to publish *New University Thought*.⁷

In general, the New Left remained a movement with a broad front and had organization only in its *core groups*. It was a movement that would share the Old Left hatred of the "bourgeoisie" and of the leaders of the "capitalist" world, especially the United States, but which would be shorn of the deadening dogma of earlier leftism, the bureaucratism of Soviet communism, the vile crimes of Stalinism, and the stigma of so many earlier defeats. They retained the old hatreds and the core values of the Old Left while seeking to rejuvenate the movement, to make it relevant to the lives of the educated young. But this was only a marriage of convenience between the old dogmas and the new "existential humanism," a marriage destined for a different dissolution in the split over "progressive labor" in 1969.

At the same time, and quite independently of these movements, there were many other adults who were seeking to organize the young, especially the growing power of the college youth, to produce certain more limited and less radical social changes which they saw

⁷ Jacobs and Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

as vital. Such attempts by adults to organize the young had been made before, as in the America First movement before the Second World War. But the new attempts were more exclusively devoted to the college young, were directed at a more powerful group, and were more oppositional, more "radical" in their goals, without being in any way revolutionary. Probably the most important movement of this sort was the antibomb movement in this country and others, especially in Britain.

The young did indeed wrest control of the movements from the older generation, mainly by simply going beyond their elders, by doing their own organizing and marching. But it is of vital importance that their elders took the major responsibility in starting them on their way: *adults taught the youth the values and beliefs that underlie so much of the protest movements; they taught them to protest; and they taught them how to organize and what tactics to use to carry on their protest against American society.* The situation, the confluence of events that produced the powerful sense of anguish and of anger directed against American adults in the young, then provided the vital sense of urgency that got them started on their own.

The most vital element of all in this teaching of protest, the one indispensable element provided to the young by their elders, was that of initiative and organization. The young have long had a great deal of dissatisfaction and anger, but they did not organize to do anything about it. Part of the reason for this lack of organized action was a lack of a sense of common cause. This was taken care of by the development of the increasingly shared youth and college student subcultures and by the immediate situations (of civil rights and Vietnam, above all) that cast their fates together. But American youth would still have lacked organization and would probably have suffered in lonely silence, as they have long done and as the Negroes have done. *What they needed was a sense of power, a feeling that they could do something about it all by their own actions. This was the key element that bridged the chasm between suffering and action, between thought and deed.* This sense of power was given partly by the facts of their new-found power in numbers and the power of their (subjectively) central position in American society (see Chapter 1). But the practical means of doing something with this new sense of power came from the adult world. The adults, including at times the President of the United States, recruited this new power of youth for their own purposes, civil rights and liberal and radical politics, but in the process they showed the youth that they could in fact do something about their own situation. The adults taught them the *open secrets of veto power* in a pluralistic and mass democracy that liberally protects the civil rights even of those who violently attack

its very foundations, especially the rights of the "young." The adults taught them the tactics that could be used by small minorities to paralyze or shut down any institution in American society as long as the attackers were reasonably well protected by the other institutions from the use of force to stop the attackers.

Political thought, political maneuver, the tactics of organization, organizational initiative, and all such entrepreneurial activities are basic to organized adult life in our society; but they are learned rather late by youth. Adults must teach the young to be business (organizational) entrepreneurs through clubs for that purpose and through massive training programs for the new recruits. The reason for this is that all such organizational skills are secrets, simply because they are contrary to our ideals. In their most Machiavellian forms they cannot be taught at all: they must be learned through doing, for no one will tell anyone about them unless he trusts the other implicitly, a rare phenomenon in such a competitive society. For this reason and others, the young are brought up on the *pap of idealism* in the Sunday schools and the public schools. While this same pap makes the young more alienated from the "hypocritical adult world" when they do encounter it, the pap also makes the young singularly incapable of doing anything about it: this pap of idealism and the secrecy about the realities of organizational activity in our society help to make the young singularly incapable of doing anything of an organized nature and incapable of easily learning how to do any such thing.

But once the adults had decided to "use" the young, or to let the young join them, in the civil rights movement and in the liberal movements of other kinds, the young were inadvertently let in on the secrets—they were mobilized. And, as is so often the case when the young learn something new, they quickly took off on their own voyage of discovery and outdistanced their erstwhile mentors. They themselves went on to create new tactics of organization, tactics for manipulating the mass media, tactics for destroying their enemies. They created new twists on the old civil rights confrontation tactics and they created almost from the ground up their own tactics for polarizing groups and their own tactics of *de-organizing* their opponents—often called their tactics of disruption. Again Hoffman and the Yippies have carried these creative efforts to their (present) outermost limits:

We appeared at Brooklyn College and announced, "The class-room environment is free," unscrewed desk tops and transformed them into guns, passed out incense and art, wrote Black Board on the door, switched off the lights and continued in the darkness, announcing that the security guard was one of us, freeing him through the destruction

of his identity, and in general doing whatever spontaneously came in mind. Our message is always: Do what you want. Take chances. Extend your boundaries. Break rules. Protest is anything you can get away with. Don't get paranoid. Don't be uptight. We are a gang of theatrical cheerleaders, yelling Go! Go! Go! We serve as symbols of liberation.⁸

In the United States, SANE, Turn Toward Peace (TTP), and the Committee of Correspondence were the most active ban-the-bomb groups. They were largely made up of highly liberal and politically involved academics and intellectuals. As such, they naturally turned toward the growing ranks of college students for support in their political moves to change government policy. Because so many of the intellectual young were already profoundly anxious over the nuclear situation in the 1950's, and because so many more of them were also highly liberal, these groups of academics found reasonably wide appeal among the students; but these organizations remained in the hands of the older groups. In the final analysis, they did little more than fan the fears of the young and their growing beliefs that the older generation had gotten them into a terribly frightening situation; but they also helped point the way toward political activism, and activism which in time would overwhelm them, as Roszak had argued:

Admittedly, the dissent that began to simmer in the mid-fifties was not confined to the young. At the adult level of resistance, SANE was created in 1957, and later Turn Toward Peace. But precisely what do groups like SANE and TTP reveal about adult America, even about the politically conscious types? Looking back, one is struck by their absurd shallowness and conformism, their total unwillingness to raise fundamental issues about the quality of American life, their fastidious anti-communism, and, above all, their incapacity to sustain any significant initiative on the political field. Even the Committee of Correspondence, a promising effort formed around 1961 by senior academics, quickly settled for publishing a new journal. I can remember attending meetings of the West Coast committee at which Seymour Martin Lipset, who was the sort of responsible, anti-Communist liberal everybody felt certain had to be included, put the damper on any radical action by arguing without significant opposition that the cold war was entirely the fault of the Russians, and there was nothing to do but leave things to the government; which was in excellent hands, and so why were we all meeting anyway. . . .

⁸ Hoffman, Abble, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

At present, the remnants of SANE and TTP have been reduced to the role of carping (often with a good deal of justice) at the impetuous extremes and leftist flirtations of far more dynamic youth groups like SDS or the Berkeley VDC or the Spring Mobilization. But avuncular carping is not initiative. And it is a bore, even if a well-intentioned bore, when it becomes a major preoccupation. Similarly, it is the younger Negro groups that have begun to steal the fire of adults' organizations—but in that case with results that I feel are bound to be disastrous.

The fact is, it is the young who have—gropingly, haltingly, amateurishly, even grotesquely—gotten dissent off the adult drawing board. They have torn it out of the books and journals that an older generation of radicals wrote, and they have fashioned it into a style of life. They have turned the hypotheses of disgruntled elders into experiments though often without the willingness to admit that one may have to concede failure at the end of true experiments.⁹

The Civil Rights Movement and the Calling of Protest

By the late 1950's many of the students had some real fears of the nuclear situation, fears which were to be more profoundly stirred by the Kennedy campaign against the (non-existent) "missile gap" in 1960, and there was now a hard-core movement intended to provide them with old hatreds and values, as well as some new interpretations of the very old values on individualism and democracy. But there was little feeling of that profound sense of righteousness which was to become such a familiar part of the protest movements in the 1960's. The first turn of the youth toward this deep feeling of righteousness came with their involvement in the civil rights movement in the later 1950's and the early 1960's. It was here as well that they learned the first stage of the tactics that were to prove so effective in paralyzing the most liberal institutions in the most liberal society. It was here that they learned protest as a Christian calling, a duty to man and to God.

The whole subject of civil rights is still a very emotional one for most members of our society, with the consequence that anything that one might say about it is apt to be misinterpreted by at least three different sides to each dispute. However, its partial, if truncated, success was assured by the commitments of the increasingly educated upper-middle class Americans in the suburbs to the principles and practices of racial equality and integration (though it may be true that they did not expect it would someday affect them and their schools). For many decades these educated professional,

⁹ Roszak, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

business, and government people had grown increasingly favorable toward these goals for American society as a whole. Though the social relations are complex, with some of them going back to the strong abolitionist and reconstruction forces, it seems clear that formal education played a very important part in the development of the pro-civil rights feelings and values among the middle and upper-middle class Americans. The teachers at all levels were predominantly in favor of "tolerance for all racial, ethnic and religious groups" (as the endless high school orations put it); and in higher education there was almost universal commitment to these goals. At the highest levels by the 1950's the upper-middle class social scientists did masses of research to destroy ancient racial myths and testified in favor of desegregating schools in the crucial Supreme Court decision; at the lowest level of the suburban high schools (at least in the North) in the 1950's there were the massive sympathy votes for any Negro school candidate, the endless orations, and many other kinds of pro-civil rights activities. By the later 1950's and early 1960's the white college students were putting their bodies on the line and a few were being murdered for the Blacks in the South; by the early 1960's inter-racial dating, cohabitation, and marriage were growing rapidly among the college students; by the later 1960's the militant movements had clouded the whole issue, but in most places the move was still toward more integration.

In the early stages of the civil-rights involvement, most of the college youth involved were undoubtedly *reformists*. They were radical only about a very limited realm of experience and expected changes in this realm to solve the whole racial problem, or to be a beginning in a progression toward that goal. Dotson Rader, who was eventually to become one of the sit-in radicals at Columbia, has described this period very well, as the birth of generational self-righteousness and the learning of the tactics of confrontation:

Summer. 1961. The Kennedy Years. Fifteen of us met at night in Dupont Circle in Washington. We were all in our late teens or early twenties and we were tired from having spent the day sitting-in against segregation at a diner in Maryland. We gathered around the fountain in the park, feeling strong and morally upright and optimistic about America, believing justice was a matter of forcing white men to sell black men Coca-Colas and apartments and good jobs and good education throughout the South. The task was simple. The North would convert the South . . . Yankee troublemakers. We sat staring ahead at the mirror behind the shelves of danish and doughnuts. And then our leader started singing, *black and white together we shall not be moved . . . just like a tree planted by the water we shall not*

be moved. Singing it out, my throat tightening with the sense of unexpected courage, the image of rural Southern ambushes and police thugs vivid in my mind, all the years of wanting to act in unavoidable risk on behalf of the unfree, and there I sat like a picture out of *The New York Times*, playing *Northern Integrationist Liberal* to the hilt, really believing (and that was what was different then) that a sit-in against segregation *meant* something. In my mind applauding my moral purity, feeling a sense of solidarity with the blacks sitting beside me, a solidarity with the entire black nation.

I did not know why I had come. But my sitting-in, as other college students had and would sit-in until 1964 when Watts brought the Southern summer to a close, grew out of white guilt (what else?) and an attempt to declare the gap between our generation and our parents'. That assertion of moral and historical uniqueness by my generation characterized the period of youth revolt inaugurated by the Freedom Riders.¹⁰

To those reformists, revolution was not an issue, and certainly not a goal. In a very real way, they were informally led by the Kennedys, including the President of the United States, in their attack on the segregation laws of the Southern States. And their efforts were certainly instigated and coordinated by white and black liberal adults. This was only one of many ways in which the majority adults, often inadvertently, took a major part in creating the student protest movements.

Writing shortly after the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964, Mario Savio was very aware of the importance of the students' involvement in the civil rights movement in the development of the protest movement at Berkeley; and he was equally aware of the importance of the political nature of the Bay Area in this development:

The external influences on students result primarily from involvement in the civil-rights movement, both in the Bay Area and in the South. . . . There are students at many Northern universities deeply involved in the civil-rights movement; but there probably is no university outside the South where the effect of such involvement has been as great as it has been at Berkeley.

One factor which helps explain the importance of civil rights here is the political character of the Bay Area. This

¹⁰ Rader, Dotson, *I Ain't Marchin' Anymore*, New York: Random House, 1969, pp. 10-11.

is one of the few places left in the United States where a personal history of involvement in radical politics is not a form of social leprosy. And, of course, there are geographical considerations. The Berkeley campus is very close to the urban problems of Oakland and San Francisco, but not right in either city. On campus it is virtually impossible for the thoughtful to banish social problems from active consideration. Many students here find it impossible not to be in some sense *engagé*. The shame of urban America (just south of campus or across the bay) forces itself upon the conscience of the community. . . . Over ten per cent of the student body has taken part *directly* in civil-rights activity, in the South or in the Bay Area. These three thousand, all of whom have at least walked picket lines, are a leaven for the campus. And many more can be said to have participated vicariously: there is great and widespread interest in what those who "go South" have done and experienced. . . .¹¹

For many thousands of college students the civil rights movement in the South was the beginning of real political consciousness and the beginning of the more general sense of righteous indignation against the society—and generations—which had so long tolerated this legal segregation. This was a central point which Thomas Hayden and others pointedly emphasized in the "Port Huron Statement," the basic guideline of SDS ideology published in 1962. At the same time that they made the moral aspect of this Civil Rights Crusade very clear, they emphasized the fearful aspect of the bomb; and they argued that the "hypocrisy" of legalized segregation showed something evil about American society in general:

INTRODUCTION: AGENDA FOR A GENERATION

We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.

When we were kids the United States was the wealthiest and strongest country in the world; the only one with the atom bomb, the least scarred by modern war, an initiator of the United Nations that we thought would distribute Western influence throughout the world. Freedom and equality for each individual, government of, by, and for the people—these American values we found good, principles by which we could live as men. Many of us began maturing in complacency.

¹¹ Savio, Mario, *Introduction to Berkeley: The New Student Revolt*, Hal Draper, ed., New York: Grove Press Inc., 1965, pp. 2-3.

As we grew, however, our comfort was penetrated by events too troubling to dismiss. First, the permeating and victimizing fact of human degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle against racial bigotry, compelled most of us from silence to activism. Second, the enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of the Bomb, brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract "others" we knew more directly because of our common peril, might die at any time. . . .

The declaration "all men are created equal . . ." rang hollow before the facts of Negro life in the South and the big cities of the North. The proclaimed peaceful intentions of the United States contradicted its economic and military investments in the Cold War status quo.¹²

Race itself, however, has always tended to remain a reformist issue, at least for the whites. That is, the question of race has not generally been directly tied in to the generalized, revolutionary attack on the "Whole System." This is because these young Americans have come to think of race as an isolated thing, a trait, a skin color, and not some external sign of a whole internal person. The revolutionary potential of the race issue for non-racist whites and blacks, therefore, has been quite limited.

For the whites race has become a rallying point for revolutionary zeal, an ideological issue, only insofar as it can be used to mobilize the support of the liberals, and more importantly insofar as it is a part of *the* ideological issue for all hard-core radicals—class and poverty, the twin aspects of one phenomenal experience for radical youth.

This is so much the case that radical youth, both black and white, have had to continually combat civil rights reformism. This point was made very strikingly, in the same way the Progressive Laborites were later to make it, by a black Columbia student in an argument with Rader, who was not yet willing to give up his reformist belief in "it's all due to racism":

"It ain't white and it ain't black. It's rich and it's poor. It's the oppressed and the oppressors. That's all! And, baby, if you start believing," Al said, tight, the anger close, constant, closer and more intimate than it ever was for me, really *believing* that it is because the Man's *white* that he's the Man, *!*, then you start thinking it's because you're *black* you're a nigger. I tell you, being a *nigger* has nothing to do with color, it has to do with being *kept* dumb and

¹² Hayden, Tom, et al., "The Port Huron Statement," pp. 149-162 in Jacobs and Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

made different . . . if there weren't blacks around in their America they'd find someone else to play nigger. No blacks in the Midwest so the *!*** choose the Catholics or the fags or the Jews. Makes no difference."

I told him that I did not think that was entirely true; I thought it was the racism in the American character that was at cause.

"Racism? It's *hate*, baby. Hate. Like in France under the Catholic kings, no blacks around, it was the Protestants who were niggers. In England the Catholics, in Russia the liberals, in Spain the Protestants again, and in Egypt the Jews, in Israel the Arabs, in the Congo the whites. Just good old human hate. That's the enemy. They gotta pay. And, baby, when you make hate *rich*, why there's no end to the niggers you can find with all that middle-class American leisure on your hands. The fags and dykes and hippies and the young. . . . *!***! No *end* to it."¹³

Once the profound emotions of race and abolitionism, and the profound sense of self-righteousness that has always been associated with that emotion, could be tied in with the issue of poverty in general, and poverty tied in with the "very nature of the System," then a greater sense of revolutionary zeal was created. But the race issue for the white radicals was soon superseded by the Vietnam crisis. Out of this moral and emotional crisis came a far more generalized, revolutionary spirit in which specific issues such as race were all jumbled together in a broadside attack on American society and the whole adult generation.

The Black Student Protests

The civil rights movement had a very different effect on the Negro students from its effect on white students. And the failure of that movement to achieve complete equality for Negroes in American society had a far more profound effect on them than on the white students, who might be angry over the failure, but who did not have to live with it.

The whites and, apparently, most of the Negroes involved in the civil rights movement had always assumed that Negroes, any Negroes, would want the same thing as whites, if only they had the same opportunities. The civil rights liberals had fallen victims to their own ideology and rhetoric: they believed the American Negroes were "just like everyone else," only with darker skin. Indeed, so strong was their commitment to this idea that they came to see it as immoral to believe—or suggest—that there might be some real cultural dif-

¹³ Rader, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

ferences between most of the white groups in our society and the Negro groups. It came as a terrible shock to many of them to discover that there are some real cultural differences that are more than skin deep.

The civil rights movement was even more important in helping to create the black student protest movements than in helping to create the white student protest movements. As Jacobs and Landau have written, the civil rights movement led directly to the development of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee:

SNCC was formed in April 1960 at an Easter Week conference in Raleigh, North Carolina, from a group of Negro college students who had been brought together by some of the civil rights leaders interested in coordinating the student sit-in movement that was spreading so rapidly through the South. In June 1960 SNCC had a staff of only two but by now it has reached more Southern Negroes on a personal level than has been done since Radical Reconstruction.¹⁴

It was SNCC, more than any other group among the Negroes, which moved all the way from non-violent civil rights tactics to open acceptance of violent means of achieving their goals. It was SNCC, or the leaders of SNCC, which more than any other group created a synthesis of the much older black militancy and the student protest movement and forged the ideas of "black power" which seem to have unlocked the deep, pent-up feelings of "Black racism" (or "Black national pride") which has proven in some cases to be as virulent as the ancient forms of "white racism" that spawned it. And it was SNCC which more than any other group helped to forge the more general student protest movements among the black students that produced the Black Student Union and similar groups practicing confrontationist tactics on the university campuses. Again, as Jacobs and Landau have said:

At the same time, SNCC dropped its previous, at least tactical, commitment to non-violence. In a series of speeches Carmichael excited SNCC's black radicals and depressed many white liberals. If the new militancy in SNCC can develop black power in the swelling urban slums, it may channel centuries of discontent into the most explosive period in American history. Thus far, however, black power is a slogan that has produced little beyond some excitement and a minor riot in Atlanta. The masses of poor Negroes remain an unorganized minority in swelling urban ghettos, and neither SNCC nor any other group has found a form of political organization that can convert the energy of the

¹⁴ Jacobs and Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

slums into political power. Meanwhile, despite SNCC's courageous position on the Vietnam war, Negroes continue to live in poverty at home and fight in bloody battles in Vietnam. SNCC's task is to translate its angry consciousness of the shame of America into a mass movement. Its members, after all, are the only troops that have had extensive battle experience.¹⁵

Just as in the case of the Gandhi movement in India, the leaders of nonviolent movements had inadvertently released repressed hatreds which led to all of the violence the original leaders had most hated.

Since Jacobs and Landau published this in 1966, the "Black power" advocates, who have since come to be known as "Black militants," have done far more than incite a minor riot in Atlanta. Among other things, they have been very important in producing bloody confrontations over "non-negotiable" black demands at such major universities as San Francisco State, Berkeley, Cornell, and CCNY. They have helped to create a generalized student movement that might in the end prove far more destructive and long-lived than all of the extreme radicalism of the white students.

I say that this movement *might* prove far more destructive because, while it contains a virulence and knowledge of the tactics of violence which are far greater than those to be found among the whites, it is exceedingly difficult to know what the black students are trying to do, let alone what they will wind up doing. There are a number of obvious reasons for this.

The beliefs, feelings, goals, and tactics of the black students are very fluid. The amount of change in the last several years has been very great indeed. The push for independent black studies programs and colleges, for example, appeared very suddenly and in a short time became a standard "non-negotiable" demand of the blacks on many major campuses. There is no way of knowing what will suddenly spring up next and sweep across the campuses as the mass media carry the new message of *the* black ideas and goals.

One reason for this would seem to be that the black students are in great conflict about all of these matters. There is no doubt that most of them are angry and are feeling quite militant about what should be done. But there seems little homogeneity in their positions on most other things, and least of all on the matter of tactics concerning their relations toward the university, the police, the government, and the rest of American society. Some of them continue to follow the lead of more moderate civil rights advocates, such as Roy Wilkins, and seek to improve the condition of all Negroes by

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

achieving success in more standard ways. Some of these are completely against the whole idea of separatism, nationalism, black studies, and so on. Some of the others are apparently anxious to use violent means to get even with white society. There is probably an underlying conflict within the individuals themselves that is producing such conflicts in the movements. They probably want both to be a success within American society and want at the same time to reject that society, partly out of fear they cannot make it in competition and partly out of hatred of the things that have been done by that society.

It is also very difficult to know what the black students are up to because they are more political and guarded in their self-presentations than even the extreme radicals among the white students seem to be. Perhaps out of distrust or out of long experience with having to hide their inner feelings and thoughts, they seem very adept at tactical maneuvering in their public statements, and in their actions. When combined with the fact that very few social scientists have that personal experience that would allow them to use their common-sense experience to figure out what they mean and what they are "really up to," it becomes exceedingly difficult for us to unravel the mysteries of the black student movements.

All of these problems make it impossible for us to even know whether the non-negotiable demands involved in the confrontations created by the blacks are "real" or whether they are merely pretexts intended to polarize liberal students in much the same way many of the moves of the radical white students are. On the one hand, we have bland assurances that the blacks are more pragmatic about their goals in the confrontations, an assurance given by Seymour Martin Lipset and shared by no less a black social scientist than Charles Hamilton:

Black students, of course, constitute a major exception to the pattern of political passivity, or conservatism, among students of relatively deprived backgrounds. To them, the gains made before they came of age appear empty. And on the major campuses of the nation, the growing minority of black students have found themselves in a totally white-dominated world, facing few—if any—black faculty, and incorporated into a white student body whose liberal and radical wing turned increasingly, after 1964, from involvement with civil rights to activity directed against the Vietnam War. The concern with Black Power has, consequently, won growing support among black students. They have been among the major forces initiating sit-ins during the 1967-1968 school year at schools as diverse and separated as San Francisco State College, Columbia, Boston, and Northwest-

ern universities, and at many predominantly Negro institutions as well. However, as Charles Hamilton has pointed out, black-student protest differs considerably from that of the more affluent white radicals in that the politics of the former is much more *instrumental*, directed toward realistic, achievable goals, whereas that of the latter is inclined to be *expressive*, more oriented toward showing up the "immorality" of the larger society than to securing attainable reforms.¹⁶

James McEvoy and Abraham Miller have reached a similar conclusion from their discussions with the blacks at San Francisco State:

Our respondents repeatedly called for the preservation of accepted procedures of due process, the right of political dissent and academic freedom, the right of the students to have a voice in their education, and the exclusion of the chancellor and the trustees from affairs that were perceived as falling under the jurisdiction of the campus administration. Students and faculty, of almost all shades of opinion, saw these issues as the underlying causes of the crisis. But in contrast to the whites, black students tended to ignore the "larger issues," and to emphasize the demands being made by the B.S.U. and the Third World Liberation Front. The blacks spoke of very pragmatic and visible goals the attainment of which required not rhetoric but results.¹⁷

But these views of the pragmatic nature of the black student demands and goals, which imply a more moderate longrun goal of improving the black situation *within* American society, have been strongly disputed by many others, not all of whom see the militants as enemies. For example, Oliver Henry, an undergraduate Negro student at Columbia (who defines himself as Negro, as opposed to black), has argued very strongly that the blacks are concerned with producing a revolution, rather than with achieving pragmatic reforms within the university:

Unrest and discontent characterize Negro student communities on campuses throughout this nation. The unrest manifests itself both internally and externally; the discontent stems from the conditions in which many of these students have been forced to live. For today, the majority of Negro collegians come from ghettos, and it makes little difference whether the specific ghetto was Bedford-Stuyvesant, Watts, or the South Side of Chicago. These students know from

¹⁶ Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁷ McEvoy, James, and Miller, Abraham, "On Strike—Shut It Down": The Crisis at San Francisco State College," pp. 18-23ff in *Trans-Action*, March 1969.

first-hand experience the world of the ghetto which, to a large degree, represents the life of most Negro Americans: poor educational institutions, poor health facilities, poor transportation services, poor everything. The shadow of the ghetto world follows many to the college campus. In their new situation—in fact, in their new life—some find a new freedom. Yet at the same time, most contemporary Negro students do not wish to forget their past while merging into the university scene. Indeed, many use their new freedom with its consequent permissiveness in furthering actions ostensibly directed toward so-called black liberation.

In many cases, these actions are directed against real grievances and, whether or not recognized, symbolize an indictment of the whole structure of American society, a structure which has until recently countenanced the conditions in which most Negro Americans live. Many students have grown tired of this society and of its institutions. And, for many, the college or university represents but another "white racist" institution whose real function is the "destruction of the black mind." And the campus with its tradition of tolerance, of free inquiry, of personal freedom, provides a setting in which many students can engage in activities, and formulate "plans for the liberation of the black people." Thus many Negro students, only recently freed of the confines of the ghetto, with the opportunity of a lifetime before them, suddenly become "Black students." Their goal is no longer academic success or a broad-gauged college experience or even post-college economic advancement; for, as black students, they see these goals as but tranquilizers, as binds in which, if they allow themselves to become entangled, "whitey" can continue to control their lives and through them the lives of all black people.

The new black students reject academic success, liberal education, and economic advancement as significant goals of their college years. And these blacks join, or are converted to, a movement whose goal is "the liberation of black people by any means necessary. . . ."

But black students soon realize that the real revolution exists not on the campus but in the larger society. Thus, in order to be relevant to their people, they must wage a form of revolution on campus. They do so in their "demands" for Afro-American Studies programs wholly controlled by blacks, black faculty and coaches, black student lounges, black dorms, "soul food," and quotas for black

student admissions. Their revolution is against the university in which they are supposedly forced to adhere to "white standards." And this confrontation commences with incendiary rhetoric, the issuing of non-negotiable "demands," and the seizure of university buildings. Victory lies in the capitulation by those in power to their demands, for such represents a victory against white society, one which hopefully will lead to a better life for Negro Americans.¹⁸

As we have noted before (in Chapter 3), there are some close and important direct relations between black militant groups on campuses, such as the Afro-American study programs and the Black Student Union, and militant adult groups outside, such as the Panthers and US. Because these outside groups, and some of the black students from ghetto areas, know far more about using weapons and fighting than do the middle-class white radicals, and because many of them seem far more willing to fight to achieve whatever goals they have at a given time, the potential for violence from the black student protest movements is far greater than that coming from the white militants. Indeed, as many academics have begun to realize, the only danger of really great violence being initiated by college students, rather than being suffered by them, is from the black militant groups. The use of bombs, beatings, and other attacks and threats at San Francisco State and a few other universities has made it abundantly clear that this potential is there and that it may well be realized. Many believe that, had the police chosen to use weapons in the Cornell confrontation—in which black students armed themselves with rifles—there would surely have been a gun battle that would have led to severe repercussions around the country. There have been other situations like this which have not been reported in the mass media. It may simply be a matter of time before the first serious battle erupts. But there is no way of knowing this because of the great difficulty in knowing just what the black students are up to at any given time and over the long run. Since they themselves are probably not at all sure of what they want, the nature of the situations will be of great importance in determining what happens and what directions they themselves take in the long run.

This means, of course, that it is the vastly more powerful white majority and the white officials who will be of crucial importance in determining what directions the black student protest movement will take. Oliver Henry saw this very clearly and pleaded for a more traditional civil rights path to be followed by the whites:

The unrest and tension which characterize Negro student

¹⁸ Henry, Oliver, "A Negro Student Looks at Blacks," pp. 297-298, *Dissent*, July-August, 1969, Vol. XVI, No. 4.

communities throughout the nation are signs of "an ostracized race in ferment." Out of this ferment many directions will emerge and have emerged. While black students seem intent upon forcing all Negroes down the path toward a new segregation, toward a renewal of the "closed society," Negro students seek to maintain equality of opportunity in a free society as the goal of Negro Americans. To a larger extent, which road predominates will depend upon which faction white America supports through action or inaction. To Negro college students, the future appears dim, for on all sides white administrators, students, and decision-makers seem intent upon conceding to black students' demands for separatism, for a renewal of racial exclusivism, for the maintenance of the color line. But, to the end, Negro students will and must oppose these new trends toward segregation, those new chains for Negro Americans.¹⁹

But the whites, especially those outside of the university, have been polarized by the violence and the talk of violence that has already taken place. They have decided to use police power to put an end to it. They have failed to see that these moves toward repression create a profound sense of anger among these students, because to them it looks like old-fashioned "racism." These white authorities have also failed to see, if in their own anger they even care to see, that many of the black students will fight, just as they have been carrying on their lonely fight against the police in the ghettos for decades. It was precisely this kind of anger over a "white racist" incident that led to the occupying of Willard Straight Hall at Cornell by the armed black students. William Friedland and Harry Edwards have described these events very well:

At 3:00 a.m. on the morning of Friday, April 18, persons still unknown threw a burning cross on the porch of the black girls' co-operative. Responding to a call, the campus safety patrol reached the co-op where the fire was stamped out. What exactly the campus safety patrol did at the scene of the cross-burning is not clear, but apparently all seven officers covering the incident withdrew, ostensibly on other business, leaving no protection at the co-op. Much later, a guard was established, but by that time the blacks had evidently lost any confidence they may have had in campus protection. This was to be exacerbated as campus officials, while strongly deploring the incident, referred to it as a "thoughtless prank." To the blacks, the symbolism of the event was as powerful as if someone had burned a *Mogen*

¹⁹ Henry, Oliver, *op. cit.*

David in front of a Jewish fraternity. Had such a thing occurred, the blacks reasoned, all the powers of the university would have been brought to bear and the cries of outrage would have been mighty indeed. As it was, the somewhat cavalier attitudes of the university seemed still another reflection of the institutional racism, less open perhaps than the occasional group of white boys who had shouted "nigger" at black girls, but racism it was, nevertheless.

As word of the cross-burning spread among the blacks, they assembled at the co-op to decide what action was necessary to protect their women. The defense of their own kind, this was to become a central symbol of the events that followed. As for their choice of target—the student union at Willard Straight Hall, this was in part dictated by the dramatic possibilities implicit in the fact that Parents' Weekend had begun and the opportunity to demonstrate before thousands of parents was tactically so tempting that rumors had been circulating that some group would seize some building somewhere regardless of the issue. How significant a role the rumors played in the deliberations of the blacks is not known, but the tactical impact of the seizure was clear. But it is clear that in deciding to take over the student union, the blacks were intent only on giving an emphatic warning to the campus to "get off our backs"; they were not concerned with specific demands. Indeed, the original intent was to seize the building for one day only and then surrender it peaceably . . . the occupiers of Straight Hall were still determined to demonstrate to Cornell whites that they were no longer sitting ducks. So it was that despite pressure from administrators for a decorous exit, the blacks proceeded to make a dramatic exit, brandishing their weapons. It soon became convenient for the shocked white majority of the university to look upon this as a new escalation in student activism. While campus after campus had experienced confrontation, it was argued that this was the first time that students had taken up arms. It was within this context that Cornell arrived at a new level of internal tension on Monday, April 21.²⁰

In describing and analyzing the black student situation on California campuses, Kathy Mulherin has seen very well what appear to be the goals of the Afro-American study programs and the willingness of the militants to use force to achieve those goals:

²⁰ Friedland, William, and Edwards, Henry, "Confrontation at Cornell," pp. 29-36 in *Trans-Action*, June 1969.

Black and Ethnic Studies programs were conceived to meet three kinds of needs: to introduce third-world students to their own culture, thereby giving them a sense of themselves—pride and dignity are words meaning a sense of self; to provide them with the skills they need to find jobs and to service the needs of the ghetto; the third aim is more ambitious, more elusive. It is to build new values, new ways of living, new political organizations. To do this, power is required. Leroy Goodwin, off-campus co-ordinator for the San Francisco State BSU: "Each day our demands are not met, our tactics will escalate. We have no illusions about using force. If armed strength is what we need to seize power to determine our own educational destiny, then that will be done. . . . They do not realize we are serious. It's a matter of our survival."²¹

At the same time that the black students have been getting more militant and better organized to confront the administrations and the rest of society with their "non-negotiable demands," they have been rapidly increasing in number and proportion on the campuses of the most liberal universities as these universities have tried to bring in more and more of the ghetto students. In the past four years their number has increased 85 percent. As they have grown in number, and as they have been given greater preference in admission policies, they have been increasingly attacked by politicians and other white leaders, which has only made them more militant. The universities, the politicians, and the black students have set out on a very clear course of collision. The collision can only be avoided if one side changes its goals or its tactics, but thus far there is no indication of such changes.

The Anguish of Youth: Vietnam

It was one thing to feel moral anguish and another to feel the anguish of a personal threat. The cause of civil rights had caused the white students much moral anguish. But Vietnam caused both moral anguish and the special anguish that comes from a threat to one's own life, especially a threat from what one sees as an evil cause. Vietnam and the draft made the anguish of youth very personal for each college student.

In the beginnings the radicalism of youth and their rebellious zeal was highly personal and specific, rather than an ideological commitment to a "Grand Cause" of generalized and revolutionary proportions. This was a major reason why the modicum of organization and the seeds of ideology provided by the radical adults was

²¹ Mulherin, Kathy, "California's Academic Fault," pp. 281-286 in *Commonweal*, May 23, 1969.

so important in getting the youth started. In many cases, in fact, the political radicalism, even of the specific and personal sort, came only after involvement in such organized political activity—the radical ideas came as afterthoughts.

In his study of the students involved in the Vietnam Summer organization of 1967, Keniston found the radicalism of students to be very personal and concrete. He found a general lack of ideology and of interest in ideology. Students emphasized the complex, fragmentary and flexible nature of their ideas and actions. As one of the students told him:

One of the things that makes it difficult for me to trace where I came from is the fact that I don't have an ideology. If I did, if I knew precisely, I mean if I had clear political goals—well, I have something of an analysis of why certain things happen, and why certain things must happen. But it's not very tightly formulated and I'm very flexible about it. If I did have a rigid view, I would be better able to look back and say, "This is where this and that came from." . . . But I think it's better this way. It's more real, it ties in, it forces you to bring yourself together more as a unified thing rather than to say, "Here are my politics, Dr. Keniston, and this is where they came from. Now if you want to talk to me about a person, that is something else." But things really are together, and that's real. It's so—things really *are* together.²²

Some of them were explicit about the ways in which their radical ideas grew out of the facts of their personal relations in such organized political activity.

The politics came after the people. There was always a personal relationship first. And the most important thing of what you were going to do with a person was personal, not political. The political development came from that background, and from the reading I did.²³

Reviewing the findings, Keniston concluded that:

As a rule, formal, elaborated and dogmatic ideological considerations were seldom discussed in these interviews; they rarely formed a major part of the radical's presentation of himself to me. No doubt, had I been a political scientist inquiring about political philosophy, statements of formal ideology could have been obtained. But to give great emphasis to such statements would, I believe, falsify the per-

²² Keniston, Kenneth, *Young Radicals*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968, pp. 27-28.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

sonal position of these radicals, which rests on a set of time-honored principles rather than on any elaborately rationalized ideology.²⁴

Most adults, especially the older adults, find it very hard to understand how and why the college students have reacted with such moral fervor against the Vietnam war and, as a result, against the draft. Indeed, large percentages of older adults feel just as angry against the students as the students feel; and for many of the adults this anger is just as moralistic as the anger of the young. Many feel that they themselves have sacrificed years of their lives, and sometimes parts of their bodies, for their country, while the students are unwilling to serve even when there would be almost no chance that they would see actual combat duty. (It is a fact that exceedingly few college student draftees have been involved in combat in Vietnam; and certainly very few of these few have been casualties. The college graduates have, especially, retained their preferred positions all down the line. And the changes in draft policies that have at times threatened to get more of them drafted, while never quite catching up with them, have largely been the result of adult anger over student anger—another polarization effect by which one creates the opposite of what is intended.)

Much of the feeling against the Vietnam war has been based on general moral consideration of the evils of war and killing—and forcing others, young Americans in this instance, to do things that get others killed and sometimes themselves. This ancient moral feeling against war and killing is well expressed by Kunen in *The Strawberry Statement*:

Thursday, June 27: I don't understand why our government has us fight the war. I don't know. Are they incredibly evil men, or are they stupid, or are they insane? How can Johnson sleep? How can he go to bed knowing that 25,000 American boys—and countless Vietnamese—have died because of his "policies." He obviously doesn't consider the Vietnamese to be people at all. They're strange, distant, numberless, and yellow, so perhaps he can't empathize with them, can't know their existence and their joys. . . . Wars are silly. They're ludicrous. But they're real, extant, constant, present. Why don't countries just stop it? Just cut it out, that's all. We don't want any. They struggle tortuously to arrive at disarmament pacts. They tell everybody that arriving at peace is complex, difficult. Don't they see? It's not a question of State Department negotiations or of treaties or international law. It's very simple. All that's

²⁴ *Ibid.*

necessary is for the leaders to see what they've always done and are doing and for once know and feel and get sick and stop. Nobody fight any more. Of course it's not that simple. But I must be stupid because it seems that simple to me.²⁵

Many students have at times expressed the same dismay at seeing themselves polarized against American policy, for they have often never thought of themselves as in any way radical until they became deeply involved in the anti-Vietnam movement and the draft resistance movement that flows from that. This is one reason why so many of them have found the initiative provided by adult organizations, often the churches, so important in taking the first steps in opposition to the war and the draft. But once they became involved, they were swept along by their own emotions and by the polarization effect. All of this is very clear, for example, in the statement of one Harvard student, Wayne Hansen. Above all, a moral anger pervades the whole statement:

I sit here with a pile of yesterday's speeches on my left, a jumble of questions in my head, and an ache in my heart which has little to do with any of this, except cosmically perhaps. Yesterday, October 16, I handed my draft card to Jack Mendelsohn at the Arlington Street Church and joined over three hundred other men in the same illegal act. . . . I can tell you one thing, no one was more surprised than I was when I did it. When I first came into contact with the whole middle-class college scene of anti-war and Help the NEEgrows in Mississippi, I thought it was the silliest biggest cop-out ever created. I know why now and I know why I've changed. Before, I saw only the appearances of the scene, in much the same way as the guy who drives through Harvard Square on Saturday night might think that a few sixteen-year-old kids who've combed their hair down over their ears are the essence of the so-called Hippy Movement. No wonder they're turned off—I'm turned off too. But what I've seen now is the fire in the center of that movement, the sun of the solar system of the anti-war, future freedom in America movement, and I recognized it in my brothers and I belonged there and nowhere else. It is a change that only those very close to me could know about, but it is an astonishing change.²⁶

Most of the college students have seen their actions in just the opposite way they have been seen by the older Americans who are angry with them. The older Americans have seen the students'

²⁵ Kunen, James S., *op. cit.*

²⁶ Hansen, Wayne, "Resist the Draft," pp. 295-297 in *Notes From the New Underground*, Jene Kornbluth, ed., New York: The Viking Press, 1968, pp. 296-297.

actions as a betrayal of America. The students have seen their actions as the only true support of the pristine American morality. Each side has used "American values" to justify his own position and to attack the opposing side. Wayne Hansen was especially clear in his moral stand and saw it as the only possible stand for a true American who stood firmly in the tradition of Jefferson and all the other Founding Fathers. He rejected the "laws of the land" in the name of the "spirit of America," just as the earlier Americans had rejected the "laws of the land" in the name of the (unwritten) "constitution" of the English people—and had thereby produced the first modern revolution:

Those of us who yesterday said no to the laws of this country at the same time said yes, everlastingly yes, to the spirit of America. We are the true Americans, reborn at a time when it is almost a crime to be truly American. Those creeps who drove by the church in a Cadillac waving an American flag and calling coward, why, they don't even know what it is to be an American. I say it is a crime for them to misuse such spirit, only the raggie-taggle of it is theirs, because while we burned those cards with our hands, we carried that spirit in our hearts, but while they carried that symbol in their hands, they trampled that spirit long, long ago, when they did not continually work to keep it alive. Oh, maybe they had it once, reciting the pledge of allegiance in a second-grade schoolroom or jammed in a fox hole in Italy with shells bursting over their heads, but they have died to it and it is dead in them and they are still like a branch cut from a tree whose dry leaves still rustle in the wind—they have no source of life. We might thank them for having done well once, but we cannot respect them, for they no longer do . . . I sat in the Arlington Street Church and I could not tell if we were the names and the bodies we are known by now or if we were Paine and Franklin, and Jefferson or Emerson, Lincoln, and Thoreau. We were all of them, all of them on our way to becoming more of them, for the knowledge that was theirs is yet for us to learn, but we are learning, the pure vision that was theirs we yet must see, but we are seeing, and the strength to manifest that vision that was theirs, must be ours also—and yet we do not have it, but we will.²⁷

Staughton Lynd, one of the foremost "older" leaders of the "Resistance Movement," as he has called it, has provided an excellent description of this early period in the resistance to the Vietnam

²⁷ *Op cit.*

war and the draft. As he argues, it was a period when the resistance was quite unideological, quite isolated from other issues (except the earlier one of race in many cases):

There is what might be termed a classical period in the history of draft resistance to the Vietnam war. This period began in April 1967, when about 150 young men burned their draft cards in Sheep's Meadow and, in the Bay Area, David Harris, Dennis Sweeney, Lenny Heller and Steve Hamilton named themselves The Resistance and in its name called for the mass return of draft cards on October 16. The classical period ended in April 1968, when within the space of a week, Lyndon Johnson withdrew from the Presidential campaign and announced a partial bombing halt, a third day of card returns brought the number of non-cooperators to perhaps 2500, and Martin Luther King was assassinated.

During that year, April 1967 to April 1968, there was an obvious answer to the question: What is a member of the Resistance? A member of the Resistance during this classic period was one who public and collectively non-cooperated with the Selective Service System, or who advocated, aided and abetted that act.

Somehow the classic act of noncooperation with the Selective Service System has been permitted—to borrow from Karl Marx language which he borrowed from the anthropology of religion—to become a fetish, to be reified or thingified, so that an action which, after all, is only one way of resisting one form of repression, has come to define our movement as a whole.²⁸

But many of the members of the "Resistance" moved quickly away from this non-ideological stance of 1967. They seemed to have moved away for two basic reasons. In the first place, there was a kind of *sui generis spread of the anger* from the immediate cause, Vietnam and the draft to Johnson, the electorate, the society—to The System. As the intensity of the anger grew, it spread beyond the earlier situational boundaries on its own. But this spread of the anger was greatly facilitated by the polarizing effects of the confrontations with the "Symbols of the System," especially the hated police.

In the early stages we can see the anger over Vietnam being mixed with the earlier anger over the race issue and the poverty issue, which has always meant primarily the race issue for youth and for most other Americans. This mixture of angers, its resulting gen-

²⁸ Lynd, Staughton, "The Movement: A New Beginning," pp. 7-20 in *Liberation*, May 1969.

eralized "disgust" (an important term in the students' description of their generalized moral feelings) and its direct relation to the feeling that *only* revolution will solve the whole mixture of evils, is seen very clearly in Dotson Rader's description of his first perception of the necessity for revolution. He is exhorted by a girl friend:

"A murder a week or more, the poor killing the poor, *!*, it goes on and on and on and, Dotson, you come over here in the West Village, so much *!*,* wealth and uptown even more, billions, Rockefeller and the rest, and a few blocks south of them and north of them, just a few blocks from them fat cats, people are dying and nobody gives a damn and kids, younger than us, Honey, are dying everyday in Johnson's war, *their* liberal war, not just the poor *!* soldier, not just those young, young guys, but peasants and peasants' kids, civilians . . . and they're dying from our weapons in other places on the earth and nobody gives a good *!* . . . Honey," she said, squeezing my arm tightly, "Honey, revolution's got to come, baby, it's *got* to come."

And for the first time, walking with her, for the first time I, too, wanted revolution . . . in my gut, there, inside like part of me, inside true, I wanted it to come, wanted the senseless, everlasting killing, the *!*,* misery, the poverty to end. Wanted *justice*.²⁹

In so many of the statements by students and others involved in the anti-Vietnam and antidraft movement there is a mixing of the Vietnam issue with all of the other issues—the *radical bill of particulars*. But this mixing seems to have given way over time to a growing pattern in the bill of particulars. All of the issues increasingly became subordinate to Vietnam and the draft, so, increasingly Vietnam tops the list and the others trail in its wake. This pattern is very clear in the statements of many of the leaders by the time of the Columbia revolt in 1968, even though the university's relations with the surrounding black ghetto were the rallying point for the beginning of the revolt. The famous letter by Mark Rudd to Grayson Kirk, the President of Columbia, shows this pattern, and shows that by that time Vietnam was, at the very least, the primary rhetorical rallying point for the students:

You might want to know what is wrong with this society since after all, you live in a very tight self-created dream world. We can point to the war in Vietnam as an example of the unimaginable wars of aggression you are prepared

²⁹ Rader, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

to fight to maintain your control over your empire. . . .³⁰

It was this patterned, generalized anger which was increasingly associated with the patterned, generalized attack on the "System" (the "Establishment"), which in turn produced the intense desire for generalized and deep change—revolution—accompanied by violence if necessary. As Rudd concluded in his letter to Kirk:

You are quite right in feeling that the situation is "potentially dangerous." For if we win, we will take control of your world, your corporation, your University and attempt to mold a world in which we and other people can live as human beings. Your power is directly threatened, since we will have to destroy that power before we take over. We begin by fighting you about your support of the war in Vietnam and American imperialism—IDA and the School of International Affairs. We will fight you about your control of black people in Morningside Heights, Harlem, and the campus itself. And we will fight you about the type of miseducation you are trying to channel us through. We will have to destroy at times, even violently, in order to end your power and your system—but that is a far cry from nihilism.

Grayson, I doubt if you will understand any of this, since your fantasies have shut out the world as it really is from your thinking. Vice President Truman says the society is basically sound; you say the war in Vietnam was a well-intentioned accident. We, the young people, whom you so rightly fear, say that the society is sick and you and your capitalism are the sickness.

You call for order and respect for authority; we call for justice, freedom, and socialism.³¹

The revolt against the Vietnam war led not only to a generalized attack on the "System," and a demand for revolutionary change, but for many it led as well to a far more generalized attack on all institutions, perhaps on the very idea of society itself. This rebirth of the ancient American ideal of anarchy, of total individual freedom, was strikingly presented in a talk at Columbia by a Vassar student, reported by Dotson Rader:

The role of students in this stage of the revolutionary movement is to plant seeds, to create alternatives, to make people disassociate themselves from a government which makes war. Americans have been raised to believe that this America is

³⁰ Avorn, Jerry L., *Up Against The Ivy Wall*, New York: Atheneum Press, 1969, p. 26.

³¹ *Ibid.*

the great, white, liberal democracy, the place, Heaven. We must make them understand how evil the government is in order to win them to resistance. The polarity must be between the government and the people, not between the people themselves. We're wrong to focus their frustration and hatred against Johnson and Humphrey, to personalize it. It must be directed against the System, against *government* itself, against the *idea* of government. People must be made to understand that the government and the people represent two different Americas. They must be taught to distrust all institutions. All tactics are symbolic now. Disruption is needed. That is the most forceful kind of demonstration. People must be made to think!³²

For some, this generalized desire to disrupt and destroy, when coupled with a feeling of the hopelessness of the revolutionary cause, led to nihilistic, suicidal attacks on the "System," a blind desire to wreak whatever havoc one could on the "System." This longing for an *American Götterdämmerung*, and the casting of oneself in the role of a vengeful God, was beautifully depicted by a Rutgers' student speaking at Columbia, again described by Rader: "Nowhere have I read or heard a Leftist say *how* to win today. We can't. So *!*! winning! Let's break what we can. Make as many answer as we can. Tear them apart. They're corrupt and still they can't lose. We lose. So *!*! the *!*!*" For such students as these, the act of opposition, the act of destruction, became a self-fulfillment in itself, an existential act confirming the self and, as Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman have argued so well,³³ bridging the absurdity they found in their lives.

But few students, even among the most radical seem to have had this grand vision of an *American Götterdämmerung*. For most of them the game was still played to win, however small the realistic probabilities may have seemed in the inevitable moments of despair. Because of the generalizing of anger and of the sense of revolution, the hard-core radicals, the true believers, came to see power as the name of the game. For them, any means was to be used to achieve power and all such activities such as attacking the university were to be used merely as tactics in the far larger game of revolutionizing American society. As Dotson Rader and Craig Anderson later argued in *The New Republic*:

But the three issues were pretexts. The point of the game was power. And in the broadest sense, to the most radical members of the SDS Steering Committee, Columbia itself was not the issue. It was revolution, and if it could be shown

³² Rader, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

³³ Lyman, Stanford, and Scott, Marvin, *Agony on Campus*, forthcoming.

that a great university could literally be taken over in a matter of days by a well organized group of students, then no university was secure. Everywhere the purpose was to destroy institutions of the American Establishment, in the hope that out of the chaos a better America would emerge.³⁴

Out of the anger, the struggle, and the destruction a new cadre of professional revolutionaries had been born in a few years. Just as the men of the "System" were accused by the young of *using* them, of seeking to destroy their individuality and spontaneity by the methods of bureaucratic processing, for the purpose of building their own power, so it seemed that the new revolutionaries sought in turn to use the young for the purpose of building their own power. The methods to be used, confrontation and polarization within a liberal community, were very different, and were not entirely subject to anyone's manipulation. But the goal of power was the same, and the ancient prerequisites of power—the regimenting of human wills to be directed by a few leaders—would exact its ancient price. As all earlier modern revolutionaries had learned to their dismay, power can only be defeated by a greater power, and, since all power demands the subjection of the wills of many to those of a few, even a revolution with the one goal of freedom for all would become a destroyer of freedom; and the "dilemma of power" in such revolutionary regimes, as Barrington Moore has called it, would produce the perpetuation of tyranny. But, while the historical implications are not fully understood as yet, there is no reason to believe that the generalized anger of the American students has been sufficient to make them willing to support such revolutionary organizations. Indeed, the very nature of the radical student movements insures continued fragmentation and the inevitable failure of the revolutionary design, unless the forces of repression from outside the movements become severe enough to force the students into relinquishing their individual freedoms.

Confrontation and Polarization

While, as I have already argued, it is almost certainly true that the existence of small radical organizations and of the civil rights movement was of considerable importance in getting the student protest movements started and in giving them direction, it would be a complete mistake to conclude that the movements are in any way organized or directed from any few centers of power. The truth is just the opposite. In fact, it is because there is so little organization, so little centralization of any kind other than that which comes through the mass media, that we have called them protest

³⁴ Rader, Dotson, and Anderson, Craig, "Rebellion at Columbia," pp. 67-78 in *The Age of Protest*, Walt Anderson, ed., California: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1969.

movements instead of organizations. Whatever organization there is, is quite pluralistic and fragmented. Any centralization comes primarily through emulating what is learned of through the mass media rather than through the centralized power of organization.

There are probably many reasons for this, but certainly one of the central reasons is that one of the goals of most of the students is freedom and the power to do what they want to do. Except for the relatively few extreme radicals, whose anger has led them to become quite committed to leftist ideologies that *do* lend themselves to organizing for power, the youth are generally more committed to doing their own thing than they are to winning in their struggle with the "System." This has made it extremely difficult for the extreme radicals to achieve their goal of organizing the "enemies of the System." Instead, they have had to count on the use of situational organizing of protest and on trying to achieve longer run organization from the commitments that grow out of the confrontations that take place in the situations of protest. Their one great ally in this has been the "System" itself—and they have counted on this faithful ally.

In the beginnings of the student protests, especially at the time of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, there was exceedingly little organization of any kind. The students responded to the situation at hand, as they defined it. Moreover, these situational definitions were very problematic or uncertain for the students, since there were few previous definitions of situations taken to be similar (e.g., "confrontations with the administration"). The students, the police, the administrators, the media, the legislators—all participated in creating routinized situational meanings for the events that were to unfold. There was no basic structure in the beginning, no patterning, except for the generally shared meanings in our society. Structure had to be created by these many participants, but once it was created it would partially transcend the many participants. While it would have to be recreated in many ways in each new situation, the freedom of individuals to create the meanings they might prefer would be progressively limited. Within a few years the confrontations would assume that air of inevitability which would make the academic participants feel that they were involved in a Greek tragedy, with a Fate against which they were free to protest but not to change.

Part of the reason for the lack of structure is that our world has become unstructured, especially for the young who have not attained those *routinized self-identities* which older people today find a substitute for external structure. Our social world is being radically transformed in totally new ways by the many simultaneous revolu-

tions stemming from the scientific-technological revolution.³⁵ Since the young live in this new world more than the old, and will certainly have to do so even more as they grow older, and since the university is at the center of this confluence of revolutionary changes, it is not surprising that the young should have responded most to the new forces. They have done so in part by creating their own kind of *primitive existentialism* and grafting on the more philosophical analyses of our contemporary existential situation. Keniston found this primitive existentialism among his alienated youth in the 1950's, though we must suspect that at the "elite" schools such as Harvard there was more than a slight admixture of the more formal theories:

In such a world, lacking inherent meaning or the possibility of genuine "communion" with others, the present moment necessarily assumes overwhelming importance. The alienated generally affirm that they have no long-range goals, and indeed believe it impossible to find or create such goals; instead they are "realists" of a special kind, whose ultimate philosophical justification for their acts is their own immediate feeling, mood, pleasure, or enjoyment. Long-range planning is impossible, given the uncertainty of the future and the likelihood that things will turn out badly; what remains are the needs of the moment, of the body, the senses, the heart, and the "humor of the ego."

Philosophically the core of this native existentialism is the denial of inherent meaning to man's life or the universe: in a universe without structure, regularity, or purpose, the center of whatever meaning can exist must inevitably be the solitary individual, isolated, gloomy, apprehensive, wary of appearances, and heeding primarily the needs of the moment.³⁶

This commonsense existential world view was both a response to, and a subsequent support for, the high degree to which the actions of the students were situationally defined by them. It was a point of view which supported the free, spontaneous response to the immediate situation, largely unfettered by considerations of the future or even of the consequences that would come on the morrow. Though there was certainly some important (if unplanned) preparing of the situation at Berkeley, this situationalness was at its zenith in the Free Speech Movement. The swarming around the police car, the symbol of "The System," was the basic message, the primary reality. The ideological messages and much of the tactics of confrontation

³⁵ Douglas, Jack, "Freedom and Tyranny in Technological Society," *op. cit.*

³⁶ Keniston, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

came *after* this swarming of youth, not before, and the events in that situation were of great importance in determining the nature of the messages (and the tactics) created later to "explain" the events. These *ex post facto meanings* imputed to the event by the participants constituted an attempt to create a plausible relation, a bridge, between the situational meanings and the "structural" meanings (generally shared) in American society. The truth was in the event; the rationale came later. While this high degree of situationalness of the FSM has been reported as well by several sociologists who were involved in the movement, the best description of that spirit has probably been written by Michael Rossman:

For example, the Police Car Episode. . . . Understand it, and you understand FSM: for FSM was forged around that car, *not* at the later "convention," and those two days were a miniature of the entire conflict. They furnished the emotional impetus for our fight, they were our signature on a promissory note of the heart; given the nature of the participants, events thereafter unrolled with the Greek inexorability remarked by us all (and unmentioned, unexplained in these books). But *why* should up to three thousand students surround a cop-car two days, and risk expulsion, arrest, violence (and as some students, faculty and administrators felt), death? . . .

We used four million sheets of paper to expand those barefoot thoughts (and *only* those) spoken atop the car in the first true dialogue I have heard in America. It was all there: the "non-negotiable" issues; the unexpected intensity of our commitment and community; our strange honest humor; the absent estrangement of the faculty; the administration's refusal to speak to us save via 650 cops, or even to see us, encamped under its nose; our desperate spontaneous democracy; and the total loneliness . . . no single real element—psychological, tactical, dialectical, compositional—entered the controversy from then till its climax: all that we were, all that we faced, was there full-fledged around the car, in every sense.³⁷

The small groups of radical students on the "elite" campuses are important not in directly determining the situational events and their meanings for the other students, administrators, and other participants. Rather they have great influence on the events and their meanings for two reasons: (1) they serve as the *moral provoca-*

³⁷ Rossman, Michael, "Barefoot in a Marshmallow World," pp. 208-212 in Jacobs and Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

teurs,³⁸ seeking out moral issues, conflicts, and absurdities that can be used to *mobilize* a larger group of students around the created *issues*; and (2) they can try to manage the properties of the situation in which the issues are contested so that they can indirectly affect the nature of the event and the meanings that will be created for them.

The radical students are moral provocateurs for a number of reasons. The most obvious reason is that they are in moral conflict with the "System" and want to argue with it. But provocative activity is more than disagreement; it is also a matter of finding and creating issues—making up pretexts—for other people. They want to provoke other students, faculty, and outsiders into conflict with the "System." They want to do this most obviously because it will give them allies in their struggles. But there seems to be a more basic reason lying behind both this desire to provoke others into confronting the "System" and their own desire to confront the powerful "System," a desire that leads them into struggles even when they do not expect to "win" the struggle itself. This something else has to do with the very nature of the radical student protest movements.

We must remember first of all and above all that the student protest movements are radical *movements* and as yet involve little organization. They are not highly developed and organized groups of individuals who have carefully organized themselves over long periods of time around a few simple beliefs, feelings, and goals. This kind of organization can be found in many of our political parties and certainly in such (erstwhile) protest organizations as our labor unions, but they do not in any way characterize the student protest movements. On the contrary, student protest movements, like most other radical movements in our society, are made up primarily of a large number of different kinds of individuals and different kinds of groupings which have constantly shifting memberships, constantly shifting goals, and constantly shifting ideas. These movements have power only in so far as temporary coalitions, such as the Vietnam summer coalition, can be built around a few basic ideas and goals, so that the efforts of many shifting and often uncertain "memberships" can be brought to focus clearly and sharply in a short period of time on certain issues, publics, or organizations.

It should be clear, then, that any individual or group of individuals involved in such a movement, or potentially involved in such a movement, faces a very great problem in trying to organize sufficient power to achieve any end that he wishes to achieve at a given time. He does not have an organization which he can throw into the struggle, but must, on the contrary, create an organization—

³⁸ Douglas, Jack, "Deviance and Order in a Pluralistic Society," in *Perspective on Sociological Theory*, John McKinney and Edward Tiryaklam, eds., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969.

an uncertain coalition—for that purpose, an organization which he must realize will not last beyond that shortrun activity. Having to construct organizations for specific purposes, anyone seeking to lead a radical movement and any individual member wishing to see such a movement succeed must rely very heavily upon the individual commitments to the radical purposes. This lack of stable organization and, therefore, the lack of ordinary commitments to stable organizational goals and everyday practices, leads to the necessity of relying to an extraordinary degree on the individual emotions and beliefs of the individuals involved, or potentially involved, in such a movement. Since there is tremendous variability in such individual beliefs, and even more in individual feelings, it should be apparent that such movements as this have a tremendous tendency to be anarchic.

This tendency to anarchy has been both the cause and the effect of the very conscious attempt of the (leftist) American student protest movements to rely upon a high degree of democratic participation, or "participatory democracy," in all of the activities of the organization. The relative lack of any kind of longrun organization has been both the result of the nature of the movement and of one of the fundamental ideals of the radicals, which has been to do away with bureaucratic organizations in the modern world. The general result has been that these student protest movements have had to rely heavily on the individual feelings and beliefs of their members or potential members.

This situation has had many fundamental consequences for student social movements. For one thing, it makes a high degree of "emotionalism" extremely important to the individuals involved. To get some action they must seek to "whip up" the emotions of all the potential members. Otherwise, they will not join the movement; they will sit it out. It has led to a tremendous profusion of different messages, a profusion which has been all the more accentuated by the tremendous readiness of the mass media to publish the individual views of many of the participants.

But the most important consequence of all, as Lee Weiner has so clearly seen,³⁹ has been the tremendous insistence upon the "revolutionary integrity" of each "radical." Any group, of course, insists upon many different kinds of symbolic demonstrations of one's allegiance to the group. Middle-class people are certainly intensely concerned with symbols of allegiance, such as the length of hair, the flag, and so on, which demonstrate one's allegiance to middle class respectability and American society in general. They can become very angry when people violate these symbols. They can in fact insist upon throwing people into jail for violating some

³⁹ Weiner, Lee, "Revolution as a Problem in Labelling," an unpublished paper.

of these symbols. Yet there seems to be a great difference in degree involved here. Student radicals of all different sorts not only place a profound emphasis upon such symbolic demonstrations of allegiance to the purposes of the movement and to the general character types that they associate with such purposes, that is, the "good radical," the "dedicated radical," but they spend an immense amount of their time talking about this kind of thing and dedicate tremendous energies to demonstrating their revolutionary integrity. While middle-class people appear to spend little time talking about their middleclassness, revolutionaries appear to spend much of their time talking about their revolutionariness. Indeed some former members of such groups as the SDS have expressed tremendous frustration over what they saw as an interminable amount of "posturing," that is, demonstrating to other radicals that one is indeed a dedicated revolutionary and has no "deviant tendencies."

One obvious cause of this concern with "revolutionary integrity" is the personal ambivalence about one's own position and the social conflict that grows out of that ambivalence. As innumerable "radical students" have posed the issue, if one is truly a revolutionary, and the university is truly an organization dedicated to processing refills for the military-industrial complex, then what in the world is a truly revolutionary individual doing there in the first place? In the second place, what in the world is he doing striving to be successful in terms of the conventional (bureaucratic, military-industrial, IBM) criteria of grades, graduation, and advancement to graduate college? The whole setup is a "sellout" from the very beginning and the "true radical" doing such things must suspect himself and be suspected by other dedicated individuals to be headed ineluctably toward the over-thirty sellout—the middle-class death and respectability embalment. This is precisely the kind of ambivalence so apparent in the insistence of many "radical students" in upholding traditional standards, including forms of showing deference (such as saying "Sir"), while at the same time attacking all traditional forms. They suffer from this, and some of them escape by going all the way—quitting school, refusing to achieve in terms of the conventional standards. But the vast majority have stuck it out and sought to exorcise their conflict and guilt by endless talk about and insistence on their "revolutionary integrity."

But the need to demonstrate such revolutionary integrity to such an extreme degree is also a direct result of a need to rely almost entirely upon the individual beliefs and immediate commitments of the members to the purposes of the movement. As we have noted, since there is no long run commitment to a group in most cases, there is almost nothing else that the individuals involved can rely upon. This fundamental *problem of social order* which they face

has, then, greatly reinforced the importance of "revolutionary integrity" and of the shared forms for demonstrating that integrity.

The demonstration of one's revolutionary integrity cannot be restricted by the members to "mere talk." The revolutionaries have the same profound distrust of "mere words," of intellectualism, of verbiage, that any ordinary American businessman has. Indeed, as many intellectuals and social scientists have remarked with dismay, the radicals have in many cases made "anti-intellectualism" one of their great ideals. They have even become philosophical about their anti-intellectualism, about their need to rely upon feeling, about the unimportance of the incoherence of their messages to other people. The radicals insist on *action* as the only fundamental way in which an individual can ultimately demonstrate his revolutionary integrity. They would be "activists," not talkers.

By "action" they do not mean simply giving a talk in the plaza. They do not mean simply publishing a Free Press newspaper that attacks middle-class respectability. All of these are important and helpful, but the only kind of "action" which truly demonstrates "revolutionary integrity" is action that puts the individual's "body on the line." One must play for the ultimate stakes of life and death—or, at the least, graduation and expulsion—to demonstrate "true revolutionary integrity."

For most American radical students, the stakes are played in the arena which they themselves have built, involving a violent or potentially violent confrontation with the enemy. The ultimate enemy for them, because they believe this enemy represents the worst of all that is middleclassness, is the police—the "pigs." To attack old ladies, who probably hate student radicals more than the police do, would, of course, be a kind of confrontation with middleclassness, but it would in no way demonstrate one's "revolutionary integrity." I personally know of no instance in which student radicals have sought to confront, much less attack, little old ladies, even right-wing groups such as the Daughters of the American Revolution. They might all express contempt for such groups, but they rarely even allude to such things; one cannot demonstrate "revolutionary integrity" by doing something which does not put one's body on the line. Fighting the police, or confronting the police and, therefore, *potentially* fighting the police, always involves a significant personal risk. Not only is one subject to physical beatings, but one might be killed. If this were not in fact the case, then the student radicals would generally not be terribly interested in fighting the police.

It is for this profound reason and in this profound sense that student radicals, at least those on the left, inevitably seek out confrontations that potentially involve violence with the authorities of the middle-class world. This is one basic reason why the radicals

keep pushing to precipitate such violent confrontations. When administrators in universities keep giving way to the demands of the radicals, agreeing with them, heeding their demands, and asking forgiveness, the radicals tend to become more and more angry at these individuals. They see them as "jellyfish" who give way to the least little bit of pressure, who have no structure, who, indeed, have no "soul," as the radicals see it. But the radicals know that even the most *jellyfish administrator* can give way only so far. Once he has given way to the lesser demands, there will come greater demands which either he will refuse to meet or which will lead to his dismissal and replacement by administrators and politicians who will not give way, who will fight back, and who will use the police. This is one reason why we get the obvious escalations in demands. (See the Appendices on the Chronologies.) Indeed, if anything, the radicals seem to get more and more angry, more and more frustrated as administrators give in to their demands. And, of course, this is perfectly understandable when we recognize that they have such a profound need for confrontation with authority. Only when the administrators will stand up and fight back, thereby proving to the radicals that the radicals do indeed have revolutionary integrity, can the radicals be satisfied. This is one reason why the radicals seem to show so much more respect for those administrators who are not jellyfish, who do not give in to every demand. This is not merely the respect that one soldier feels for the enemy soldier who demonstrates courage. It is also the respect, if not affection, that an individual feels for someone who provides him with a means of self-fulfillment. The radicals need figures like Ronald Reagan as much as he needs them. Each needs the other to publicly demonstrate his heroic commitments and his unflinching courage in the face of the enemy.

When we look at student protest movements and the individual actions of radical students in this light, we can see far more rationality in them. We can see that in their discussions of revolutionary activity, their talk of revolutionary integrity, their verbal attacks on the enemy, their unending demands in the face of capitulation by administrators, their hatred of those who capitulate, their hatred in many cases even of those who try to agree with them, there is a "rational" purpose of meeting the needs of the movements and the needs of the individuals involved. All fulfill the need to demonstrate "revolutionary integrity," which in turn meets the need for a quasi-organizational ordering of the individuals in their opposition to the enemy. All underlie the rationale of creating and using "liberal pretexts" against the university administrators. Because they are largely pretexts, which can always be escalated further if one must become more provocative to force a too liberal administration

into a corner, nothing could be more absurd than the often heard complaint of liberal faculties that "it would all go away and leave us alone if only men in power would meet their just demands." We must recognize that in the conceptions of rationality and justice, there is a fundamental difference among the participants in these tragic dramas.

But the pretexts and the tactics of confrontation have another fundamental purpose as well. They are intended not only to meet one's personal needs and the needs of the movement, but also to pave the way to victory over "the oppressive System." Confrontations are always managed in such a way as to produce a polarization of the liberal community into opposing sides, one side of which will support the radicals to give them sufficient veto-power to paralyze the opposing forces marshalled by the administration. On the larger stage, such as that on which the Yippies and others play, confrontations are intended to polarize the entire society in such a way as to paralyze it, leaving it ready for the great consummation, the "takeover."

The opening scene of any move toward confrontation always finds the radicals seeking to marshal support. There have thus far been so few radicals, and even fewer who are willing to throw their bodies on the line at any given moment, that they must have allies. Their allies must, of course, come from among the liberals, who are closest to them in their feelings, beliefs, and policies. How does one gain liberal support? Obviously, one makes liberal proposals, liberal demands. One takes a moralistic liberal stand against racism, war, killing, poverty, starvation, inequality, irresponsible power, oil depletion allowances, and attacks on the central nervous systems of little children by dope peddlers inspired by capitalistic selfishness. Amitai Etzioni noted this very clear pattern in the actions of the radicals over several years at Columbia and saw how ineffective they were when they were unable to force the administration into a corner:

Civil disobedience and other modes of confrontation are not of course employed exclusively by radicals. Liberals, too, participate in sit-ins and have few qualms about resorting to such tactics when all other means of redressing grievances have been exhausted—that is, when the repeated presentation of legitimate demands evokes no response. But radicals would rather dispense with the normal approaches because any effective operation of the system undercuts the radical premise: that the system is in need of a fundamental transformation. Thus they prefer to act as if due process were exhausted so that they can mobilize liberal support, while they really hold no briefs for liberal politics in the first

place. This was quite evident at Columbia.

In the last two years, the same groups and leaders who precipitated the present crisis advanced several causes peacefully, yet even then they showed a marked preference for demonstrations, picketing and petitions, over voting, presenting documented support for their charges against the administration to faculty committees, etc. Indeed, they often seemed to be preparing the ground for their "Berkeley" instead of trying to work within the institutional framework, or trying to make the framework viable when they encountered one of its numerous inefficiencies. For a long time the radical approach was ineffective because the Columbia administration did frequently respond to legitimate demands, although the response was often too little too late.

Following student demands, the administration did stop releasing student grades to the draft boards; it also cancelled paramilitary parades and the ROTC reviews that had been part of commencement exercises. Following demands to forbid Dow Chemical and CIA recruiters on campus, the matter was put to a vote of the student body, and the majority favored continuing "open" recruitment policies. The university was disaffiliated from IDA, but President Grayson Kirk retained his position as a member of its board and executive committee. In addition, the administration is phasing out a CIA project and siphoning off a major complex of laboratories that conduct classified, militarily relevant research. These actions were responses to demands initiated by New Left students that gained wide support among liberal students and faculty. . . .

The task of campaigning for reforms peacefully does not appeal to students who believe in anarchy and radical transformation; to probably a larger number whose temperaments do not find slow progress congenial and who are attracted by the drama and excitement of confrontations, it seems too difficult. In short, if civil disobedience is for the liberal a court of last resort, for the confronting students it is a short-cut, and for the radical it is an attempt to destroy institutionalized channels not merely because they do not work but to insure that they will not work.⁴⁰

While it took some time for all the participants to become aware of it, the basic means of polarizing the university—and larger liberal—community were very apparent in the FSM movement. As Ross-

⁴⁰ Etzioni, Amitai, "Challenge to Liberalism," *Psychiatry and Social Science Review*, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1968, pp. 9-12.

man said, it was all there in the attack on the police car. Forcing the administration or the government into a corner in such a way that they feel the need to use power is *the prime tactic* in polarizing the liberal community. And the police—the “pigs,” as the students soon came to call them—are the *prime symbol of power* which most polarizes, fractionalizes, and paralyzes the liberal community.

There is an underlying reason for this which goes far beyond any campus and, indeed, beyond American society itself. *The use of power is contrary to all the basic assumptions of the liberal world-view.* The liberal world-view, as forged in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, is based on the assumption of an absolutist world in which right and wrong are unproblematic and in which man's reason is sufficient (and the only right way) to reach agreements about anything, so that there can never be any justified conflicts that cannot be resolved by the peaceful operation of free individuals in a free market.

Such a world-view as this seems to operate rather well as long as a society meets the demands of the model, but, as I have argued elsewhere,⁴¹ this tends to be true only so long as a society is relatively simple, homogeneous, and isolated. Once a society becomes pluralistic, so that there are in fact very real and fundamental conflicts over morality, beliefs, and interests, it becomes absolutely necessary to use power to maintain social order and, indeed, even to maintain the liberal values and beliefs themselves. But, since power is contrary to all liberal assumptions, it cannot be used even to fight those forces which seek to destroy liberal freedoms. When any group within a truly liberal society sets out systematically to use power to overcome the liberal forces, to gain ever greater power, the truly liberal forces are thrown into complete disarray and total confusion, for it simply makes no sense from the committed liberal standpoint—it just *can't* happen in a liberal world! The world simply must be too reasonable for that kind of thing! The liberal forces, therefore, are paralyzed and the way is open for the enemies of liberal freedoms to seize ever greater power and put an end to those liberal freedoms. The greatest enemy of true liberalism is liberalism itself. This is the internal contradiction in Western liberalism which Karl Polanyi and others have so eloquently described:

Freedom's utter frustration in fascism is, indeed, the inevitable result of the liberal philosophy, which claims that power and compulsion are evil, that freedom demands their absence from a human community. No such thing is possible; in a complex society this becomes apparent. This leaves no alternative but either to remain faithful to an illu-

⁴¹ Douglas, Jack D., *American Social Order*, New York: The Free Press, 1970.

sionary idea of freedom and deny the reality of society, or to accept that reality and reject the idea of freedom. The first is the liberal's conclusion; the latter the fascist's. No other seems possible. . . .

Clearly, at the root of the dilemma there is the meaning of freedom itself. Liberal economy gave a false direction to our ideals. It seemed to approximate the fulfillment of intrinsically utopian expectations. No society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor a world in which force has no function. It was an illusion to assume a society shaped by man's will and wish alone. Yet this was the result of a market-view of society which equated economics with contractual relationships, and contractual relations with freedom. The radical illusion was fostered that there is nothing in human society that is not derived from the volition of individuals and that could not, therefore, be removed again by their volition. Vision was limited by the market which "fragmented" life into the producers' sector that ended when his product reached the market, and the sector of the consumer for whom all goods sprang from the market. The one derived his income "freely" from the market, the other spent it "freely" there. Society as a whole remained invisible. The power of the State was of no account, since the less its power, the smoother the market mechanism would function.⁴²

There is a terrible implication for American society in this, for no major society is more liberal than American society, nor more pluralistic and complex. Beginning as a reasonably simple society, rent only by the terrible conflict between North and South which would one day take a terrible toll, American society has become increasingly pluralistic and complex as the massive waves of immigration, radical changes, and the scientific-technological revolutions have come together in a seething confusion still beyond the understanding of any man. To maintain any minimal degree of social order in such a tumultuous society would require the effective use of considerable power, yet what could be more contrary to the primordial American love of anarchic freedom than the use of any power to coerce other wills to our own? We have, of course, used power to try to bring some order into the confusion; but we have done so dishonestly, surreptitiously, guiltily, and ineffectively. We have denied power even as we have used it; we have been blind to it even as we have sought it.

If the problem for American society is a terrible one, it is more

⁴² Polanyi, Karl, *The Great Transformation*, New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1944, pp. 257-8.

so for the universities. For the American universities are *the* center of the liberal world-view, but they are also at the center of the revolutionary changes that are sweeping our society—and they are a basic source of those changes. As the universities have become increasingly swept up in the great changes, as they have been inundated by the onslaught of ever larger and more pluralistic student bodies, and as they have gotten inextricably more involved in the tangled webs of American political power, the universities have been transformed from the simple ivory towers of more halcyon days into giant centers of competing groups. But they have remained the center of liberalism (who ever met a Republican professor at a major university?) and, in line with this student tradition, they have remained against the use of power. No organization—or quasi-organization, since universities are fabulously unorganized—in our society is more inefficient than the administration of a major university. No institution gives and guarantees more freedom to its members. No institution grants more welfare, more security, to its members—for it is an open secret that students, especially, do not flunk out of major universities unless they work at it. Most telling of all, no other institution is devoted primarily to the purpose of increasing the freedoms of everyone within and outside its boundaries. The university is.

Because of all of this, no institution could be more vulnerable to an internal or external attack involving the use of power than the American university. A tiny minority dedicated to the use of power to achieve its ends can achieve those ends against a vast majority if that majority will not use force to meet force. The universities, like the rest of American society, have, of course, used some power at all times to achieve their goals, including the preservation of freedom; but they have done so far less and far more dishonestly and inefficiently than the rest of our society because of the far greater and more homogeneous commitment to the liberal world-view. Consequently, the universities have been most unprepared to meet the use of force that suddenly grew out of the growing student subculture when the anguish over Vietnam was injected.

Even some of those liberal students who were themselves deeply committed to liberal values have abandoned those earlier commitments as they have come to feel more alienated and betrayed over Vietnam and the other social issues. In their anger and the passions of the moment, many others have simply violated their own liberal values and beliefs. In part, it was precisely because they were so liberal, especially, as we have seen, at the "elite schools," that they felt most angry and betrayed. And because they were so liberal and so much against the use of power in the beginning, they themselves were so unprepared to meet it when it was used against them that

they reacted with even greater anger and more force. When betrayed, the true believer becomes the true sinner, the true sinner the true believer. It is a situation Saint Augustine would have understood well.

In a review of a book by Arthur Schlesinger, John Bunzel, one of the truly dedicated liberals, has noted this abandonment of liberal values among the radical college youth, something that is most striking at such an old center of liberalism as San Francisco State:

It is precisely because I subscribe to so much of Professor Schlesinger's angle of vision and sense of priorities that I find myself disturbed. But it is not what this book stands for or speaks to that causes me concern. I am talking of a deeper uneasiness, an apprehension that the very values which Arthur Schlesinger and I share—a belief in rationality, the importance of due process and the rule of law, democratic procedures in seeking political solutions, to name but a few—do not cut very deep among the young today, and for that reason are seriously in jeopardy. It is not that these values have been proved wrong or misguided; they are simply being abandoned as inadequate and inappropriate responses to the forces operating on modern youth and the demands they are making.⁴³

But the faculty and most of the students at these universities had not abandoned the liberal world-view for the radical world-view, which assumes that power must be used to repress the repressors and intolerance used to repress intolerance, as Marcuse would put it. While they probably were not so cunning as to see all of this in the beginning, the first confrontations made it abundantly clear to the radical students that they could, at the very least, fragment the liberal university community into opposing camps if they could only get the administration to make an *open* use of force against them. They knew that the university did in fact have power to use, at least power that could be called in, but they had learned also that this potential power, or any covert (taken-for-granted) power, would not anger the university liberals. After all, they had long since joined in the pretense of complete freedom, complete reliance on reason, and complete disavowal of power. They did not want to see power, so it would have to be made manifest, undeniable to all but the completely blind.

Trustee power, grade power, expulsion power, non-credit power, and almost all other forms of power routinely used by the university, however meagerly compared to any other organizations in the world, are invisible powers. They cannot be seen in operation. Their injuries

⁴³ This view expressed by John Bunzel has been echoed by many other liberal professors in recent years.

are subtle. Their victims live on, even if they die inside. But there is one form of power which is completely visible, dramatically immediate, undeniable: police power. Battered heads hurt and bleed. Blood sickens. Committee decisions are unreal; blood is real.

The ideal goal of the confrontation must, then, be to bring in the police. Secondly, every effort must be made to have the police attack as many people as possible. Third, the attack must be as overt, visible (televised), and brutal as possible. The general strategy, then, is very clear. Begin by mobilizing liberal support. Escalate until the administration is in a corner and must call in the police. Taunt the police into brutal and "unprovoked" attacks. Suffer as "innocent victims." Attack the police and administration as "fascist pigs" because they did use power, thereby fractionating the liberal community and polarizing many against the users of force. If possible, paralyze the administration and "shut it down" (since "taking over" has never yet been approached). Consolidate one's new forces and prepare for the next struggle, the next confrontation in a long series of planned confrontations.

The police have been crucial in polarizing significant proportions of any academic community against administrative power or any other power, including the government use of power in Chicago and other places where anti-Vietnam confrontations have taken place. The reason for this, which is all too generally not understood by administrations or others, is that most students have an intense dislike, if not outright hatred, of the police, not only because they are against the use of force, but also because they start with that feeling. Like most people in our society, they have a certain distrust of the police. And, like most young people, they have been subject in various ways to the police "harrassment" of the young. In so many of the "elite schools" there is a longstanding hatred of the police by the students, and of the students by the police, which is part of the town-and-gown conflict. At schools such as Harvard there is a history of "police brutality" used against students in the periodic "fun riots" that erupt, generally in the spring. Each new generation of students learns this history and learns to dislike the local police. The same is, presumably, true for the local police. Given this situation, it is only to be expected that students will react with great anger to any use of the police, especially the local police, against any members of their community. It is a clear indication of lack of understanding of their own students that men such as Nathan Pusey would use Cambridge police against any group of Harvard students, almost regardless of what those students were doing.

Most of the students taking part in most "demonstrations" are the "liberal bodies" (or "cannon-fodder") being used by the radicals who

provide the core or organization around which these bodies are ordered. Moreover, these liberal students almost always have a variety of reasons for taking part in the "demonstrations" and are not at all sure how deeply they want to get involved. It is precisely because this is true of most of the students involved that the situational events and the meanings constructed by the various sides involved are so crucial in determining what most of the students involved will do, both at the time and in the future. This is seen beautifully in the discussion by a Berkeley student of his involvement in a sit-in demonstration:

I was just amazed at the organization of the whole thing. It had been planned before, all the various aspects, including what to do about bathrooms, and what happens if people get sick. They had all these things planned: how to get food in and out, what types of food, how much; cigarettes, coffee; what to do with the waste paper; it was amazing. . . . I felt that I would stick out the night, but I had an eight o'clock class the next day, and I was going to it; so I would do my part for the protest and stay the first night, and then if I could come back, I would the next day, but I was not going to miss my classes. Of course, I didn't consider seriously the possibility of being arrested. From a logical standpoint, it was the most ridiculous thing to do. It would essentially have made us all martyrs, which it did. It would have given the protest a great deal of popularity with everyone, including the professors, which again it did. So I would say that logically the best thing for the administration to have done would have been to let us sit there—and I'm sure that, let's say, four hundred people would have walked out by ten o'clock the next day, just because of classes. [The sit-in] would have lost all its emotion and probably would have been a tremendous failure. Well, I can't say that for sure. It just would not have been a climax. So, therefore, I supposed that the administration would do the most logical thing and not arrest people. Well, of course, I didn't realize then what the administration was composed of, and I didn't realize that they were very, really scared, frightened to death, and not very rational in making decisions, so again this leaves us with a particular insight into administrators. I'm a little more suspicious now than I was, a little more critical.⁴⁴

Bringing in the police, attacking the students, arresting them, and imprisoning them all serve to polarize these liberal students to an extreme degree. Certainly it does not "automatically" turn them

⁴⁴ Keniston, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

into radicals overnight. They do still have choices, even when they have suffered the stigma of arrest and imprisonment. But the meanings of the situation have been strongly weighted in favor of the choices leading to ever greater radicalism, both for those immediately involved and for those involved only through identification with their fellow students suffering attack. And, as we have seen earlier (in Chapter 4), such polarization is reciprocal, so that situational polarizations of the students produce a polarization of the authorities which promises a further escalation of student rebellion and revolution.

The Uncertain Future

The repeated confrontations between "youthful idealism" and "irresponsible adult authority," as so many of the members of the generalized student subculture would define them, and the polarizations of groups and individuals that have so commonly grown out of these, have created large groups of angry students and non-student youths who are in generalized rebellion against American society. We have no way of knowing how many of them there are, but we must assume from all impressions that there are several hundred thousand of them concentrated in the major cities and at the major universities. These confrontations have also helped to further polarize the several million members of the generalized student and youth subcultures who provide the supporting everyday social context in which these several hundred thousand rebels live and gain moral strength.

In addition, and very importantly, the confrontations and polarizations have produced many more tens of thousands of "battle-hardened" students and non-students who *identify themselves* as "radicals" who favor some kind of "revolutionary" change in American society. In spite of their general ideological opposition to organization in the usual sense, and in spite of their continued reliance on action situations to provide their strengths and strategies, these "hard-core radicals" have begun to create more conventional radical organizations. SDS, for example, has been split down the middle by those who want more "professional revolutionists" with much more organization and much more self-identification with the organization. Though there are also the Maoist ideological differences, this insistence on harder organizational strength is certainly one of the basic differences between the Progressive Labor group and the older SDS groups. After a decade of relying primarily on generalized shared beliefs and feelings, quasi-organizational strength, and the use of "radical integrity," the more radical students have now moved toward the use of real organizations to mobilize the power that is needed to carry on the struggle. The lines are not yet

hardened, but for the first time in American history we can see the beginnings of the development of real and important revolutionary groups among the young.

Because the youth and student subcultures have become more developed, more politicized, and more polarized, because the protest movements have become so massive, and because we now see the development of truly radical organizations to carry on the struggle, we must expect that the protest movements will continue. It is a truism among sociologists that organizations tend to perpetuate themselves at any cost to the surrounding society. Wherever there is a separate group identity, distinct shared ideas and goals served by organizations, and leaders for whom many personal gratifications are provided by the organizations, the leaders, with the support of many of the led, will find a way to perpetuate the organizations. This is especially true when the organizations are born in conflict and sustained by anger, but this so-called "functional autonomy" of groups tends to remain in effect even when the initial conflicts and angers have been largely forgotten. If the old ones die or wither, the leaders and followers will find new ones, even to the extent of cynically using goals as pretexts to continue their organizations. If the old sources of membership die, the leaders and followers will find new groups to whom they can transmit the group culture. The torch will be passed, the flame sustained.

But there is even more reason than this to expect the protest movements to continue. Once a sufficient degree of polarization has been reached, once the bonds of trust that underlie our everyday social world have been sufficiently destroyed by continued conflicts, we can expect to find new angers and new senses of anguish whenever the older ones die. One will find reasons to hate the enemy. When one distrusts him, and he too is distrustful, it is very easy to find "reasonable" grounds to hate him. If the very liberal and radical students have reached that degree of polarization, and I suspect they have, and if they and the social situation of students succeed in transmitting the generalized feelings and beliefs to some important part of each new generation of students, then we can expect new sources of anger and anguish.

But even the old angers will remain with us for a long time to come. Vietnam might die away, though it is hard to see how the United States will avoid somewhat similar, if much smaller entanglements in the future. But the race issue will remain. And race is still the overriding issue, the overriding source of anger and potential bloodshed, in the United States. This is especially true at the major universities where the black students are forging separate protest movements and where the highly liberal students will probably return to race as the basic issue once the anguish over

Vietnam passes. Indeed, the growing and spreading, if quiet, movement away from civil rights goals around the country, the growing fear of the militant blacks on the campuses, could well produce far more violent anger and action in the years immediately ahead.

But few social movements are linear in their developments. Few of them simply grow bigger and bigger. There are many countervailing forces which have increasingly been mobilized as the opposing force has grown stronger. Some of these tend to curtail the growth of the student protest movements and to undermine the effectiveness of its confrontationist strategies. For example, the mere continuance of "the same old thing" can make many students angry over the continued, and increasingly serious, disruptions of their studies and career aspirations. Again, once the faculties and students come to understand the nature of the confrontationist tactics, as they have, many of them become disturbed at the idea of being "managed" or "used as cannon fodder" by the radicals. Other factors have the opposite effect of building the strength of the protest movements. Most importantly, as I have argued at many points, repressive moves that affect the whole student subculture (or the liberal subculture at the major universities) have the effect of providing excellent confrontationist situations which the radicals can then manage for their own purposes.

But, given the present anger of the general adult population against the students and academics in general, and given the politicization of the whole situation that leads politicians to attack the students for their own political advantage, the main change in the years immediately ahead will probably be only in tactics. The administrators have already learned how dangerous the use of the police can be, except in very carefully controlled situations. They will undoubtedly learn better how to play the game of confrontation, thereby forcing the radicals to devise new tactics. Indeed, if the radicals find that confrontation strategies that produce violence are "counterproductive," then they may devise whole new strategies, perhaps emphasizing such new forms for organizing their strength as the use of student unions. But changes in tactics and the methods of play will not eliminate or reverse the development of the generalized youth culture, the student subculture or the protest movements. These changes will affect their forms, but the substance of the movements can only be affected by more basic changes in our society, changes which most people would probably be unwilling to make. The subcultures and the protest movements are rooted deeply enough in our society to go on for a long time and, just possibly, to grow far stronger than they have thus far.

Chapter 8. What Is To Be Done?

The great task before the educational planners of this nation is not simply to figure out "where the money will come from" in the next two decades but the desirable shape of the university system itself. Should one link graduate schools and their research preoccupations with large undergraduate colleges? Should one not have, perhaps, two kinds of graduate schools, one training an individual broadly for a research function, the other for education and service? What is the optimal size of any single campus? What kind of division of labor can be created between different kinds of universities so that each is not compelled, for illusory competitive reasons, to "cover all fields." These are the necessary questions which face the university and it is astonishing how rarely they are asked, let alone considered.

Irving Kristol,
Confrontation

All military men know that the outcome of any battle is uncertain until it is all over. This is equally true of any conflict. The confrontations that have taken place between "officials" and "students" in the past several years have made this abundantly clear. Even in the later stages of the "Greek tragedy," there is still *some* room for maneuver, as the events at the University of Chicago and Stanford, as opposed to those at Berkeley, Columbia, and Harvard, have shown; and this room for maneuver can mean the difference between "victory" and "defeat," however the different sides might define those terms.

It is because there is such room for maneuver, such room for free choice, that knowledge about what is happening is of relevance to those events, rather than merely an esthetic appreciation of necessity and man's fate. Indeed, it is because we know commonsensically that one of the real necessities in life is this freedom to choose our actions, and because we know that knowledge is essential to wise choice, that we seek knowledge at all, rather than simply the artist's emotional response to events.

But we also know commonsensically that knowledge is only a prerequisite of wise choice, that knowledge is not wisdom and does not provide us with any clear path to wise choice. The gap between knowing and doing, between theory and action, is always great in human affairs. Our knowledge is always very limited, uncertain, and

too abstract to be applied directly to concrete situations. Knowledge can only inform the wise decision, not generate it. Knowledge of social affairs must be treated as *social recipes*: it will tell us much about the ingredients and something about the steps to be followed, but it will not really tell us how to make a good soup.

These cautions are especially important in dealing with anything in which the basic information is so uncertain as that concerning youth. We can certainly hope for little more at this time than very general social recipes. What we do know about youth from our research is all the more important because we know so little commonsensically, but we must certainly rely very heavily on practical wisdom in making use of this information. And, since there has been so little practical wisdom shown in the actions of adults toward youth in recent years, we must at present rely even more on the hope for such practical wisdom.

Predicting the Future, Values and the Goals of Policy Making

Any attempt to formulate policy necessarily rests on important assumptions about the nature of the future. If we do not know what the future will be like, we cannot make any rational decisions about what we should do to most effectively deal with the evolving social situations that concern us.

As the works of Bertrand de Jouvenal,¹ Daniel Bell,² and many others have made very clear, there are many different forms of predicting the future. Some of them, such as simple extrapolations from the present to the near future, are very simple and are taken for granted in any commonsense considerations of what we should do. Others, such as quantitative predictions about specific events, are clearly impossible at this time. Furthermore, those of us who believe that human action is necessarily free, at least partially, believe that they always will be.³

Given something as volatile as the recent American youth movements, there is little hope of saying anything very worthwhile about their longrun future. We can hardly hope to predict much about them in the year 2000. We shall be fortunate to correctly anticipate their general course over the next several years.

Such a reasonably short time span has some important advantages. Most importantly, it makes it unnecessary for us to make anything more than relatively simple extrapolations concerning the relevant basic developments in American society. These are far simpler and more reliable than any longer run predictions; this means that our only great problems in predicting the future will be those concerned

¹ de Jouvenal, Bertrand, *The Art of Conjecture*, New York: Basic Books, 1967.

² Bell, Daniel, "Twelve Modes of Prediction—A Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social Sciences," pp. 845-879 in *Daedalus*, Summer 1964.

³ Douglas, Jack D., "Freedom and Tyranny in Technological Society," *op. cit.*

with the more specific developments of the youth cultures and the social situations immediately surrounding them.

But what kinds of predictions shall we make? What kinds of policy questions shall we ask? What criteria for "good policymaking" shall we use? Any attempt to formulate policy, or even the decision that there is something about which we want to formulate policy, presupposes certain value commitments. It is this, of course, which inevitably produces so much conflict over any attempts to formulate policymaking guidelines. In such a pluralistic society any definition of a problem is generally subject to conflict, and the decision over what is a problem and what is not is generally a political decision, whether recognized or not. Yet much of this conflict has been terribly oversimplified and made uniform by a true understanding of what social scientists do—or can do when they choose.

First of all, there is the almost inevitable mutual mistrust by the different sides involved in any conflict. There is, for example, the strong belief among radical youth today that any study of *them* is directed *against* them; and, consequently, there have been demands that professional associations forbid studies of them. At the very least, radical youth demand the cessation of studies financed by the Government, which they see as necessarily their enemy and out to repress them. They ask why one should study them, which they seem to think necessarily means that one is defining them as a social problem; they contend that it is the administrators and the rest of American society who are the social problem and who should, consequently, be studied. But in all good faith the answer to this is really very simple. We are interested in studying the radicals because we have already done thousands of studies of administrators. We believe that we already know a great deal about how administration is done, who does it, and what administrators are up to. We have not done so many studies of radical youth, largely because they weren't around to be studied until recently.

The students are completely right in arguing that we must study administrators and the rest of American society (at least the relevant rest) to understand what is happening. We certainly must understand both sides—or all sides—and their interrelations, if we are to adequately understand the nature of any conflict. And certainly anyone who reads the earlier chapters of this work will see a great deal about the administrators, the government, and the rest of society. But the students are demanding political subordination of the social scientist when they demand that they not be studied while their "enemies" are studied. No social scientist seeking to truthfully understand these conflicts between youth and adults in our society could accept this, any more than he could accept demands by the

government that he study "what's wrong with youth," and evade the issues of trying to find what it is about the rest of the society that helped to create these movements among the youth.

Contrary to what so many people think, there is no need for the social sciences to be very greatly determined by the nature of the explicit and implicit value commitments that social scientists make. There are, of course, *dangers* that this will be the case; but the universal recognition that there are these dangers is of major importance in preventing their coming true, unless social scientists purposefully limit themselves to some narrow value commitments and evade the various means of encouraging, if never guaranteeing, "objectivity." There are, of course, some social scientists who do just that; but the great majority are committed in various ways to "objectivity." By this, however, we must understand that they are seeking to make their value commitments as wide as possible, as widely sharable as possible in a world of conflicting groups. As I have previously argued in "The Relevance of Sociology," our only realistic goal must be *useful knowledge*, which does involve value commitments, but commitments that are as potentially sharable as possible. What we must avoid are the narrow value commitments which would trap us in narrow interest groups and make us the prisoners of those who control such groups.

If our knowledge is based on very widely shared value assumptions, it will be potentially useful to participants on both sides of conflicts, such as those between youth and officials, even though the uses are in opposition to each other. There is an important question as to which side is better able to make use of such knowledge in trying to control the other. Some people might argue, for example, that the officials could use it better because they have more funds; but this argument overlooks the fact that youth have in no way been helpless when confronted by the vast funds of the officials. Such an argument also overlooks the obvious fact that an important implication of such arguments as the one contained in this book is that attempts at repression can be highly "counterproductive," at least until officials use such tyrannical methods that they hurt almost everyone in our society by eliminating personal freedoms.

But, even accepting this proposed solution to the problems of value commitments and policymaking, we still do not know what kind of policy we are after. What are the criteria of good policymaking, criteria that are independent of the specific moral and practical questions involved? Most importantly, what should be the scope of policymaking? This question is especially important when one is considering a dispute that involves radicals as one of the disputant sides, since they generally argue that "the whole system is rotten, so everything must be changed (revolutionized) or else

nothing has changed." If we are going to change things, how *much* must be changed, regardless of one's moral commitments?

In the first place, it is apparent to anyone that many parts of society are related to one another in many complex ways. If we change one part of the society, we may very well change other parts, either intentionally or unintentionally. But the response to this complex interdependency of the parts of society has been quite variable. For example, we have the two extremes which agree about the implications of this complex interdependency but disagree completely about what should be done about it. The extremes see this interdependency as a *total interdependency*. Everything is related to everything else. All things depend on all things. A change in any part necessarily affects all other parts to a great degree. This is the *social system assumption*. The result of this view is that one necessarily believes that any small change will have great repercussions throughout the society.

At the one extreme we have the conservatives who very definitely believe in this total interdependency of parts. Following Burke, they then argue that we must leave society alone. This interdependency of all parts is seen as beyond man's understanding, so that society must necessarily be left alone to evolve in an unconscious manner to whatever its goals are, if the term "goals" can rightly be termed here. The conservatives' view of the relation of science to human society is best summed up in Claude Bernard's famous statement: "True science teaches us to doubt and in ignorance refrain." Because of the total interdependency of parts which they assume to be true, they believe that science must leave society alone, that science must not be used to try to plan society, or the outcome will surely be disastrous.

At the opposite extreme, we have the radicals who agree with the conservatives about the total interdependency of parts, but who disagree completely about the acceptability of the current status of things. They believe that the current status is completely unacceptable; and, because they believe in the total interdependency of parts, they believe the current setup must be destroyed. Since everything is related to everything else, in order to get rid of what is bad today, we must do away with everything that exists. We must destroy the system, uproot its foundations, institute a totally new order, create a new world, and so on. Those radicals who take a negative approach to things simply emphasize the need to destroy what exists today regardless of what can be done to create a better world. Those radicals who take a more positive view tend to assume that science and other forms of human reason can be used to build a new society. They assume that we either already understand or soon can understand the total interdependency of parts, so that it makes perfectly good sense to them

to proceed apace to destroy the present world and start rebuilding a complexly interdependent new world, one which will be all good, because all of the parts and their planned relations will be good from the beginning.

There is little or no justification for either of these extreme views, simply because the assumption of total interdependency of parts is false. Certainly we know that the various parts of society can be complexly interrelated. We know, for example, that to change the basic economic relations in our society, such as to move from a market economy to a centrally planned economy, would have some profound consequences for many other parts of society. At the same time, we have no reason in the world to believe that everything is related to everything else, or that any change in society necessarily has extreme consequences for all other parts of society, or even necessary consequences for some parts. Who, for example, would seriously argue that a change in the nature of fire departments in our society would seriously affect everything else? Perhaps fire commissioners would try to argue this, but few of the rest of us would be convinced. Surely we can move from a military hierarchical structure of fire departments to a more egalitarian, democratic structure without producing chaos in the streets, and without leading to the burning of our cities (unless the firemen go on strike). Surely the functional argument about the total interdependency of relations between economy and society is absurd for complex societies such as ours. While it may be true for a simple society on some far-off island which has slowly evolved for many centuries that changes in the production or marketing of yams will lead to changes in the nature of religion, especially when that religion has a great deal to do with the production and distribution of yams, there is no reason to believe that a change in economic relations in our society will have a very profound effect on our religion. Has Swedish Protestantism changed since the Swedes became more Socialist? Did the nationalization of steel in Britain destroy the Anglican church?

American society, like almost all national societies in the world today, is not some great big social system in which everything is totally dependent on everything else, so that some small change in some small part will have infinite repercussions throughout the entire system. Quite to the contrary, American society is far more in the nature of a social conglomerate. Many of the parts of the society are quite isolated from other parts. Changes in them will have little effect on any other parts in the society. Other parts are symbiotically interdependent with some other parts, and some parts of our society, such as education and the economic system of production, are related to a great number of other parts, so that changes in

them will have important effects on the other parts, though not on all other parts.

The crucial thing for any rational social planning is to be aware of the potential existence of such interdependencies and to seek to determine just what these interdependencies are before we push ahead in making changes in society. The existence of such interdependencies, the obvious fact that we do not yet understand enough about society to predict all of them, or to know where our changes will necessarily lead to, must certainly make us cautious in our approach to social planning, unless we begin by assuming with the extremists that what exists today is so evil that it doesn't matter what happens as long as we change what now exists. Very few of us feel that way about the present social world in which we live, so there is little reason for giving it serious consideration. On the contrary, most of us feel that, however great our present problems might be, they are not nearly as bad as things can be—and generally have been for human beings.

It is these underlying assumptions of partial interdependency, and the preference for what exists now over what existed in the past and over most other possible present states of affairs, that underlie the *incrementalist strategy of social planning*. The incrementalist strategy of planning emphasizes the need to stay within the *general* bounds of the present society, but, at the same time, to try to change specific aspects of that society to alleviate specific problems. It is this incrementalist approach to social problems and social planning which has so strongly characterized American approaches to solving social problems. And it is certainly this approach which is best suited to the young and uncertain policy sciences. Prophets may have a divine wisdom which inspires their sense of certain knowledge of how to radically transform society into a more just and beautiful place, but the scientist's knowledge of the complexity of society can only inspire him with a sense of humility and cautious hope.

Social Policy and the Generalized Youth and Student Subcultures

We have seen that the rapid development of an increasingly distinct and alienative youth culture serves as the supporting social milieu, the social base, for the development of a far more alienated and angry student subculture; and the student subculture serves as the supporting social milieu for the more radical student protest movements of the past decade. Because of the interdependency of these parts, even those who have no interest in doing anything other than "putting an end to campus hellraising" must be concerned with the question of social policy toward the generalized youth and student subcultures. To try to affect the smaller protest movements,

without dealing with their interdependent social context, would probably be quite self-defeating.

But there is a very great problem involved in doing anything to affect the nature of these massive subcultures, for, as we have seen, they have grown in direct response to more general developments in our society. Specifically, they have grown and become increasingly alienated from the adult society partly because of the social transformation of "adolescence" and "young adulthood" into the social category of "youth," which constitutes a very serious prolongation of an ambiguous social position full of conflicts for those in it and for those dealing with them. The creation of this conflict-ridden social category of "youth," by which those in their later twenties are often considered "kids" and are so treated, has been largely the result of the prolongation of formal education, which in turn has been partially the result of the demands of an increasingly technological society for technical training. As long as this rising social category of "youth" is maintained, and as long as those in it are thrown together in massive schools where they share many common interests and problems, we can expect the generalized youth and student subcultures to continue to grow.

This means that any important changes in these subcultures will necessitate changes either in the technological base of society or in the ways in which those who are to man that base are educated. Since it seems highly unlikely that any nation today could adopt a policy of drastically changing its dependence on its technological base, it is clear that any proposals for affecting these generalized subcultures will have to be concerned with possible changes in the nature of formal education.

One thing that is clearly long overdue is a thorough reexamination of the whole place of formal education in our society. Most importantly, while it is quite clear that formal education is vital in providing much of the basic knowledge necessary for continued technical, economic, and medical development, it is increasingly clear to social scientists and to many educationists as well that there is a vast amount in formal education that has little or nothing to do with such development or which cannot as easily or better be provided by other segments of society.

The crucial problem seems to be that individuals who consider themselves to be full-grown, "real" people, feel increasingly *trapped* into a prolongation of the all too dependent and ambiguous status of youth or student by the need for "credentials" and "degrees" to get a "real-adult job," even when those credentials or degrees have little or nothing to do with real technical knowledge. Much of this entrapment is the result of the profound belief (especially among adults) in our society that formal education is necessary to success

and, besides, is good in itself. Much of the rest is the result of the attempt of organizations to get more prestige by hiring people with degrees in preference to those without, even when there is no way at all of showing that there is any difference in technical capabilities.

But a growing number of social scientists have begun to argue that the basic reason for this increasing segregation of the young from the adult world, the "real" world of work and responsibility, is that they are unneeded by the technological society. Their argument is that the technological society needs fewer and fewer "bodies" to produce more and more consumption goods, so that production continually threatens to outrun the demands of consumption. Yet something "safe" and "worthy" must be found for the young bodies to do, so they are shipped off to the educational institutions for temporary interment. As the excess of bodies grows, the length of interment must grow to accommodate the social need.

I believe there are some serious reasons to believe this is by no means a primary reason why formal education has expanded. But, regardless of its truth, this argument has led to a proposed solution that warrants some serious consideration. Those who accept this argument have concluded that the far more humane thing to do would be to cease to consider work as sacred, so that the sacrament of education, as the prelude to work, would no longer be necessary. Rather than expanding education (or pretending-to-work), we could expand leisure, perhaps even allowing a sizeable and growing portion of people to become permanently unemployed, as our computer-based economy is increasingly able to support them.

With this goal of *The Leisure Society* in mind, some sociologists and many other social analysts have seriously urged that we look at the hippies as prophets of our common future. As noted earlier, this misses the point about the hippies, who are really much more in a long line of romantic rejectors of the work-a-day world than they are in the line of prophetic critics of unnecessary labor. The often violent criticism of our American devotion to work which is heard increasingly from the student rebels, especially those of the New Left, is much more relevant. There is even a convergence of their serious criticisms of the work-ethic with the much simpler emphasis on free time and "fun" found in the youth leisure cultures.

In their view computerization and automation have already made it possible for us to enjoy much more leisure (by which they generally mean "free time"). Supposedly, we have failed to take advantage of this possibility only because our capitalistic economy continually creates new desires in us (what the Marxists calls false consciousness) through advertising.

The rebellious students' rejection of the work-a-day existence (the "humdrum existence") as unnecessary and wasteful of life's creative

possibilities complements their hatred for the bureaucratized corporate world. (Their hatred and fear of the corporate world is probably the more basic feeling. Their views of the possibilities of automation may simply be secondary responses supporting their prior rejection of the corporate world.) In some ways their rosy views of what "could be" resemble the early socialist belief that an equalitarian redistribution of wealth would end poverty and make everyone reasonably affluent. To some extent, just as this earlier belief was based on very false ideas about the distribution of wealth, so this more recent view seems based on false ideas about the competitive market position of American industry. It seems very questionable whether present work time could be greatly reduced while even the present level of incomes was maintained without increasing the cost of production proportionately, thereby producing a loss in exports. Perhaps future increases in productivity could be taken out in increased free time without producing these adverse effects or decreases in income, but then it would take very much longer to raise the general incomes of the lower income groups. Increased taxation to support growing numbers who would never repay this social investment would have worse effects of the same kind.

Far more seriously, there is no particular indication that many Americans prefer more free time over the alternative values of consumption or investment. On the contrary, most Americans have consistently preferred to work the same amount of time or even longer to get more money. Moreover, it is very striking and important to note that it is precisely the better educated who are working the longest hours. The Knowledge-Based Society demands more and more of their abilities and fewer of the abilities of the less educated. One very important reason for this increase in work time among the well educated is that for them "work" (the "job") has a somewhat different meaning: for them the "job" is generally both vocation and avocation, both the supplier of sustenance and a creative undertaking. It has generally been completely overlooked by the adherents of the antiwork ethic that the elites and many of the subordinates of the scientific-technological-educational world are dedicated to their work, find it fulfilling, and would certainly rather work (or "play," as some of them see it) than have more time for alternative activities. To these elites such undertakings as the exploration of space often take on the aspects of a religious mission and inspire a sense of great adventure. To them the obvious need is not for more free time but for more time to devote to the inspiring tasks facing us—a world to rebuild, a universe to explore and conquer.

There is also a second basic reason to doubt that most Americans will soon *choose* any greatly increased free time over work. The ancient tradition of Western societies, and most especially of the United

States, involves at its core the *quest for the prize*, the attempt to outdo one's fellows, to gain self-esteem and (social) prestige by being better than others. This quest has been largely economic in the United States for the past one hundred years or more. I suspect that this emphasis on the economic prize is now waning among large groups of educated people, but the quest remains very strong; and this quest for the prize involves unceasing work (in the sense of "activity whose goal is not found in itself"). There are always new prizes, new competitors, and shifting evaluations of the racers. Even free-time activities (e.g., boating, traveling) have become an important quest for the prize of prestige—so we now have *conspicuous leisure*. The members of the scientific-technological-educational elite struggle ceaselessly for the prize of "intellectual reputation." For the natural scientists the most profound motive of all is the desire for the ultimate prize of being considered a "genius," a modern form of canonization. The dedication to this goal is largely unimaginable to those who have not seen it and felt it. No amount of work, no "realistic" barriers are too much for its pursuers; and there are few who will publicly (or privately?) opt out of the race. For many of these competitors the quest for economic affluence and prize is actually a welcome diversion from "serious work," a form of avocation. The increasing affluence of this new elite will simply free them for more intense dedication to "serious work," which, for the fortunate, is all the more intense because it is also an avocation, a way of life that is an end in itself.

While it seems clearly unrealistic to expect that this new elite will become more dedicated to free time or leisure, both because of their own goals and because every further move along the path of the Knowledge-Based Society increases the demand for them, it is entirely plausible to expect that the basic trends in our society *could* lead to a basic division between this elite and the rest of the population.

Given our democratic form of government and the strong pressures against increasing inequalities of income and standards of living, it is quite unlikely that any division between the new elite and the rest of the population will take the form of any economic immiserization of the non-elite (unless the elite group should come to constitute a distinct majority and the non-elite be simply a permanent pool of poor). The real question seems to be whether the present working class group will become relatively technologically unemployed but maintained at a decent standard of living by liberal reforms (i.e., guaranteed incomes, etc.) or whether they will become better educated to meet the economic demands of the Post-Industrial Economy.

So far, all of the dire predictions in the 1950's of mass technological unemployment have proved unfounded. General economic growth,

technical training, and shifts to service occupations have produced an even higher rate of employment. This path of development can continue *if* (and only if) the technical education of all forms continues to *accelerate* to keep pace with the acceleration in the scientific-technological revolution. If this is done, then there will be an accelerating rate of education (at least of technical forms), an accelerating involvement of the young and of the older in formal education, and an accelerating rate of shift to more technical jobs. At the same time, there would be an accelerated rate of taking more free time (probably longer vacations), since this trend has been slowly occurring in certain technical jobs, and is a goal of the UAW and other unions, etc. There would almost certainly be an accelerating quest for prize through conspicuous leisure—jet-setting, boating, surfing, skiing, horsing, concerting, etc. Given these developments, one would certainly expect the accelerated development of leisure youth subcultures, but most of these would not be particularly rebellious (unless the current trend toward decreased separation between youth and adulthood were reversed). On the other hand, these developments would strengthen the antiwork ethic of rebellious youth by making it more plausible. Most importantly of all, the accelerating involvement of youth and adults in formal education and in the scientific-technological-educational subculture, with its intense emphases on the noneconomic quests, will produce an accelerating rebellion against the work-a-day world, especially as represented by the giant bureaucracies. This is and will be a rebellion for other forms of work or quests, not a rebellion for nonwork as many people see it and not a rebellion for humanistic education, as some humanists hope. Since the economy will be even more dependent on these people, the nature of the work-a-day world will be changed at an accelerating rate to meet their demands: decentralized, responsible, interesting jobs will be used increasingly as incentives, with money playing a less important role. An important and unanswered question is whether the computer revolution can eliminate humdrum jobs fast enough to dampen this rebellious trend. It is also important to know whether the aroused expectations of this revolution—the feeling that humdrum is now unnecessary and, therefore, unbearable—will outrun the real possibilities. If the revolution does not increase rapidly enough, or if the expectations outrun the real possibilities, then the rebellion could grow even stronger.

However, aside from such piecemeal measures to make work more interesting, there is good reason to believe that our society will not move in the direction of creating a permanent leisure group maintained at subsistence levels or any other levels. There is still far too much moral feeling against so doing to avoid the creation of tremendous resentment on the part of those doing the work. Those

doing the work would be the elite with the most power, so there is little likelihood of such a proposal being accepted. Moreover, such a move would create a permanent underclass. Few people, least of all those who could go to colleges, would be willing to be any part of such a group. The creation of such a class would spur far more people on to get more formal education so that they would not become part of the dreaded "leisure class." In general, this path toward freeing education from the "curse of credentialism" seems one of the less feasible.

If the creation of a "leisure-time class" which does not need to be educated formally is not a viable path to follow in trying to prevent the growing sense of entrapment found among many "students" in higher education, what path is to be followed in trying to make formal education more relevant, less entrapping, and less torn by destructive conflicts? There are two basic directions which formal education can follow in meeting the severe, growing problems of relevance in an increasingly changing and specialized world of science and technology. On the one hand, educational organizations can become increasingly complex and specialized and work closely with the technological corporate world to meet their increasingly specialized and technological needs. This is the direction haphazardly followed so far. On the other hand, the educational organizations can become more clearly separated from the immediate demands of the corporate world and try simply to provide the broad background of knowledge and abilities which can later be developed in specialized directions by specialized education in the corporate organizations. At the present time it is probably impossible even to tell which of these would be more economical. Each seems an equally plausible direction for the educational organizations to follow, at least from the standpoint of economic investment.

The *complete separatist model* is the one most often preferred by the humanists and all others who would rather return to a general education curriculum. There are several major factors against such a return: (1) the academics would thereby relinquish a major opportunity to extend their power and influence in the whole society; (2) the corporations of all sizes would be dependent on their own educational resources, which would strain the smaller ones; and (3) the student rebels do not want a return to general education, since they see Plato as even more irrelevant than modern Tibetan (this being part of their "anti-intellectualism"). There are a number of factors in favor of such separatism: (1) it would enable the academic world to concentrate on the needs and desires of those involved in education; (2) it would reduce the problems of cohesion or community spirit caused by the *specialized services approach to education*; and (3) it would allow the specialized training outside to be more

relevant to direct needs, thereby greatly increasing the efficiency and payoff of such education.

Over the next decade the present specialization of institutions will probably increase, thereby allowing increasing separatism for some types of institutions, especially those concerned with undergraduate education. Corporations, especially the giants and the growing conglomerates, will provide more and more on-site technical education. (There is already a rudimentary General Motors University.) There will be more specialized training institutions (junior universities), more government subsidies for technical retraining, more cooperation between corporations in providing such adult education, a great expansion in university adult education, and more in-plant part-time teaching by university personnel. At the same time, there will probably be an increasing specialization of institutions in either graduate or undergraduate education, rather than combining them to the detriment and resentment of undergraduates. And separate private and government research organizations are already growing rapidly.

To the extent that such separatism increases community spirit, attention to the immediate needs of the members of the institution, and relevancy of the intellectual subject matter, it will decrease the strength of rebellious subcultures. But, to the extent that it maintains or reestablishes barriers between youth and adulthood, it will be resented, even though the present rebels seem not to have considered this possibility. Such separatism would turn youth rebellion within the separated institutions more directly against the corporate institutions, but the accompanying merging with the adult world at higher levels would tend to dampen youth rebellion.

However, since the leaders of the academic organizations will gain greatly in power and influence if the current expansion and accretion of specialized services within giant universities is continued, there is a great incentive to continue it. There is even greater incentive to increasingly merge the educational institutions with the massive adult education and technical retraining demands which are being made ever greater by the scientific-technological revolution in the economy. Considered simply in terms of the efficiency of specialized work, this merger might seem like a very economical development. However, if this path is followed, the problems of cohesion and the "entrapment" of youth will become ever greater, with resulting increases in the strength of the rebellious youth subcultures. In addition the attacks could spread to the larger corporate world as they become more dependent on academically trained technologists.

The best answer to the growing problems affecting the universities does not seem to lie in either of these extreme positions. Rather than viewing the situation as an either/or situation, we would probably be better off trying to see it as a mixed one demanding a mixed answer.

The important thing is to find the right mix. Rather than seeking either complete separatism or complete subservience of higher education to the demands of the technological-corporate world, we must seek the best way of combining these partially conflicting trends.

Most basically, we need a wider recognition of the great importance to our whole society of the one fundamental social purpose served by our universities which no other groups in our society can adequately serve. More than any other group *the universities can and do serve the purpose of creating the new ideas necessary for achieving our goals in the new kind of world society, the technological society, which is being rapidly created.* The most obvious way in which the universities have done this so far is by being the center for scientific and technological creativity. But this is precisely the kind of activity that is now increasingly being performed in the giant industrial organizations, simply because they can support it and are willing to support it because the activity produces the kind of knowledge they need. The kind of ideas which the universities create which are not being created to any large extent by outside groups are ideas concerning the very nature of the society that is being created, both what it is becoming and what it should become. *The one unique and vital function served by the university in our society today is that of creating and communicating both to students and to the general public ideas for the totally new kind of society that we are, thus far inadvertently, creating.* Moreover, this is the one kind of activity which can only be done successfully within the uniquely free social setting which the universities have thus far enjoyed—and *insisted on*—in our society.

Given this goal, it should be clear that the universities are of vital importance to the society. The vast social problems created by the accelerating transformation of our society into a technological one cannot be solved by the very people who create them, the scientist-technologists and the rulers of the corporate and government world who utilize their knowledge. In fact, they are hardly even thinking about such problems. And they certainly are not working effectively to build in social checks on their own power, something which will certainly have to be done if we are to avoid the modern enslavement of *technological tyranny.* Only the universities provide the freedom and support for the *practical-utopian thought* that is needed.

This does not, of course, mean that the universities should become the spearheads of prophetic social changes or the advocates of political interest groups. It does not mean that the universities should "put themselves on the line" for the political interests of any political interest group. On the contrary, it means that the universities must avoid such constraining political entanglements; for entanglements of this sort can only destroy the one unique and vital purpose of the

universities, that of being the one group in our society devoted to the most relevant concerns of us all—the very nature of what our lives are becoming and should become.

This does mean that the universities should seek to become less and less involved in the processes of providing credentials for outside work activities. Whether credentials are a good way of handling modern technical work is not even important in this respect. Good or bad, such work detracts from the unique purpose of the universities in the modern world. Such a function builds the power of the administrators at the expense of meeting the unique purpose of the modern university. Schools of dentistry, forestry, engineering, medicine, eye research, and so on, are all vital in the modern world; and they probably cannot be transferred into corporations without injuring them. But they can be transferred into more autonomous research and teaching organizations, and will probably profit from such independence.

The more the university becomes a complex, unintegrated bundle of "service functions," the less university community there will be, the more the university will simply be serving to "entrap" youth, and the more conflict there will be within the university. Rather than segregating the youth from the "real society," the adult world, we should seek to involve them in the practical realm of activity as much as possible as long as they are doing practical things such as engineering and forestry. In fact, since most formal education is forgotten once the graduate starts doing "real work," because he goes into quite a different field, we have every reason to expect that the overall social cost of education will be greatly cut by *putting the youth back into society*. (If there are problems of not having enough jobs, then those problems must be handled by other social policies, not by segregating the "problems" and letting them wait.)

Social Policy and the Student Protest Movements

The student protest movements merge with more general social movements in many ways, and the members of these movements are primarily concerned with general social issues, rather than with localized university issues. In addition, the university itself is interdependent with the rest of our society in many ways. Both of these facts make it necessary to consider the general society's policy decisions concerning student protest movements, only then going on to consider the more specific matters of university policy toward the movements.

At the most general level there are two obvious extreme possibilities for social policy toward the student protesters. At the one extreme, that proposed by the radical students themselves, it is obvious that one could let them "take over" the society as a whole or one could

more plausibly "give in" to each of their demands. (In fact, I think that anyone who simply gave in to the demands of the true radicals would find that they would continue to escalate up to the point of a complete takeover, since I suspect their goal is power itself and not simply changing the directions of the present leaders. They believe that the present leaders are completely corrupt, so any attempt on their part to even do what the radicals want would be seen as a "trick." Only true revolutionaries can be trusted to do good. Bad guys are necessarily always bad, and good guys are necessarily always good.) But certainly there are no social leaders who will seek to formulate policy on the basis of giving in to such demands, because the vast majority of the population is opposed to most of those demands.

At the other extreme, that taken by the outright enemies of the protesters, one could seek to eliminate protest by eliminating the protesters, probably through the more humane means of incarceration than that of execution. This policy is already being carried out in a few instances of political justice by which "legal prosecution" is used to jail political protesters.

But, regardless of one's own values, there are just as many problems with this extreme approach as with the other. In the first place, trying to repress the radical students by using extra-constitutional measures injures the rest of the society. It is difficult, if not impossible, to curtail the rights of these growing groups of political dissenters without curtailing the rights of us all, which is surely something we do not want to do.

Equally importantly, all attempts thus far to repress the extreme radicals by extra-constitutional means, or extra-legal means, have been primary causes of the further growth of the very forms of protest which the authorities have been trying to repress. The reason for this is very simple: the existence of the massive alienated youth and student subcultures makes any repressive measures taken against the radicals the basic factor in mobilizing the alienated and liberal youth for radical political purposes. For one thing, the use of such repressive measures justifies the cry of the radicals that "it's all a corrupt system run by fascists," a comment the radicals are very quick to make. Secondly, such measures make the radicals into victims, and this inspires great sympathy on the part of the other youth who identify more with them, even if not a great deal more, than with adult authorities. In a situation of growing polarization, the usual methods of social control can suddenly become completely "counterproductive."

It would undoubtedly be possible to pursue an escalating policy of repression in the hope that some point would be reached at which the effects of polarization would be outweighed by the fears of physical

injury or of imprisonment. But this policy would immediately take us back to the first problem. The escalation would probably make a situation worse than if one were suddenly to launch a policy of severe repression. At each stage the students might well expect that the opposing side would not go further, so that many would be pulled in and stigmatized as radicals who would then have no way out even when the repression did actually get worse. A slow process of escalating the repression, which is surely all that even the most sinister "authorities" could get away with in American society, will be precisely the one thing which will generate the most extensive and violent forms of student protest movements and, in the end, the one policy that will most injure the rights of us all.

Beside these great problems of society, rebellion, and of reform, those of the university seem small indeed. The university has been the object of such bitter conflict only because that is where the angry young are, because that is where their revolt starts, because the university is an easy target to disrupt and defeat. But the problems of the university are not unimportant. As we have seen, it is in significant part because of the problems of the university, especially those problems which make the university a microcosmic representative of the problems of our society in general, that the radical students are able to mobilize many of the liberal students there for their confrontations against the university administrations and the political authorities. If the universities are to prevent such confrontations—and their consequence of producing evermore radicalized students for future confrontations—they, too, will have to be reformed. Most importantly, university administrators will have to start treating their students as something other than "children." They will obviously have to avoid all paternalism and move toward giving the students some form of representative, responsible authority, especially over those matters that most concern them. The university also simply cannot count on the ancient "adult authority" to continue to demand of students the many kinds of studies which the students do not find "relevant." Most of these problems can be overcome by pushing the "trapped" students into truly relevant adult job-training centers. But this will leave the radical student organizations, who will still want to use the university for their own narrow political interests, attempting to divert the university from its one fundamental purpose of creativity into channels of political activism more befitting a political party.

Assuming that the universities will not be able to return to the halcyon days of community spirit when they were small and homogeneous, they will have to move toward the same kinds of government that most complex organizations in our society have moved toward. They will have to create *private legal systems* that provide their citi-

zens with rights and duties which the great majority of them can accept as legitimate. This will undoubtedly consist in part in creating far better means for judging student grievances. It may mean helping the students to create real student unions that can provide them with stable, democratically representative and responsible forms of leadership with real power over the real interests of students. This would certainly help to prevent the arrogation of student representation by radicals in their confrontations with administrations and their statements to the mass media.

Above all, university faculty and administrators will have to adopt a whole new world-view. They must realize that they have in fact become complex, conflict-ridden societies with all the problems of social order that such societies inevitably face. The administrations will have to think and act politically, that is, will have to attempt to determine the various interests of their different constituencies and work out viable compromises. But *the faculties will have to come to understand these problems of social order and to accept the necessities of using legitimate power to maintain order in a complex society*; otherwise, any administration will be undercut by the liberal idealism which denies that these are realities.

But today administrators, faculties, and students alike must seek answers to their problems on a far larger stage. Not only is the university complexly involved in all the major problems of our society, but, because of the student protest movements and the polarization resulting from them, the university has become a battleground in the larger society. The forces of radicalism and those of repression have come to use the university as a symbol of the larger struggle and have decided to carry on some of the real fighting on the university campuses. It has, therefore, become of vital concern to the great majority of the faculties, the administrators, and the students to find ways to stop the polarization that is pushing the universities into more open conflict with State legislative bodies, governors, and many important groups in the general public. Assuming that these outside groups can still see the vital importance of the universities to the longrun interests of us all, there is surely room for maneuver and compromise remaining. If the leaders of both sides do not take this point of view and seek such compromises, there will surely be further polarization and, consequently, further conflict.

The Ultimate Choice

In the present polarized condition of our society, rebellion and repression generate each other. And there is some real danger that the cycles of rebellion and repression will grow to the extent of destroying the fabric of mutual trust that makes our democratic way of life possible.

There are now such large and growing groups of the young who are very angry over what they see as *the* social problems which must be corrected that they are willing and able when necessary to use illegal and violent means to achieve their goals of "social reform." It is the understanding of these kinds of forces that has led Jerome Skolnick and others to argue that the only basic alternative to social reform is a move toward the police state, which is no real alternative at all for Americans. The forms of social reform that will be necessary to prevent the steady growth of evermore angry student protest movements are especially those of civil rights, Vietnam, and the general position of youth in our society. All of these, as we have seen, are basic causes of the anger and the generalized revolt among growing percentages of the young.

We face a time of growing polarization in which the opposing sides become more angry, more intransigent, more inclined to fight it out simply for the sake of winning. It is a time in which the leaders of the society must find ways to construct viable compromises if we are to avoid growing conflicts that will eventually hurt us all. But it is also a time in which demagogues will inevitably arise to promise total solutions that pander to the darkest fears of the people in the guise of the highest morality. It is, then, a time in which the wisdom of the common man will be sorely tested; for in our society he will be the one who must ultimately decide who is the wise leader who can find practical compromises to these terrible dilemmas, and who is the moralistic demagogue who will bring only tyranny.

Appendix I. The Information on American Youth

While there has been a vast literature written on American youth in response to general public concern, very little of this has been based on reliable evidence. The vast majority of serious investigations of American youth have been done from one (or some combination) of two major perspectives: (1) the nature and problems of, and solutions to, the phenomenon of "adolescence"; and (2) the relations of individual factors, and factors within the educational situation, to the relative degrees of success of students in meeting the official goals of the educational organization. The first perspective is based on the implicit assumption that one should study youth in order to solve their problems of successfully progressing toward "normal adulthood." The second perspective is based on the implicit assumption that one should study youth involved in educational pursuits to determine how they can be led to better achieve the goals set for them by the educational organizations. In both types of study, youth is treated as being in a *subject* position, as Becker, Geer, and Hughes have called it.¹ It is assumed that they must *fit* into social roles and organizations determined by outsiders, adult segments of society; and the purpose of social science research is to determine how this fit can better be achieved.

In all of this research there is little attempt made to determine by objective, scientific means how the youth groups define their situations for themselves and how these definitions affect the external, adult world to which they have been assumed to be subject. As Becker, Geer, and Hughes have pointed out in the introduction to one of the rare exceptions to this criticism:

Everyone writes about college students. Many people have studied them. Yet in all the vast literature that has accumulated we find very little that gives any sense of either the overall dimensions of college life, as students see them, or of the ordinary, routine everyday character it has for them. We can learn, from the literature, a great deal about the psychological and social characteristics of students: their personality traits and attitudes on a variety of subjects, their social class, religion and ethnicity. We can learn how these attributes are related to one another and how, taken singly or in combination, they affect students' academic per-

¹ Becker, H.; Geer, B.; and Hughes, E. C., *Making the Grade*, New York: John Wiley, 1968.

formance in school and their adjustment in later life. But we will not learn much about what they do during their daily student round, how they feel about it, what they think they are doing and why.²

Regardless of the exact kind of evidence one is seeking, there are several sources of information about American youth, each one involving a distinct methodology with its own advantages and disadvantages for our purposes here. It will be of value to examine each major source before going further into the analysis of youth cultures today.

Official Information. One of the most common sources of sociological information in general is official information, especially the various forms of official statistics compiled by government agencies. The ease of access to and the vast extent of information of this sort has made it a favorite source of sociological information.³

Some information about youth in the United States can be derived from official records and some of it can be derived *only* from the official records. The census figures on age distributions of the population over the years, for example, are the only source of information that can show how great has been the increase in young people. (Such figures, however, also show that the birth rate today is lower than ever before, indicating that the average age will probably once again increase substantially in the decades ahead.) But such information as this is of only very limited value.

Sociologists and many other social analysts have also tried to use certain other forms of official statistics to determine some important things about American youth. The most important of these have been the official statistics on juvenile delinquency. These official statistics, especially the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI, have been used by the lay public and social scientists alike to analyze youth in general and, increasingly, youth subcultures. While such analyses were formerly restricted to lower class youth, they have now been extended to middle-class youth as well.⁴

The analyses of such official information have been especially important in producing and supporting the commonly accepted theories of mass society and youth cultures, "delinquent subcultures" of lower class youth,⁵ and similar theories. Such theories purport to show that certain basic aspects of our society are giving rise to increasingly frequent forms of deviant and rebellious youth cultures in our society. Consequently, an evaluation of this form of data is important for evaluating some of the most commonly accepted theories of youth cultures.

² *Ibid.*

³ Durkheim's work is often taken as a model of analysis. See my criticism of this model in *The Social Meanings of Suicide*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.

With few exceptions, those who have used official information (both statistics and records) on delinquency and other forms of youthful deviance have failed to adequately consider the ways in which such information has been constructed by officials. They have assumed, at least implicitly, that such information is sufficiently reliable and valid for their analyses.

While there has long been some important evidence showing that official information is normally biased along certain fundamental dimensions of society, such as social class, it has only been in recent years that sociologists have systematically investigated and analyzed such official information.⁶ These investigations and analyses have now made it very clear that official information is highly biased and largely useless in objectively analyzing youth cultures, deviant or nondeviant.

There are several general conclusions from these works on official information that now seem pretty clearly established: "(1) the officials are concerned primarily with the practical problems of getting a job done, rather than with collecting scientific information; (2) officials do their categorizing largely in terms of rules of thumb, rather than in terms of scientific criteria; (3) there are great variations in the formal and informal definitions of categories, organizational structures, and procedures followed, between official organizations; (4) there are great variations in the tendencies of different groups to report deviance to officials, in the official registration of members of different groups (e.g., class and race biases), and in the disposition of cases from different groups; (5) there tend to be great differences between the public (rhetorical) statements of official policy and actual (secret) practices in handling cases; and (6) officials very often corrupt the statistics, using them for their own political purposes."⁷

In addition, it has become increasingly clear that official agencies are a very important factor, perhaps the most important factor, in creating certain forms of deviant youth cultures, especially among the lower classes. These officials, especially the law enforcement agents, approach their work with certain preconceived social meanings, such as the expectation that lower class (or poor) adolescents are more "dangerous" (i.e., more recalcitrant in criminal paths of action). As a result of this, these officials have a much greater tendency to formally arrest these lower class adolescents, rather than dis-

⁶ The few examples of this work will be found in Vaz, Edmund W., ed., *Middle Class Delinquency*, New York: Harper, 1967.

⁸ See, especially, Cohen, A., *Delinquent Boys*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955; and Cloward, R., and Ohlin, E., *Delinquency and Opportunity*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960.

⁹ See, especially, Douglas, Jack D., *The Social Meanings of Suicide*, op. cit.; and Cicourel, A., *The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice*, New York: John Wiley, 1968.

⁷ Douglas, *ibid.*

posing of their cases through informal procedures (e.g., reports to parents). Once they have been formally charged with a crime, they become official "cases" in the official records. The records are then used to systematically survey and investigate, including "rousting," these same individuals over the years. The official information, then, becomes a major part of a social stigmatization process which is of fundamental importance in giving certain individuals the social identity of criminal or some other form of deviance.⁸ Because these stigmatization processes are very largely restricted to certain lower class groups, official information becomes an important cause of certain forms of deviant youth subcultures. Therefore, such information should be used to help explain these youth subcultures, rather than be used as facts about the nature of such subcultures.⁹

Questionnaire and Interview Studies of Youth Subcultures.

The great majority of studies of youth subcultures, especially of student subcultures, have made use of some form of questionnaire or interview technique. This general technique has been extensively used both because it has been generally considered by social scientists to be the best technique for getting objective, representative information, and because in general the people *studying youth subcultures* have obviously been outsiders to the members of the subculture, which has made it very difficult to use any form of participant observation method (see below). The "meaning" of such questionnaire and interview information has then generally been determined by the use of statistical analyses.

Among this great number of studies, the one reported by James Coleman in *The Adolescent Society*¹⁰ is representative of the best. A brief analysis of this study will reveal both the nature of such studies and their fundamental weaknesses.

The basic goal of the study was to determine to what degree a distinct adolescent subculture exists in American schools. Perhaps it is truer to say that, having previously decided that such a subculture exists, the researchers used the general statistical-hypothetical approach to determine more precisely the nature of this subculture. The study involved the use of questionnaires administered to all students in ten schools considered by the researchers to be fairly representative of American schools, interviews with the teachers in these schools, and interviews with the parents of the students.¹¹

One of the striking things about the formal description of the method used in this study is that there is no mention of any use of participant observation. The author did mention that, "Preliminary

⁸ See Becker, H., *Outsiders*, New York: Free Press, 1963.

⁹ See the section on the interdependency between official organizations and deviance, in Douglas, Jack D., "Deviance and Order in a Pluralistic Society," in Tiryaklam, E. and McKinney, J., eds., *Sociological Theory*, op. cit.

¹⁰ Coleman, J., *The Adolescent Society*, op. cit.

to all this, observations and pretesting of the questionnaire and interview schedules will be carried out."¹² However, there is no mention of what kind of "observation" might have been involved, what was observed, or how such "observations" might be of importance in determining the nature of the "adolescent society." When we look at the few instances in which the author reports statements (recorded?) by the students,¹³ we find what definitely appear to be simply lengthy responses to formal interview questions. Therefore, as far as we know, there was no significant participant observation involved in this research, and all of the interview and questionnaire methods actually used were of the most "obtrusive" kind in which the questioner confronts a stranger with "research questions" whose meanings the subjects must make out for themselves.

There are several fundamental weaknesses with this whole method when used to study American youth:

1. As the best survey analysts would generally agree, when one is attempting to study any group through formal interview procedures, it is necessary to know that group well enough to know what the meanings of the interview situation will be to the people being questioned so that the researcher will have some intuitive understanding of how the method of study might be determining the information obtained. The better survey researchers have always made implicit use of such commonsense understandings to try to reduce the "obtrusive" effects of the research methods. When one is studying a subculture of which he is not a member or in which he has not had extensive experience involving trust from the members, then he can only gain the necessary commonsense understandings through extensive participant observation in the subculture. Hardly any of the many interview studies of youth cultures have involved such prior participant observation, yet researchers have almost never been members of the subcultures or had extensive prior experience in the subculture.¹⁴

2. Even when one has had extensive experience in the subculture, his understandings of the ways in which the interview situation is being interpreted by the members must necessarily remain at the level of commonsense understandings. While Lindsey Churchill and a few other sociologists have begun to systematically investigate the social meanings of questioning situations in our society and the ways in which these meanings themselves affect the answers given, there is at present almost no "scientific" information on these meanings and their effects.¹⁵ Consequently, while extensive commonsense experience

¹² *Ibid.*, page 326.

¹³ See the reference to pretesting at *ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

¹⁵ See the section on participant observation in Douglas, Jack D., "Deviance and Order in a Pluralistic Society," *op. cit.*

in the subculture will undoubtedly make the information obtained more reliable, it will not invest the information with "scientific" precision not possessed by information obtained in other ways.

3. Almost all evidence to date indicates that there is little or no relationship between the responses individuals give on highly "objective" questionnaires to "strangers" (i.e., interviewers) and their privately held views and actions. As Irwin Deutscher has argued in great detail and very persuasively, there is even very significant evidence showing that people often act very differently from the way they have previously said they would.¹⁶ This difference between public questionnaire responses and private action (or even privately expressed opinions) would seem to be especially damaging to such studies as James Coleman's *The Adolescent Society*. For example, his findings from questionnaires that parents support academic work more and athletics less than the students themselves would appear to be simply the abstract expression of "scholarly ideals." In their everyday lives the parents, like most of the students, show immensely greater enthusiasm over athletic prowess than they do over intellectual abilities. Responses to questionnaires are made almost entirely *in the abstract* and must not be expected to be significantly related to the specific meanings of things to individuals in everyday situations that do determine what they will do.

4. One of the very important reasons for this relative lack of relationship between questionnaire responses and actual behavior in everyday life is that in the questionnaire situation the respondents are generally faced with a stranger who is asking them questions of great importance to the respondents' self-esteem and social prestige. In this situation the incentives to carefully *manage one's self-presentation* will be at a maximum. This strong tendency of the questionnaire situation to elicit presentational devices is especially important when one is attempting to study American youth. If there is any one thing about which almost all observers of American youth are agreed, it is that they are almost universally very sensitive about their public images. They worry a very great deal about what others think about them. Moreover, they themselves are so aware of the importance and frequency of false self-presentations that they have long developed and transmitted very distinctive linguistic categories for these practices: they are constantly on guard against the "snow-job," "big buildup," and so on, which simply means that the practitioners of these fine arts of social relations have to develop their techniques all the more to make them successful.

In general, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that question-

¹⁵ See Churchill, L., "Some Notes on Questioning," unpublished paper, Russell Sage, New York.

¹⁶ Deutscher, I., "Attitudes and Actions," in *Social Problems*, Vol. 13, 1966, pp. 235-254.

naire studies of American youth have produced any reliable information on youth cultures. On the contrary, what we know about these methods and about youth must lead us to believe that the results of such studies are primarily an artifact of the methods themselves and that the findings, *even* if they were highly reliable, bear little relationship to what people do in everyday life. This does not mean that questionnaire and interview techniques are useless in studying youth cultures. As a general rule, it seems highly reasonable to expect that the more "factual" the nature of the information sought by these techniques, the more valid and reliable the information can be made by careful validation studies—which thus far have almost never been attempted. (Most studies such as the Coleman report simply do not even ask the question of whether the respondents are giving "truthful" responses. The Pollyanna approach to truth in an age of suspicion, an age in which youth has developed the fine art of the "put-on," hardly seems justified.) Questionnaires can, then, be used to get at factual material if the research is done carefully and with validation. Interviews can be used even more extensively, but they are reliable only when the interviewer already knows a great deal about the subculture through some form of participant observation, enough, certainly, to know when he is being "managed" (or "worked" or "conned"), and when he is being trusted and accepted by the members of the subculture. Unfortunately, very few parts of the numerous questionnaire and interview studies of youth cultures meet these standards to any significant degree.

Participant Observation Studies of Youth Cultures. As should already be apparent, some form of participant observation seems to be the only way of meeting these criteria to yield reliable and valid information. While the positivistically inclined methodologists may be correct in arguing that such involvement always poses problems of objectivity (and certainly I believe there are always such problems, both for the immediately involved and the mediately involved, for at some level one is always involved), it is of crucial importance to see that such participation is *necessary* before one can see *what* is going on: if the researcher does not participate in the everyday lives of the members, then he may remain very objective but either have nothing to be objective about, or delude himself into believing that his objectively-arrived-at information (i.e., questionnaire responses) validly represents private attitudes and actual behavior.

There are, of course, many forms of participant observation and, unfortunately, few attempts have been made to determine how these various forms might affect what is observed. We shall consider the outsider, commonsense forms of (minimal) participant observation below; but here we are, specifically, concerned with the more formalized, controlled form of participant observation (The Chicago Type)

in which the social scientist defines himself for the members as a social scientist doing a study of them, establishes trust, and seeks to become accepted so that his presence becomes as unobtrusive as possible.¹⁷

A great number of participant observation studies of The Chicago Type have been carried out by sociologists over the last five decades, but only a few of these have been concerned with youth cultures and education. This great paucity of participant observation studies of youth has probably been due to the same reason for the general paucity of participant observation studies of deviant and criminal groups:¹⁸ social scientists have generally been highly reluctant to do, if not incapable of doing, such studies of groups which are very different from the groups of which they are normally members.

While there are a few essay reports on such studies and a number of new studies now underway,¹⁹ the study by Becker, Geer, and Hughes of Kansas students is the only major study that meets the generally accepted criteria of participant observer studies. While the first of three planned volumes reporting this study provides some important information concerning the *perspectives* of college students on their education, it has very little to say about the perspectives of students on work and leisure, especially after college. This was simply not a subject of significant concern to the authors. Consequently, the two additional volumes now planned do not include these areas as topics to be covered.

Worse than this, as these authors themselves would be the first to emphasize, it will not be possible for a long time to accumulate enough case studies of this sort to determine how representative this study, or any such study, is. It is quite apparent that there are great differences between the student cultures of different junior colleges, liberal arts colleges, technical colleges, State colleges, and universities throughout this complex society. There is no *prima facie* reason to expect that any one will be representative of all the others. At best, we could expect that several intensive studies of this sort could tell us a great deal about one or a few important types of institutions and would give us an immensely clearer idea of the range of similarities and differences, thereby enabling us to far better understand the dimensions of the problems and to far better plan an attack on them.

Even were such a concerted research effort to be started immediately, it would take several years for it to produce the needed in-

¹⁷ See Becker, H., and Geer, B., "Participant Observation and Interviewing," *Human Organization*, XVI (Fall, 1957), pp. 28-32.

¹⁸ See the section on participant observation in Douglas, J., "Deviance in a Pluralistic Society," *op. cit.*

¹⁹ It should be noted that Hollingshead used a combined interview and observational method in researching *Elmtown's Youth* (New York: Wiley, 1949).

formation. In the meantime our society is changing at an ever greater pace and the meanings of education and work to youth are becoming evermore important. It is certainly essential to make do with the best information we have in establishing interim policies.

Outsider Observations and the Bits-and-Pieces Strategy. The great paucity of good evidence on youth cultures has not, of course, deterred social scientists from proposing various, and sometimes extreme, theories of youth cultures (or the lack of them). Works such as Edgar Friedenberg's *The Vanishing Adolescent*,²⁰ Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd*,²¹ James Coleman's *The Adolescent Society*, and Ernest Smith's *American Youth Culture*²² are fairly representative. The Coleman book, as we have already seen, makes almost exclusive use of questionnaire responses. The other three, while sometimes using such evidence as this, are primarily very general analyses of American youth confronted with the educational and work-a-day worlds. All of them make use of roughly the same kind of evidence.

First of all, each author makes very extensive use of his common-sense, everyday experience as a member of the society. We have all been students, we have generally had children in school, we follow the news about schools; most social scientists have certainly been teachers in a number of different schools.

As students and, more generally, as adolescents, we did all have a great deal of participation with other students and adolescents. Unfortunately, this is the kind of total participation that seems to make the problem of maintaining objectivity insuperable. In addition, all of us had very limited experience from a few perspectives, yet, I would suggest, even this limited experience normally shows a great deal of variability—one individual moving to different schools and communities can find his experiences varying greatly, which would indicate considerable variation in the social groups.

More normally, social scientists have made use of bits and pieces of information which they have gathered from various outsider experiences. Being teachers, they are in constant contact with various segments of the youth groups. This observation post, which might be viewed either as the crow's nest or the ramparts, does certainly afford the social scientist a general view of many apparent facts—the rapid increases in number of students, the increases in various forms of politically active groups, and so on. But there is still always the problem of representativeness and, far more importantly, there is the great problem of determining what the meanings of such things are for the students and, then, using these imputed meanings as crucial variables, interpreting the present and future significance of

²⁰ Friedenberg, E., *The Vanishing Adolescent*, Boston: Beacon, 1959.

²¹ Goodman, P., *Growing Up Absurd*, New York: Random House, 1960.

²² Smith, E. A., *American Youth Culture*, New York: Free Press, 1962.

such apparent facts. In doing this, these outside observers have little advantage, if any, over other outside observers, such as journalists. For one thing, while teachers have much more interaction with students than most other outside observers do, it seems reasonably apparent that students carefully manage their self-presentations to teachers and that they tend to drift toward professors whose views of things are roughly similar to their own, thereby further decreasing the representativeness of what the teacher observes.

These disadvantages of the teachers' observation point, however, seem to have escaped most of the writers on youth and education. Structural-functional sociologists, such as Parsons²³ and Smith,²⁴ and social critics, such as Friedenberg and Goodman, seem equally convinced that they have gotten at the truth about youth and education. The fact that their various theories are generally in great conflict with one another seems not to deter them from their assumptions that they unproblematically understand youth and the implications of this understanding for the present and future of American society. Indeed, in the extreme cases of these two nonelected "spokesmen" for youth, we get an insistence on the necessary truth of the totally personalistic view. Friedenberg even insists on a solipsistic point of view and exults in his romanticism about youth:

The Vanishing Adolescent is, among other things, a love story. . . I knew, of course, how I felt, and still feel, about adolescents. But I did not know how specialized and solipsistic my awareness of them had become. I do not myself believe that one can learn anything important about anything except by loving—or possibly hating—it: without strong feeling there is simply not enough empathy available to transcend the barrier between one's own existential state and any other. But this is only one kind of knowledge, and in the age of science not a kind that is held in much esteem; we call it subjective and dismiss it as useless for purposes of external manipulation and control. . . I regard them as I do love and death, which are not problems, though they leave problems in their wake. Adolescents both comfort and terrify me by their very nature and existence. . . . Except for the place described in the chapter on "Five Exemplary Boys," I had hardly set foot in a high school . . . I assumed then that the things that were wrong with high schools would be much the same as the things that were wrong with my college, but that they would be worse in high school; especially since I teach people who

²³ Parsons, T., "Youth in the Context of American Society," in Erikson, E., ed., *Youth*, New York: Basic Books, 1963, pp. 93-120.

²⁴ Smith, *op. cit.*

are, or plan to become, high school teachers, and had some idea of what their limitations were.²⁵

Romantic or poetic descriptions, the outpourings of one's innermost feelings, are undoubtedly of expressive value to those who share one's point of view. But they have the unfortunate disadvantage of being on an equal footing with any other romantic outpouring. They can always be disproved—nullified—by counter assertion. Most of us are certainly unwilling to follow Friedenberg down the primrose path of solipsism. We still believe that knowledge must be social, that man, the social animal, must have some basis for agreement about what is true, or else his life is not possible. We are still very much in need of far more objective information on youth.

Conclusion. The simple fact, of course, is that we have little alternative to using the bits and pieces of information which we, both as former members and as outside observers, are able to glean from our experiences with youth. There is so little reliable information on youth that we must to a great extent make do with such information at present. This, however, does not at all mean that we must consider our use of such information and our interpretations based on such use to be unproblematic. Quite to the contrary, the implication of our entire argument concerning the information available on American youth is that we must be very cautious in our analyses of youth and in our policy proposals. We must always take into consideration the likelihood of important errors in such analyses. This consideration in turn provides the greatest rationale for considering various possible paths of development in the relations between youth cultures and the adult world. It gives no support at all to any doctrinaire understandings or "solutions."

²⁵ Friedenberg, E., "Preface to the 1964 Edition," in *The Vanishing Adolescent*, New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1964, p. 10.

Appendix II. Chronology of Events at Berkeley

September 1964—June 1969*

September 4, 1964. A picket was launched against the Oakland Tribune.

September 10, 1964. A letter written by a former student and distributed on campus called for an "open, fierce, and thoroughgoing rebellion" on campus.

September 16, 1964. Leaders of all student organizations received a letter from Dean of Students Katherine A. Towle which announced that beginning September 21, tables would no longer be permitted in the 26-foot-strip of University property at the Bancroft and Telegraph entrance, and that "advocative" literature and activities concerned with off-campus political issues would be forbidden. The reasons given: interference with traffic, and misuse of the area.

Arthur Goldberg, former chairman of Slate, announced that lawyers would meet the next day to decide possible action on behalf of interested groups.

September 17, 1964. The University clubs formed a United Front, which included groups of many political persuasions, from Youth for Goldwater to radical and socialist groups. Representatives of the Front met with Dean Towle and asked for:

1. advocacy of any political viewpoint and action, or to be able to distribute advocative literature in the banned area; and
2. permission to distribute literature from tables, and to attract students by means of posters.

Concessions were made by the representatives, who offered:

1. to make a traffic flow survey;
2. to police for violations of university rules regarding the placement of posters on university property; and
3. to forgo collection of money in the area.

Dean Towle refused the student requests.

September 18, 1964. Student representatives petitioned Dean Towle for the use of the Bancroft area under the following conditions:

1. Tables for student organizations would be manned at all times.
2. No University tables and chairs be borrowed.
3. There would be one table only in front of each pillar and on

* Appendices II-VII were compiled by my research assistant, Carol Warren.

each side of the entrance way; none would be placed in front of the entrance posts.

4. No posters would be attached to posts or pillars, but to tables only.

5. The students would be responsible for the enforcement of the above.

6. The tables would be used to distribute advocative literature, but the organizations would not use the University name.

7. Donations would be accepted at the tables.

September 21, 1964. The administration announced a free speech area, on an experimental basis, at the entrance to Sproul Hall. The students refused to accept this, and approximately 75 students held an all night vigil on Sproul Hall steps.

September 22, 1964. The ASUC Senate requested the Regents to accede to the original student requests, by a vote of 11-5.

September 23, 1964. Chancellor Strong issued a statement declaring that advocative activities had no place on campus. A Free Speech Vigil was held. The participants then marched to University House, left a letter of appeal, and returned to the Vigil.

September 25, 1964. Chancellor Strong condemned the demonstrators.

September 28, 1964. Chancellor Strong announced a concession: campaign literature advocating "yes" and "no" votes, campaign buttons, and bumper strips could be distributed in the Bancroft area and in eight other locations.

The United Front picketed Strong.

September 29, 1964. Several tables were set up in the Bancroft area and in front of Sather Gate; most did not have the required University permit. Hourly violations checks began.

September 30, 1964. The hourly checks continued; five students were cited for violating the new rules, and were asked to appear at 3 p.m. before the Deans. At that time, about 500 students sat and stood outside the office of the Dean of Students; Mario Savio presented a petition signed by more than 500 students which demanded that:

1. all signers be treated the same as the five cited students; and
 2. all charges be dropped until the University clarifies its policy.
- Dean Williams refused to make any concessions, and Mario Savio, the spokesman for the group, announced that they would remain in Sproul Hall throughout the night. Three more students were cited, including Savio. At midnight, Chancellor Strong announced indefinite suspension for the eight cited students. The Free Speech Movement—FSM—was named that night. Savio announced the three points of future protest action:

1. a fight for the dropping of the suspensions;
2. a continuation of the fight for the free speech areas; and
3. the stipulation that no disciplinary action be taken against any students participating in further demonstrations.

October 1, 1964. The first Sproul Hall sit-in ended early in the morning, and another was planned for noon. Students set up tables on Sproul Hall steps. Police arrested Jack Weinberg, a nonstudent, for soliciting funds from a CORE table. He was carried into a police car, which was immediately surrounded by students—lying, sitting, and standing. By noon, several thousand students were crowded around the car, which did not move for another thirty-two hours. During these hours, many people spoke from the car top—including Mario Savio and Professor Lipset—for and against the demonstrators. Savio and Powell, the ASUC president, attempted to negotiate the release of Weinberg and amnesty for the eight suspended students, but Chancellor Strong refused. In the afternoon, about 150 students held a sit-in outside the Dean of Students' office in Sproul Hall, which was discontinued about four hours later. Later that night, the demonstrators clashed with a few hundred antidemonstrators, who were, apparently, fraternity men.

October 2, 1964. Demonstrations around the police car, and speeches from its top, continued throughout the day. Several hundred policemen were called in to surround the demonstrators. As they arrived, protesters and onlookers swelled the crowd to more than 7,000. A meeting between faculty, administrators, and protest and student representatives was held, and at 7:30 p.m. Mario Savio read the resulting agreement:

1. The student demonstrators would desist from all forms of illegal protest.
2. A committee representing students—including demonstration leaders—faculty, and administration would be set up to discuss on-campus political behavior.
3. Jack Weinberg would be booked and given bail, and the University would not press charges.
4. The duration of the suspension of the eight students would be submitted within one week to the Student Conduct Committee of the Academic Senate.
5. Activity might be continued by student organizations in accordance with existing University regulations.
6. The President was willing to consider deeding the Bancroft Strip to the ASUC or the city of Berkeley. The police left the area, and the demonstrators dispersed.

October 3-4, 1964. The Free Speech Movement was formed out of the United Front, with a twelve-man steering committee.

October 4, 1964. Chancellor Strong's office issued a statement:

1. The names of the eight suspended students would be sent, on October 5, to the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct.
2. The members of the tripartite committee would be appointed on October 5.
3. The University had not pressed charges against Weinberg.

October 5, 1964. Protesters held a victory rally at noon on Sproul Hall steps. The rally was technically illegal, but was permitted under a "special waiver." The students began to collect funds to pay for the \$334.30 damage to the police car. The cases of the suspended students were passed to the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct, since it had been discovered that the committee named in the October 2 agreement did not exist. The tripartite committee membership was announced, and included:

- four faculty appointed by the administration;
- four administrators appointed by the administration;
- two students appointed by the administration; and
- two students appointed by the students.

October 6, 1964. The FSM Steering Committee met with Vice Chancellor Searcy to protest the unilateral appointments.

October 7, 1964. The tripartite Committee on Campus Political Activity held its first meeting, and ten FSM spokesmen declared it illegally constituted, requesting dissolution. The Committee did not disband.

October 8, 1964. President Clark Kerr announced that:

1. The misnomer of the faculty committee was a mistake in good faith.
2. The tripartite committee had to be appointed by the administration.

October 12, 1964. The FSM Steering Committee met with Chancellor Strong, and called for the suspension of the Study Committee. Chancellor Strong said that he would discuss its suspension with the Study Committee itself.

October 15, 1964. A new agreement was reached among the FSM, the Regents, the administration, and the Study Committee.

1. The Study Committee was expanded from 12 to 18 members.
 - a. The two new faculty members would be nominated by the Academic Senate, the two new administrators by the President, and the two students by the Steering Committee.
 - b. Recommendations were to be made by consensus.
 - c. No more than five silent observers and two silent attorneys were to be present at each meeting.
 - d. The committee would hold two or three meetings a week,

and would be terminated within three weeks.

2. The Academic Senate was asked to appoint an ad hoc committee on the eight suspended students which was to be advisory to the administration.

October 25, 1964. The ad hoc Academic Senate Committee (known as the Heyman Committee) recommended that the eight suspended students be reinstated during the course of the committee's hearings.

October 26, 1964. Chancellor Strong refused the Heyman Committee's recommendation.

The FSM Steering Committee demanded:

1. freedom to advocate off-campus political and social action;
2. freedom to recruit for off-campus political organizations;
3. freedom to solicit funds for off-campus political causes; and
4. freedom from "72 hour rules"; the mandatory presence at meetings of tenured faculty moderators and police.

November 7, 1964. The CCPA reached an impasse on the question of University discipline of students and organizations engaging in activities that "directly result" in "unlawful acts" off campus.

November 9, 1964. Because of the CCPA's lack of action, the FSM stated that it was lifting "its self-imposed moratorium on political activity," and held a rally on Sproul Hall steps at noon.

FSM and eight off-campus organizations set up tables on the steps of Sproul Hall, with donation cups and sign-up sheets. About 75 persons had their names taken, and each table offered a petition which stated: "We were at the tables and support those who were manning them."

Speakers addressed the rally, which consisted of about 200—with 400 onlookers.

Kerr and Strong announced that, as a result of the rally, the CCPA was dissolved.

November 10, 1964. Graduate students and TAs continued the table-manning. No official notice was taken of the violations.

November 12, 1964. President Kerr released the report of the disbanded Committee on Campus Political Activity, which recommended:

1. liberalization of the University rules regarding on-campus political activity;
2. availability of rooms for meetings of off-campus groups; and
3. discontinuance of the use of the area near Sproul Hall as a free speech area.

November 13, 1964. The Academic Senate Ad Hoc Committee recommended that six of the eight students be reinstated, and that Savio

and Art Goldberg be given six-week suspensions, to end November 16.

November 16, 1964. Tables were set up on the steps of Sproul Hall. The FSM began the circulation of a petition which disagreed with point 3 of the CCPA's statement. The petition upheld the position that only courts of law have the power to judge whether the content of speech is an abuse of the constitutional right of free speech.

November 17, 1964. Tables were again set up on Sproul Hall steps, and no attempt was made to remove them.

November 20, 1964. A mass rally, with speeches and singing by Joan Baez, was attended by about 3,000 on Sproul Hall steps. Most of those in attendance then marched to University Hall, where they sat quietly while the Regents met.

For violation of rules subsequent to September 30, 1964, Goldberg and Savio were placed on probation for the rest of the semester, and the other six students received suspensions from September 20 to date. No specific procedure on discipline for advocacy of "unlawful off-campus action" was passed.

November 23, 1964. The FSM held a mass rally at noon, followed by a three-hour sit-in at Sproul Hall.

November 24, 1964. Chancellor Strong announced new rules for campus political activity:

1. Authorized students were permitted, in designated areas, to distribute material and accept donations and membership signups.
2. The administration of the new arrangements was delegated experimentally to the ASUC president.
3. Permits must be obtained from the ASUC.
4. Tables must be manned at all times.
5. The organizations should provide their own tables and chairs.
6. Organizers must not use the name of the University.
7. Posters should not be attached to pillars; other regulations were stated governing poster and table placement.
8. Nonstudents were not included in these regulations.

November 28, 1964. Letters arrived at the residences of Savio and Goldberg, requiring them to attend a hearing of the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct.

November 30, 1964. Chancellor Strong rejected demands that the new charges against Savio or Goldberg be dropped.

December 1, 1964. The FSM issued an ultimatum:

1. Disciplinary action against FSM leaders should be dropped.
2. Only the courts should regulate free speech.
3. The Administration should refrain from further disciplining of students and organizations for political activity.

December 2, 1964. A mass rally was held, followed by a sit-in of about 1,000 in Sproul Hall. At 7:00 p.m. police locked the doors, allowing no one to enter. University Young Republicans formally withdrew from the FSM.

December 3, 1964. Early in the morning, over 600 police assembled outside the building. At 3:45 a.m., police began the arrests, which terminated only after 12 hours. Any demonstrator was free to leave before he was arrested. All demonstrators were taken into custody, and released by December 4. A general faculty meeting was held, and a resolution passed which supported the liberalized campus rules, and the dropping of actions against students.

Pickets announced a student/faculty strike.

December 4, 1964. A rally attended by about 5,000 was held at noon. The strike continued.

December 7, 1964. Seven hundred eighty-six arrested demonstrators appeared for arraignment in court, which was postponed until December 14. At 11:00 a.m., 16,000 students, faculty, and staff attended a scheduled convocation at the Greek Theater. President Kerr announced:

1. The University community would abide by the liberal political action rules.
2. For offenses committed on December 2 and 3, the University would accept the court's punishment as final.

After a scuffle to reach the microphone, Savio announced a noon rally to the assembly. About 10,000 persons attended the noon rally, and rejected Kerr's proposals. The FSM announced that the strike would end at midnight.

December 8, 1964. The Academic Senate met, and their proceedings were relayed outside to the waiting crowd. They resolved:

1. that no disciplinary proceedings should be taken for activities prior to December 8;
2. that the liberalization of political activity rules be continued pending the report of the Committee on Academic Freedom; and
3. that the content of speech or advocacy should not be the responsibility of the Academic Senate.

The crowd cheered; later Kerr announced "no comment."

December 9, 1964. The Union of University-Employed Graduate Students was formed, to affiliate TAs with the labor movement. A victory rally was held in Sproul Hall Plaza.

December 14, 1964. Arraignment of most of the arrested students, scheduled for today, was moved to January 5.

December 15, 1964. A noon rally was held on city property.

December 18, 1964. The University Board of Regents refused to ac-

cept the Academic Senate's solution to the free speech controversy, affirming that disciplinary powers must ultimately rest with the administration, not the faculty.

January 2, 1965. Martin Meyerson was named Acting Chancellor at Berkeley, replacing Chancellor Strong, who was given a "leave of absence."

January 3, 1965. Meyerson announced:

1. an open discussion area;
2. areas at which tables might be set up, to attract support; that donations, recruiting, posters, and other activities were to be allowed; and
3. that notification for off-campus speakers was to be 48 hours.

January 4, 1965. The FSM held its first legal rally on Sproul Hall steps at noon.

March 3, 1965. John Thompson, a nonstudent, stationed himself on the steps of the student union, holding a placard saying "*!*" ; he was arrested.

March 4, 1965. Speakers from the same steps protested his arrest; many used the same word and nine were arrested—of whom three were students.

March 9, 1965. Kerr and Meyerson announced their resignations, and then retracted them.

May 7, 1965. The Byrne Commission Report indicted the Regents.

July 26, 1965. Mario Savio was sentenced to 120 days in jail for his role in the December 1964 sit-in. Kerr announced that Roger Heyn would be the new Chancellor as of October 1.

October 15, 1965. The Vietnam Day Committee staged an all-day antiwar rally attended by about 3,000. A torchlit parade to Oakland army base was halted by police, and 150 slept in front of City Hall.

October 16, 1965. Three thousand attempted another march to the base, and were stopped by police.

November 3, 1965. Several students were arrested during a demonstration.

November 8, 1965. Mario Savio was denied readmission to Berkeley.

November 20, 1965. Approximately 8,000 persons marched to Oakland in a demonstration organized by the WDC; later, an authorized rally was held.

November 30, 1965. A sit-in was held in the basement of the Students' Union after the administration refused to allow nonstudents to set up an antiwar table on campus. After the demonstrators re-

fused to move, police were called with warrants for the arrest of several nonstudents, including Mario Savio.

December 1, 1965. An Ad Hoc Strike Committee called for a student strike, and demanded:

1. a rule change to allow nonstudents to set up tables;
2. an administrative pledge not to call in outside police to deal with campus problems;
3. a pledge not to discipline the November 3 demonstrators; and
4. a promise to seek dismissal of charges for those arrested during the current demonstrations.

December 2, 1965. Chancellor Heyns announced that he would not accede to these demands, or meet with any group which included nonstudents.

December 5, 1965. The faculty voted to support Heyns.

December 1-6, 1965. About 3,000 students participated in the strike.

December 6, 1965. The student senate voted to end the strike. The Board of Regents passed a resolution:

1. supporting disciplinary action for any student advocating renewal of the strike; and
2. authorizing amnesty for student violations of the rules during the strike.

January 21, 1967. Mario Savio and four others (nonstudents) were convicted for their part in the sit-in.

June 28-30, 1968. During violent demonstrations to show "solidarity" with French students, 12 persons were arrested and 30 injured.

August 30-31, 1968. Demonstrations took place against:

1. U.S. policy in Vietnam; and
2. Chicago police tactics during the Democratic Convention.

October 14, 1968. A campus demonstration in support of the California grape boycott resulted in 11 arrests.

October 23-24, 1968. Two sit-ins were held as a protest over the non-credit status of Eldridge Cleaver's course. About 200 students were arrested.

January 22, 1969. A strike was called to demand a "relevant" ethnic studies program.

February 4, 1969. Twenty arrests occurred as a result of clashes between police and striking students of the Third World Liberation Front.

February 5, 1969. Governor Reagan declared a state of emergency at Berkeley.

February 17, 1969. Police called to "supervise" a picket line of students and TAs were attacked by missiles.

April 20, 1969. Work began on People's Park. Five hundred students, faculty members, and "hippies" planted trees and flowers in the derelict area, which belonged to the University.

May 15, 1969. Police removed a group from the park, and work began on a fence ordered by Heyns.

About 2,000 persons demonstrated near campus; a battle with police and the National Guard ensued, during which 20 were arrested and 70 were injured. A rally was held in Sproul Hall plaza; the participants went to take over the park, and were met by police, who used tear gas and birdshot-loaded shotguns. Reagan ordered out the National Guard, outlawed assemblies and parades, and set a curfew.

May 16-18, 1969. Protests and arrests continued.

May 19, 1969. James Rector, a nonstudent injured by birdshot on May 15, died of his wounds. The disclosure that Rector had died led to renewed violence. About 2,000 demonstrators led a silent funeral march. A group of 5,000 advanced on Heyns' house yelling "Murderer!", and were dispersed by police using tear gas.

May 21, 1969. The faculty voted for a nonbinding boycott of classes as long as the National Guard remained on campus.

May 22, 1969. A march through downtown Berkeley was attempted, and over 500 persons were arrested.

May 23, 1969. The Academic Senate voted:

1. to request an investigation of "police lawlessness" on campus;
2. to reject a resolution calling for Heyns' resignation; and
3. to support the continuing development of People's Park.

Eighty-five percent of those students who voted in a referendum also supported the continuing use of People's Park.

May 24, 1969. Most National Guard troops were removed from campus. Reagan lifted the restrictions against parades and assemblies, and declared the state of emergency (which had been in force since February 5) ended.

Appendix III. Chronology of Events at Columbia

May 1965—June 1969

May 7, 1965. About 200 students participated in a protest against the Vietnam war.

April 9, 1966. The first high school gathering to protest the war in Vietnam took place on the Columbia University campus. The day-long meeting, organized by the New York Committee of Students for Peace in Vietnam, was attended by 175 junior and senior high school students.

May 14, 1966. A few students picketed against the draft-deferment test.

March 3, 1967. About 200 members of the faculty and staff of the Teachers' College sent a letter to President Johnson urging the de-escalation of the war and a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. They further urged that he accept the participation of the Viet Cong in peace negotiations.

April 3, 1967. The ranking of students was abolished; the University Council announced that undergraduates' class standing would be withheld from local draft boards.

June 5, 1967. More than 5,000 students, teachers, and administrators submitted a petition to the President which demanded an end to the bombings of North Vietnam, and a de-escalation of the war.

October 20, 1967. About 330 students marched to President Grayson Kirk's office to demand:

1. an end to on-campus recruiting by the CIA and the Armed Forces;
2. a halt to Columbia's "complicity with the war in Vietnam."

The latter statement referred to Kirk's attendance at a meeting of the Institute for Defense Analysis in Washington, where, the students alleged, he was "thinking up ways for making better napalm."

When Kirk returned to the campus, he stated that he knew nothing about napalm, but he conceded that Columbia performed "a good deal of testing and evaluating of all kinds of problems" for the Defense Department.

November 21, 1967. President Kirk announced suspension of on-campus recruiting until the Federal Government provided assurance

that students who interfered with recruitment would not lose their draft deferment. About 150 members of the faculty had recommended this action.

April 23-30, 1968. A group of Negro and left-wing students seized and occupied five University buildings in protest against:

1. the construction of a University gymnasium in city-owned Morningside Park; they charged that this was a racist project;
2. the University's ties with the Institute for Defense Analysis which they felt aided the Vietnam war effort.

Mark Rudd, leader of SDS's campus chapter, led about 150 persons to Low Memorial Library. They were barred from the library by guards, so they marched to the site of the new gym, and tore down a section of fence. Then they marched to Hamilton Hall, and held Acting Dean Henry Coleman and two other officials as prisoners for more than 24 hours. On the orders of the Negro students—representing the Students' Afro-American Society—the white students left Hamilton, led by Mark Rudd, on April 24, and marched to the Low Library. There they occupied and ransacked Dr. Kirk's office.

April 24, 1968. The students at Hamilton Hall released Coleman, but refused to meet officials without a guarantee of amnesty.

About 200 protesters demonstrated around the library in the evening, and city police established a command post on the campus.

An emergency faculty meeting recommended that the University halt its construction of the gym but continue its affiliation with IDA. The committee voted against amnesty, and recommended a student-faculty-administration disciplinary committee (henceforward referred to as "The Tripartite Committee").

April 25, 1968. About 100 white students seized Fayerweather Hall, and another 100 whites seized Avery Hall. About 200 students picketed outside Low Library in support of the protesters, and about 350 students opposing the demonstrators met in the school gym. Dr. Kirk rejected the students' demands for amnesty.

April 26, 1968. A fifth building, the mathematics building, was seized by students. This brought the number of occupying students to about 700.

All classes were cancelled, and the campus was sealed off after about 250 Negro high school students invaded the campus, shouting "black power."

H. Rap Brown met with the Hamilton Hall students, and spoke in support of their objectives.

The Majority Coalition, a group of students opposed to the demonstrators, began a blockade of Low Library.

H. Rap Brown and Stokeley Carmichael entered campus.

April 27, 1968. A rally of antiwar demonstrators was held near campus.

The University Board of Trustees denounced the protesting students, and rejected the idea of amnesty.

April 28, 1968. Faculty members voted 466-40 in condemnation of the occupation. An ad hoc faculty committee recommended:

1. A tripartite committee with alternate judicial powers on all disciplinary matters.
2. The revision of University statutes dealing with disciplinary matters.
3. The adoption of "a new approach of collective responsibility."
4. Uniform penalties for violators.
5. Suspension of work at the gym site and the evacuation of the occupied buildings.

April 29, 1968. The Majority Coalition clashed with protest supporters who were supplying survival items to the demonstrators. Faculty members restored order. Kirk proposed a peace plan which embodied the "spirit" of the faculty recommendations.

April 30, 1968. One thousand city police, armed with night sticks began clearing the occupied buildings at 2:30 a.m. One hundred forty-eight persons were injured, and 707 arrested, including two faculty members and 181 nonstudents.

A student strike was announced by the president of the Student Council, who called for the resignation of Kirk and Truman.

May 1, 1968. A student rally was held, during which police and students fought. Five policemen and six students were injured. Most classes were suspended on campus.

May 2, 1968. Police were withdrawn from the campus. The Strike Coordinating Committee announced that 4,000-5,000 students had joined the strike. They demanded:

1. a recognition of the "right of students to participate in the restructuring of the University."
2. amnesty for protesters as a precondition for negotiations.

May 5, 1968. The faculty of Columbia College voted to end formal classes and cancel final examinations. The faculty investigating committee appointed a five-member commission to investigate the disorders.

May 6, 1968. The suspended classes reopened, but were boycotted by many students.

May 8, 1968. The commission issued a statement:

1. The restructuring of the University was under consideration.
2. Some of the student strikers were seeking only to escalate conflict.

Kirk announced that the gym decision would be postponed until negotiations with community representatives were underway, and that "important actions" had been taken to meet the strikers' demands.

May 11, 1968. Mark Rudd announced that the strike committee would meet with the Board of Trustees.

The Associated Press reported that Rudd had made a statement, in October 1967, about the planned radicalization of the campus in 1968.

Kirk denounced the New York State Senate's vote to bar educational funds to any student convicted of a crime committed on campus premises.

May 12, 1968. The faculty appointed a 12-member investigating committee. The Board of Trustees appointed a committee to recommend changes in the structure of the University, and announced that "negotiations with community leaders shall be held" before a decision is made on the continuation of the gym's construction.

May 13, 1968. The first meeting of the commission was held, and several of the striking students walked out.

May 17, 1968. The Community Action Committee conducted a sit-in, which was supported by about 1,000 students, inside a Columbia-owned apartment building.

May 18, 1968. Police cleared the apartment building; 117 persons were arrested, including 56 Columbia students.

May 21, 1968. Students invaded a campus hall in protest against the suspension of four radical students. One hundred thirty-eight students were arrested and 56 suspended.

May 22, 1968. Police quietly cleared the building, but violence erupted as they cleared the campus.

May 28, 1968. Irving Dekoff was appointed to the new post of director of student interests.

June 4, 1968. The IDA announced that it would cut official ties to 12 colleges, including Columbia.

Richard Hofstadter spoke at Commencement, and 300 students and 15 faculty walked out to attend a counter-commencement, attended by 2,000, at the Low Library.

July 3, 1968. The Ford Foundation announced a grant of \$100,500 to three committees studying reorganization of the University, one of which was a student committee—Students for a Restructured University—which received \$10,000. SRU reported receiving other grants from the New York and Taconic Foundations, and a private trust.

August 23, 1968. Kirk announced his retirement, and was succeeded by Andrew W. Cordier as acting president.

September 9, 1968. The University announced that it had asked the courts to drop criminal trespass charges against 400 of the students arrested during the spring happenings.

September 11, 1968. Forty-two of the students suspended during the second occupation were reinstated. Some more serious offenders, including Mark Rudd, remained suspended.

September 18, 1968. A demonstration by 150 students briefly halted registration.

September 19, 1968. Cordier attended a rally in support of SDS; on the same day he rescinded a University decision banning an SDS meeting.

October 9-15, 1968. Eighty-two criminal trespass cases were dropped by the court.

December 18, 1968. The five-member Columbia College disciplinary tribunal suspended disciplinary probation for 60 students.

January 10, 1969. Twelve students filed suit in the New York State Supreme Court demanding that the University's trustees be dismissed for failing to produce a state of "tranquility" on campus.

February 7, 1969. A tripartite committee recommended that punishment be waived for 367 students, and that the 16 suspended students be readmitted.

February 11, 1969. Cordier endorsed the recommendation.

February 20, 1969. The one student who applied for readmission was reinstated.

March 3, 1969. The Board of Trustees voted to discontinue the gym project.

March 4, 1969. A work-stoppage of scientific personnel was held to protest government "misuse of science" in defense-oriented projects.

March 25, 1969. SDS staged a peaceful one-day strike. They termed it the "first blow" of a spring protest offensive. They demanded abolition of the ROTC program, an end to military research and recruiting on campus, and the reopening of 197 Columbia-owned apartments to the public.

April 14, 1969. Twenty black students of the Student Afro-American Society (SAS) occupied the Columbia College Admissions Office in Hamilton Hall. They charged that the University was oppressive and racist in its relations with blacks, and demanded a special black-run admissions board for black students.

Two hundred students, mobilized by SDS, marched across campus to demand open admission for "all black, brown and white working class seniors" from four neighboring high schools, and freedom for 21

Black Panthers indicted April 2 on a bomb plot charge in New York.

April 16, 1969. The black students vacated the building, having been notified that a court restraining order would be served.

April 17, 1969. Cordier issued a policy statement which affirmed his commitment to a black studies program, and pledged the University to increasing the enrollment of black and brown students.

Two hundred SDS supporters occupied the Philosophy Hall in opposition to "ROTC, war research and racism." A scuffle occurred with anti-SDS students. The protesters left the building as officials attempted to serve a court restraining order.

April 19, 1969. Thirty-two members of a breakaway radical faction of SDS—The Expansion Committee—occupied the same building, but left after six hours, saying they lacked campus and community support.

April 20-21, 1969. About 150 high school students were brought to the campus by SDS in support of the open admissions policy, and held a brief sit-in on April 21.

April 22-23, 1969. SDS staged a "mass evacuation" in support of its demands.

April 24, 1969. An SDS majority dissolved the Expansion Committee.

April 30, 1969. One hundred sixty SDS members seized Mathematics and Fayerweather Halls. Eight professors and a graduate student remained in Fayerweather Hall for a counter sit-in.

May 1, 1969. The SDS group left the building after warrants for their arrests were issued (on contempt of court charges for refusing to obey earlier court orders).

May 2, 1969. Five SDS leaders surrendered to law officers after State Supreme Court Justice Charles Marks had ordered the arrest of any person who could be identified as having participated in the seizures.

May 8, 1969. A University spokesman said that Columbia's master planner, I. M. Pei, had presented a proposal for expansion of facilities within the present campus boundaries.

May 13, 1969. The University trustees voted to abolish the Naval ROTC program by June 1971.

The trustees approved the creation of a senate, including student representatives, to cooperate with the trustees in setting University policies.

Appendix IV. Chronology of Events at San Francisco State College

December 1967—March 1969

December 6, 1967. Members of the Black Student Union, angered at "racist implications" in the college newspaper, marched to the administration building and broke in. One faculty member—John Gerassi, author of *The Boys of Boise*—joined in the attack. While the trustees called the police to restore order, President Summerskill closed the campus. S. I. Hayakawa summoned the police, who occupied the lobby of the building. Later, about 400 strikers and 3,000 other students disrupted classes and pelted the police with missiles. The crowd dispersed by 3:00 p.m.

December 9, 1967. At a special session, the trustees of the California State Colleges decided to penalize students and employees who disrupt classes.

December 10, 1967. An investigating committee tentatively endorsed Summerskill's handling of the riot.

February 22, 1968. Summerskill announced his resignation, effective September 1.

May 24, 1968. Glenn S. Dumke announced that Summerskill's resignation would become effective immediately.

May 30, 1968. Summerskill was replaced by Robert Smith.

October 24, 1968. George Mason Murray, a black instructor, announced to about 1,000 students that if the administration refused to allow them to run the college, they should do so with a gun. He also stated that they should "kill all slavemasters"—members of boards of education and others.

November 6, 1968. A strike was called by BSU, SDS, and the Third World Liberation Front in response to Murray's dismissal. They announced 15 demands, including:

1. Murray's reinstatement;
2. the establishment of a virtually autonomous black studies department; and
3. the admission of any black student, regardless of his qualifications.

November 13, 1968. Smith closed the college following continued disorders.

November 18, 1968. The State trustees ordered the immediate reopening of the college, and stipulated that there should be no negotiations with the students involved.

November 26, 1968. Smith submitted his resignation because of his inability to resolve the conflict. Hayakawa was named acting president.

December 2, 1968. Supported by San Francisco police, Hayakawa opened classes, but disorders continued, during which about 85 students were arrested.

December 3, 1968. Hayakawa closed the campus for the Christmas vacation one week early. At a news conference, he stated that student government would not be given a role in college disciplinary courts because the officers were rebellious and irresponsible.

December 5, 1968. Police used mace and guns to keep 400 persons away from the administration building.

December 6, 1968. Hayakawa announced that:

1. a black studies program, including 11 teaching positions, would be started immediately;
2. the 128 unused places in a new special admissions program for 426 educationally deprived students were to be filled in the spring;
3. a nonwhite director of student financial aid would be appointed to deal with nonwhite students' problems;
4. suspended students would not be given amnesty; and
5. the police would remain on campus. Student leaders announced that Hayakawa's position was unacceptable and that resistance would continue.

December 9, 1968. A rally was held, which developed into an attempt to break into a classroom building, and fights with police took place. On recommendation of faculty members, Hayakawa temporarily lifted the suspensions of 44 students. But demonstrations continued throughout the week.

December 26, 1968. Hayakawa announced that a 4-year course of studies leading to a degree in Negro studies would begin in January 1969.

January 6, 1969. San Francisco State opened to a strike called by the local chapter of the AFT, which demanded better working conditions and a settlement of the student strike. Hayakawa stated that the strike was a "vicious power grab."

January 7, 1969. Sympathizers from other unions caused the closure of the campus bookstore and cafeteria.

January 8, 1969. Reagan announced that he would cut off the salaries of striking teachers, and a superior court judge signed a temporary restraining order against continuing the strike.

January 6-9, 1969. Scattered confrontations between police and students resulted in about 14 arrests.

January 11, 1969. Many department heads refused to give the names of striking teachers to Hayakawa, who was attempting to dismiss strikers.

January 23, 1969. A rally was held by the Third World Liberation Front in defiance of new campus restrictions on demonstrations. Four-hundred eighty-three arrests ensued as students fought with police who attempted to break up the rally.

February 4, 1969. The teacher strike was banned by a court injunction.

February 6, 1969. Hayakawa announced that he had offered to re-hire, without tenure, 199 of the 208 teachers who had been declared resigned because of nonattendance.

February 16, 1969. The black studies department's opening was postponed to the fall semester by Hayakawa. He also announced that Dr. Nathan Hare, acting head of the proposed department, would have to undergo disciplinary proceedings for his support of the students. He had been arrested twice, on January 23 and February 14.

March 4, 1969. A scientific "research stoppage" was held to protest "government misuse of science in defense-oriented projects."

Appendix V. Chronology of Events At Cornell University

May 1966—May 1969

May 14, 1966. Thirty students picketed against the draft-deferment test. One student was arrested when he pounded on a desk and refused to leave the testing room.

February 14-25, 1967. The Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations was labelled by the *New York Times* as an organization which had received grants from foundations reported to be channelling CIA funds.

October 16, 1967. Approximately 200 students marched to Selective Service Headquarters in Ithaca, New York, and fifteen turned in their draft cards.

November 17, 1967. Nearly 200 antiwar demonstrators attempted to prevent two U.S. Marine captains from recruiting on the campus, and clashed with other students.

April 4, 1968. About 60 of the 150 Negro students at Cornell seized the Economics Department office and held the department chairman captive for six hours in protest against "racist" remarks of another professor, the Reverend Michael McPhelin.

May 1, 1968. An investigative commission reported that faculty, administrators, and students must share the blame, and that the demonstrators should not be severely punished.

December 13, 1968. About 75 Negro students demonstrated in the library and main cafeteria in support of demands which included the establishment of an autonomous college of Afro-American studies. The college would be run by a committee of students who would have total power to hire or fire faculty members, devise courses, and control the budget and admission.

President Perkins said that the proposal was not legally feasible.

January 15, 1969. A commission on the status of the campus ROTC recommended that:

1. the ROTC be deprived of academic standing, and have extra-curricular status; and
2. ROTC instructors should not have professorial status, nor should they be military personnel.

March 4, 1969. Scientists participated in a one-day research stoppage in protest against the "government misuse of science in defense-oriented projects."

April 18, 1969. A cross was burned in front of a Negro co-ed residence.

April 19, 1969. About 100 black students seized the student union, and took over the campus radio station WVBR. Edward L. Whitfield, the president of the Afro-American Society, announced that the black students were protesting against the "racist attitudes" of the University. WVBR student operators cut off transmission from the building, and resumed regular operation elsewhere.

The blacks demanded:

1. an investigation of the cross-burning incident;
2. that disciplinary proceedings against three Negroes involved in the December demonstrations be dropped. (The students had been given reprimands.) About 15 white students attempted a counterinvasion, which was ineffective. Seventeen firearms were brought into the hall following this incident.

April 20, 1969. The students ended their occupation, and 15 armed Negroes stood guard as President Miller signed an amnesty agreement which stated that:

1. the disciplinary reprimands were nullified;
2. the university would not press civil or criminal charges against the demonstrators, and would supply legal assistance if needed;
3. the University would provide 24-hour protection for the Afro-American center and black co-op residences, and begin an investigation into the cross-burning and the counterinvasion attempt; and
4. the University would consider a new campus judicial system, to be devised with the help of black students.

April 21, 1969. The Cornell faculty voted to reject demand No. 1, and approved a resolution condemning the cross-burning.

April 22, 1969. There was an overnight sit-in of 3,000 students in Barton Hall.

April 23, 1969. Some 8,000 white students gathered at Barton Hall in support of the black students. The faculty rescinded its April 21 decision on demand No. 1.

April 24, 1969. Three faculty members announced their resignation in protest against the rescinding. Several others signed a pledge to stop teaching until all armaments on campus were surrendered.

April 27, 1969. President Perkins announced that the black students had assured him that their guns had been removed from the campus.

May 1, 1969. The trustees instructed Perkins to implement a 10-point declaration to ensure that "tactics of terror" on campus would be met by "firm and appropriate response."

May 2, 1969. Eight SDS students invaded a restricted area and painted anti-ROTC slogans on a deck gun.

May 5, 1969. Since Perkins had pressed criminal charges against the SDS students, they were arraigned in court.

Appendix VI. Chronology of Events at the University of Chicago

January—February 1969

January 30, 1969. About 400 students occupied the administration building in protest against the nonrenewal of the teaching contract of Mrs. Marlene Dixon, a New Left faculty member. The chairman of the Sociology Department said that the reasons for such decisions were confidential, but the students alleged that her dismissal was linked with her political views, her sex, and her emphasis on teaching rather than publication.

February 6, 1969. Sixty-one of the protesting students were suspended; they had failed to respond to summonses from the University disciplinary committee. Two students who had appeared before the committee were not punished.

February 8, 1969. Ten men, possibly Minutemen, fought with the students, and three were arrested. A student and a campus policeman were injured.

February 12, 1969. The University offered to renew Mrs. Dixon's contract for one more year, which she declined.

February 14, 1969. The occupation came to an end; throughout, the University had refrained from force or the threat of force. A protest leader stated, "We must admit to ourselves that we lost. There was no campus uproar . . . nor was (sic) there any campus demands for amnesty for the sit-inners" The demonstrators voted to drop their demands for student power in faculty hiring and firing.

Appendix VII. Chronology of Events at Harvard University

January 1966—May 1969

January 16, 1966. Sixteen Harvard professors and others released a statement attacking the use of chemicals to destroy crops in Vietnam.

May 3, 1966. A series of "read-ins for peace in Vietnam" was launched at Harvard.

February 13, 1967. About 500 students demonstrated against the appearance of Arthur Goldberg on the campus.

May 13, 1967. A rally against the war in Vietnam was held on the campus by the New England Regional African and Afro-American Association. About 200 black students from 14 New England colleges participated.

October 25, 1967. About 200 students held a sit-in in front of a conference room used by a Dow recruiter, whose departure was prevented for over seven hours.

October 31, 1967. The University announced that 74 of the demonstrators had been put on probation.

January 16, 1968. The Ad Hoc Committee on Vietnam announced that 51 percent of the Harvard and Radcliffe student body had signed a statement deploring escalation of the Vietnam war. Fifty-four percent of the Harvard faculty in arts and sciences and 722 other students, faculty, and staff had also signed.

December 12, 1968. A sit-in was held against the campus ROTC.

January 14, 1969. The faculty of arts and sciences voted to overrule administrative recommendations to expel five students who had taken part in the December 12 sit-in.

January 21, 1969. A faculty panel recommended the establishment of an Afro-American student program.

February 4, 1969. The faculty voted to deprive the ROTC of academic status.

February 7, 1969. Over 100 black students invaded the first meeting of a class on the control and elimination of slum riots and denounced it as "racist." The course was later cancelled.

April 9, 1969. A noon rally was sponsored by SDS, at which three demands were presented:

1. the abolition of ROTC on campus;
2. the lowering of rents for University-owned apartments; and
3. the curbing of University expansion into poor neighborhoods.

Three hundred militant students seized University Hall, the main administration building. During the take-over, nine deans were forced from their offices. More than 200 students remained through the night.

April 10, 1969. Four hundred State and local police arrived at a dance and cleared the hall in 20 minutes. Sixty-nine Harvard students were arrested. At a campus rally, 1,500 students voted for a three-day student-faculty boycott of classes; these included moderate students opposed to the use of police on campus. SDS added amnesty for the demonstrators to its list of demands.

April 11, 1969. Classroom attendance was reported 20 to 30 percent of normal. The faculty of arts and sciences voted 395-13 to deplore both the occupation and the use of police.

April 14, 1969. Nearly 6,000 students voted, by a narrow margin, to continue the strike for three more days. Members of the black students' association presented a demand that they be given the direction of the Afro-American studies program.

April 15, 1969. The Negro students announced that, since their demands had not been met, they had set up a "free university."

April 17, 1969. By a 385-35 vote, the faculty decided that the University should sever all official connections with ROTC, but that it could remain as an extra-curricular activity.

April 18, 1969. The Harvard Corporation confirmed the faculty's decision. The students voted to suspend the April 10 strike, but SDS and the Afro-American organization decided to continue the boycott until all demands were met.

A district court judge refused to drop the charges, at the University's request, against 173 students who occupied University Hall on April 9.

April 21, 1969. Five hundred students held a "mill-in" at University Hall, shouting "smash ROTC, no expansion."

April 22, 1969. SDS voted to suspend its boycott in favor of "more effective" action.

April 25, 1969. Students voted on the continuation of the boycott.

SDS students invaded the office of Radcliffe's president to protest against Harvard's expansion plans.

April 28, 1969. Students continued to vote on the boycott, and decided against its continuation.


SDS students invaded the office of Radcliffe's president to protest against the probation of 22 girls who participated in the December 1968 sit-in.

April 29, 1969. The trial of the 173 was held, and all but four were found guilty of criminal trespass.

May 6, 1969. The University announced the following housing measures:

1. the construction of units for low- and middle-income families;
2. the availability both to students and community residents of all new Harvard housing projects; and
3. that no residents in areas due to be razed because of expansion would be evicted until comparable-cost housing was found nearby.

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HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
HEALTH SERVICES AND MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH
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5454 Wisconsin Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

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